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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
HISTORY, IDENTITY POLITICS AND SECURITIZATION: RELIGION'S ROLE IN
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDIAN-ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND
FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR COOPERATION
by
Michael Mclean Bender
Florida International University, 2016
Miami, Florida
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor
This dissertation aims to provide an understanding of the historical and
contemporary dynamics of India’s foreign policy towards Israel within the context of
religious identity from 1947 to 2015. A historical analysis of the relationship between
India and Israel exhibits the ways that religious identity has served as a primary factor
impeding as well as facilitating relations between the two nations.
The analysis was done within the context of the historical Hindu-Muslim
relationship in India and how the legacy of this relationship, in India’s effort to maintain
positive relations with the Arab-Muslim world, worked to inhibit relations with Israel
prior to normalization in 1992. However, the five years leading up to normalization, and
thereafter, the dynamic is reversed with this legacy playing an increasingly progressive
role in India-Israel relations via the social construction of shared meanings and identities
between India’s Hindu majority with Israel’s Jewish majority. Social construction of
shared meanings and identities are based, in part, within an historical/modern-day context
of conflict with a minority, religious Other (Islam), and through bridges of connection
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based in other historical, cultural, social, and religious areas. Formal interviews, archival
primary-source analysis of government documents, and secondary-source review were
methods employed in the evaluation of the role of religion in India’s foreign policy
towards Israel.
In conclusion, this dissertation demonstrates the normative and functional effects
that religious identities have played, and continue to play, in determining India’s foreign
policy towards Israel given the fundamental role religious identity has historically played
in the structuring of social perceptions, interactions and worldviews within Indian society
up and through the present-day.
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INTRODUCTION
“Relations between Israel and India tend to grow stronger when tensions
between New Delhi and Islamabad rise, or when India experiences a
rightward shift in anti-Muslim public opinion or in leadership” (Pfeffer,
2008).
The above quotation was taken from an article in an Israeli newspaper written in
the days following the violent terror attacks in Mumbai in late November 2008. The
attacks targeted several public buildings around the city, two of which were the Taj
Mahal Palace & Tower hotel and the Nariman House Jewish community center in the
city’s downtown 1. These deadly acts were carried out by a Pakistani-based,
fundamentalist Islamic jihadi group known as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). LeT’s targeting of
a Jewish establishment as a part of a major terrorist attack within India worked to send a
violent message to their dually perceived enemies of the Indian state and the Hindu world
on one hand, and Israel and the Jewish community on the other.
The quotation further implies that this sort of violence, experienced by both
societies with great frequency over the last few decades, highlights a more encompassing
narrative and a deeper pattern of behavior. This is a narrative implicitly defined by
identity and ultimately determined by threats to security. Indeed, Israel and India
currently enjoy a very warm, albeit low-key, diplomatic relationship with one another,
but to what extent, if at all, does the opening quotation be explain the primary motivating
factor in the Indian-Israeli relationship since normalization? Has the history of conflict
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This series of attacks lasted 3+ days and killed 164 people across several areas of the city. Other targeted
areas of this attack included the Cama and Albless hospital, the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus railway
station, the Metro Cinema, the Leopold Café, and the Oberoi-Trident Hotel. (“Mumbai terror attacks”,
2015)
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through the modern day with neighboring Islamic nations, which Israel and India have in
common, been a foundation for growth of friendly ties? Can this foundation be seen to
include deeper religion-based cultural ties and affinity? Will this historical commonality
continue to provide a base of stability for a friendly and progressive relationship,
characterized by a greater frequency of cooperative measures, between the two nations
for the foreseeable future? Conversely, prior to normalization what role did religiouslybased national or cultural identity play, directly or indirectly, in preventing normalization
of relations between India and Israel from the time of Israeli independence? Do the overarching, religiously-based national or cultural identities of the primary parties involved in
these historical conflicts operate in a normative and/or functional capacity with regard to
a presumed role in the historical Indian-Israeli relationship?
In this dissertation I aim to provide a greater understanding of the historical and
contemporary dynamics of India’s foreign policy towards Israel within the context of: 1)
The role of identity regarding its religious majority of Hinduism and its largest religious
minority of Islam; 2) the role of the religious identity in maintaining positive relations
with the Arab-Muslim world and the resulting negative relations with Israel prior to
normalization; and 3) the progressive role religious identity has played/can play via
shared meanings and identities of Israeli Jews with India’s Hindu majority postnormalization. Shared meanings and identities are based, in part, within a modern-day
historical context of conflict with a minority, religious “Other” (i.e. the Indo-Pak conflict
as ‘Hinduism v. Islam’ and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as ‘Judaism v. Islam’), a
dynamic that refers to both nations only since their near simultaneous independence in
the late 1940s. I will examine the Indian-Israeli relationship with regard to similarities in
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the development and history of each respective nation-state, each of which are
highlighted by the shared experience of Partition movements that have come to be
defined by the existence of a narrative of conflict with an Islamic “Other”. This research
seeks to address three main questions concerning the historical nature and potential future
of the Indian-Israeli relationship that combine to form the thesis of this work. First, what
has been the functional and/or normative role of religion-based national and cultural
identity (Hindu, Jewish and Islamic) in the history and establishment of Indian-Israeli
state-to-state relations? Second, since normalization, how crucial has identity been in
reinforcing the burgeoning strategic/security relationship that exists today and also in
reifying the importance of factors of religion-based cultural or national identity? This
question is evaluated in the context of political and strategic developments, enveloped in
a nature of religion-based nationalism, that have taken place in India and Israel over the
last twenty years. It also considers the strong religious element present in both countries’
contemporary concerns of cross-border terrorism by Islamic radicals originating in
neighboring states. Finally, since normalization, to what extent are the religion-based
national and cultural identities of (Hindu) India at the sub-state level (religious leaders,
business elite, etc.) internalized and work to propagate the same dynamic that I argue
exists to a relevant degree at the state level (e.g. ‘Hindu’ nation vs ‘Islamic’ nation),
ultimately resulting in a reinforcement of this state-level dynamic?
Throughout my analysis of this topic, the use of several different, but interrelated,
terms will be used in reference to the “identity” of both India and Israel. References,
categorizations, and descriptions of identity in this case will include the frequent use of
the terms “culture”, “religion”, “nationalism” and combinations of the three. The
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interchangeable nature of the manner in which I use these terms throughout this writing
comes with solid conviction and a legitimate explanation. An understanding of this
explanation relates directly to recognizing Hinduism and Judaism as both traditionally
being non-universal religions of “orthopraxy” or, put another way, “lived” religions. As
“lived” religions, these traditions come to include several identifiable characteristics
considered to be of a religious nature and action which would fall outside the standard
Western understanding of what is and what is not a part of religion. This includes, but is
not limited to, ideas of nationhood and ethnicity bound by a sacred language/land, strict
dietary regulations, extensive systems of law and jurisprudence, and frameworks for
social organization to name a few. A detailed explanation of orthopraxy as it relates to
Hinduism and Judaism, and the significance this explanation has as a foundation in
understanding of my overall argument, will be presented in chapter two. In short, if their
classification as orthopraxic religious traditions is considered, Hinduism and Judaism
cannot be compartmentalized as other institutionalized religions or religious practices
would be according the standard Western understanding of what is and is not religious in
nature.
It is also very important to make clear that the argument I will be making
regarding the role of religious identity and the Islamic “Other” is particular to the IndianIsraeli case and their relationship with one another and not to either country’s identity as
a whole. While my argument may be applicable to India’s and/or Israel’s relations with
other states, this is not the claim I will be making nor addressing. As Desch notes,
“Cultural theories that may not be amenable to generalization across cases might still lead
to generalization within cases across time. In other words, they may not offer general
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theories of all states’ behavior but may suggest theories of a particular state’s foreign
policy behavior over time” (1998, p. 155). Desch’s point is directly applicable to this
work and my argument presented here regarding India’s foreign policy behavior towards
Israel.
It is also significant to note that the Hindu nationalism I describe is a broadly
construed, politicized version of what traditional Western scholarship identifies as the
Hindu religion. Furthermore, its role in the Indian-Israeli relationship that I argue for is
but one construction of the Hindu identity in India among many. As such, it is not a
representative view of all 948+ million Hindus in India nor of India’s approximately
260+ million non-Hindu citizens, a majority of whom (approximately 170+ million) are
in fact Muslims. (Ghosh & Singh, 2015) 2
The primary theme or assertion of my argument is that religious identity and
concerns related to religious identity have historically had, and continue to have,
legitimate effects on the status of the Indian-Israeli relationship. This argument, however,
is not one of exclusive causality vis-à-vis the historical non-relations and eventual
normalization between India and Israel. The non-relations and the process of
normalization were ultimately the result of several important ideational, domestic, and
systemic factors at play at various times throughout the historical period in question. In
this respect, my goal is not to demonstrate the absolute role of religious identity as the
sole causal mechanism responsible for the historical circumstance in question. Rather, the
goal is to highlight religion-based national and cultural identity in the case of India and

2

The cited article denotes numerical values, in part, through the use of the term ‘crore’. Note that 1 crore is
equal to a sum of 10,000,000 units.
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Israel as one of the most critical factors responsible for determining the status of relations
between these two countries and is an effort at demonstrating and encouraging critical
thought on the impact of identity on state-to-state relations and foreign policy as a whole.
Finally, and perhaps most critically, I would like to point out my awareness of the
other dynamics involved in the conversation assessing the Indian-Israeli relationship,
specifically with regard to historical Hindu violence against those perceived to be nonHindus. Anti-Muslim violence exemplified in the 1992 Babri Masjid incident and the
2002 Gujarat riots, as well as violence against Christians across India, and particularly in
the state of Orissa since 1999, are but just a few of the unjustifiable acts of violence
committed by Hindu factions in India against non-Hindus over the last few decades.
Although some of these incidents will be mentioned at times throughout the course of my
dissertation, they are not the focal point of this study. For the sake of this research, I am
focusing on the Hindu-Jewish/Indian-Israeli dynamic as described previously. The
arguments I make regarding this topic are not intended to ignore, down-play or otherwise
justify other dynamics related to my argument, especially those dealing with violence
committed in the name of Hindu identity or Hindu Nationalism against Muslims,
Christians or others.

Chapter Outline
The chapters of my dissertation will be set up in the following manner with six
chapters in total. Chapter 1 contains an introduction to the topic being researched as well
as my thesis statement and the aims of my research. Included here are an outline of all
chapters that will follow as well as a description of what this research contributes to the
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field and the scholarship on this subject. Chapter 2 includes an explanation of key terms
and concepts, the literature review and both my theoretical and analytical framework and
method sections. The literature review will include the works most relevant to my study
from the following fields and sub-fields: the history of Hindu-Jewish relations, identity in
Indian-Israeli relations, and the politics of identity as analyzed in the field of International
Relations. The theory and method sections of this chapter are key for understanding and
framing the rest of the discussion and the arguments that I put forth regarding the role of
identity in the historical Indian-Israeli relationship.
Chapter 3 details the historical beginnings and trajectory of three key nationalist
movements based in religion up until the approximately the middle of the 20th century,
including: 1) the development, evolution and role of Hindu Nationalist ideology, and
what would eventually become the Hindu Right, in India’s domestic political realm; 2)
the onset of Muslim nationalism in India, the establishment of the All India Muslim
League and the eventual creation of the world’s first Muslim national state of Pakistan;
and 3) the concurrent rise of Israel through the Jewish nationalist (i.e. Zionist) movement
which began in the 19th century and culminating in the establishment of the state of
Israel in 1948. The histories of these religiously-based political movements are
chronicled in order to explain what I later argue to initially be a primary source of
conflict between India-Israel and, later, a source of progression and normalization
between the two countries through the recognition of one another’s “shared” identity and
historical experience.
Finally, religion’s role in India’s relations with Israel from pre-Partition to the eve
of normalization (approximately 1980) will be analyzed as well. This analysis is done
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within a framework that shows how religious identity negatively affected the
normalization process, ultimately institutionalizing a view of Israel that would prevent
the establishment of relations throughout the time frame under review.
Chapter 4 begins by looking at a brief comparative analysis of the histories of
conflict with domestic and external Muslim factions or nations that both India and Israel
have experienced. The respective histories of each nation as modern-states in this regard,
will work to create a comparative historical and normative context within which my
argument for the role of identity can be understood. This is followed by a thorough
analysis of the decade immediately preceding the normalization of relations between
India and Israel where the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) made their initial rise to
relevancy in parliament. In contrast to the previous chapter, I argue here for factors of
religion-based national and cultural identity being facilitators of India’s relations with
Israel, rather than an obstacle to them. It is the identity of the Hindu Right, combined
with its unprecedented rise to political prominence during this decade, which I argue is
absolutely critical to the “why” and the “when” of the establishment of relations. Chapter
5 looks at relations since normalization took place in 1992. It highlights the evolution of
Indo-Israeli security cooperation and its status as the linchpin of relations today, while
also maintaining how this cooperation emanates from notions of religion-based identity.
This chapter will also detail alternate bridges of the Indian-Israeli relationship including
trade, tourism, technology exchange and agriculture and the role identity has in
underpinning these relationships. Chapter 6 will be the final chapter and will include
conclusions found in my research, research challenges and competing explanations, as
well as future prospects for Indian-Israeli relations.
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Research Contribution
There is a clear lacuna in the literature concerning the role of identity in the
Indian-Israeli relationship, concerning both state and non-state actors. Additionally, there
also exists little focused scholarship on how religion-based national and cultural identity
functions generally in each of these country’s international state-to-state relations as well
as how non-state actors from these countries interact with other actors at the international
level. In this regard, this research is highly original and will be a novel contribution to the
extensive field of identity politics, the sizable regional sub-fields of South Asian and
Middle Eastern Studies, and the narrowly focused area of Indian-Israeli relations in
particular.
My contribution will fill this deficit in the small but increasingly important
literature on Indian-Israeli relations, specifically with regard to their official state-to-state
interaction and how non-state factions affect the perception and role of each state’s
religion-based national and cultural identity in this interaction. The inclusion of, and
focus on, the role of non-state actors in the Indian-Israeli also will contribute to the
literature on the effect of bottom to top interaction and influence in state-society relations
and what this means for state-to-state interaction. The context and aim of my research is
not only highly original but becomes seemingly indispensable when considering current
events and emerging patterns in the contemporary international system. My research is
also relevant to the current debate and development taking place in the field of
international relations when considering three global developments in particular: identity
conflict, the rise of non-state actors as a threat to state security, and globalization.
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The increase and frequency of identity-based or identity-involved conflict
worldwide is difficult to argue against, especially in the third-world, developing countries
and most recently, parts of Russia and the former Soviet Union. Identity here is a term
inclusive of any category used by groups as a primary mechanism for differentiating
themselves from the “Other” such as ethnicity, religion, nationality, etc. Furthermore, it is
a feature which I believe requires sufficient attention to be given to it in order to gain a
comprehensive understanding of today’s international conflicts and relationships. In
addition to the regions that include India and Israel, one can observe several examples of
conflict which bring questions about identity to the forefront including ethnic wars
throughout sub-Saharan Africa, sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia across the
Islamic world, ethno-nationalist conflict in Eastern Europe and ethno-religious strife in
the Caucasus to name just a few.
Religiously-motivated violence and conflict is an area of particular concern at the
time of this writing, with several regions of the globe under varying degrees of threat
from conflict of a religious nature or based in religious ideology. The imminence of such
religiously associated conflict is reflected most notably in examples such as the fallout of
the Arab Spring, highlighted by Syria’s brutal civil war, and the subsequent rise of the
radical Islamic “State”, the 2014 election of Hindu nationalists as a majority in the state
parliament, including the position of prime minister, in India the world’s largest
democracy, and Russia’s resurgent support of the country’s Christian Orthodoxy under
the Putin regime as a means of reconstituting a nostalgic grand narrative of Russian
dominance and empire.
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The rise of the non-state actor as a serious or primary state security threat began
to make headway in the early 1990’s with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War. The spike in ethnic-based conflict in Africa, the Balkans and parts of Asia
during this time period, coupled with a steady increase in the occurrence of terrorism in
various parts of the globe, gave reason for a potential shift in the focus of a state’s
security concerns to the realm of non-state actors. This potential shift was catapulted to
the forefront of global security concerns almost overnight due to 9/11 and the USA’s
reconfiguration of the global security narrative defined by the new “global war on terror”.
Fifteen years and two major US-led wars in the Islamic-world and thousands of incidents
of terror across the globe later, the concerns implied by this narrative still remain at the
forefront of the perceived state security concerns of countries worldwide. In the absence
of confirmatory statistics from a research group like SIPRI 3, few other countries in the
world experience more cross-border terrorism than India and Israel. The state security
concerns that they prioritize, I would argue, reflect not only a major linchpin in their
cooperation with one another currently, but also the continued relevance and critical
importance of the increasing role of the non-state actor as it relates to state security
concerns.
Globalization has ostensibly contributed to the rise in the frequency of identitybased/identity-involved conflict. It is also a trend that is highlighted by characteristics
highly visible in the Indian-Israeli relationship including technology development and
exchange, increased economic cooperation and a thriving of the travel and tourism sector.

3

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
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Globalization is undoubtedly, and faster than ever before, bringing into contact
individuals and groups who historically have had little or no interaction with one another.
As the world becomes a “smaller” place, one result has been for groups to reaffirm
particular identities in the face of the encroaching “Other” which subsequently leads to
conflict of varying degrees.
Conversely, globalization can also be a force for cooperation and constructive
development. It is a process that has been greatly facilitated recently by the development
of internet technology, the advent of widespread social-media, and the existence of rapid,
global transit, all of which contribute to an environment of expanding communication
and exchange of ideas. These developments as well as others have played a major role in
the interaction between Indian and Israeli societies at every level, generating awareness
of the “shared” identity factor, and positively contributing to the growth of the IndianIsraeli relationship as it stands today.

12

LITERATURE REVIEW AND EXPLANATION OF CONCEPTS, THEORY AND METHOD

My review of existing writings relevant to this research topic will be organized
into three general bodies of literature. The first will survey the rich but relatively compact
body of scholarship on Hindu-Jewish relations from ancient times to the modern-day. I
focus here particularly on the historical Jewish experience in a predominately Hindu
Indian society. A look at Hindu-Jewish relations significantly aids in creating a context
for understanding the historical relationship between the indigenous and predominant
cultures within both Indian and Israeli society and how they interact on the international
stage. These are cultures that, I argue, underpin how these identities function in IndianIsraeli relations as well as underpinning the religious and nationalist identities at the
center of my inquiries.
Next, I review the more established literature on identity politics. The notion of
identity that I prioritize in this research is characterized by a cultural hybrid cultural and
religious inclusive of conflated ideas of religion, ethnicity, and culture, the effects of
which currently manifest themselves most notably through the Indian-Israeli security
dynamic. Further, I will argue that this provides a base for engagement and a variety of
interactions between Indian and Israeli societies, from the state or government level down
to the individual as described in my theory section.
Lastly, I will review the minimal literature that exists on the role of identity in
Indian-Israeli relations, primary of which are the works of P.R. Kumaraswamy and
Nicolas Blarel. Several volumes and articles have been written on India and Israel,
especially since normalization in 1992, but scholarship focusing on the causal or
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normative effect regarding factors of religio-nationalist/cultural identity in the
relationship is an area that is greatly lacking. Although several authors give varying
degrees of attention to this subject matter in their writings on the Indian-Israeli
relationship, an extensive inquiry into the topic is yet to be done.

Hindu-Jewish History
Hindu-Jewish relations have existed for centuries and the history of this
relationship provides fitting examples of why the groups continue to have genuinely
friendly relations. The Hindus and the Jews are not strangers to one another with contact
between the two groups possibly reaching as far back as one thousand BCE as the
Hebrew Bible indicates by its description of trade between Solomon’s kingdom and
India. (Katz, 1999, p. 13) Nathan Katz suggests the plausibility of India’s earliest Jewish
community in what is today’s Cochin, Kerala dating back to the years shortly after the
destruction of Jerusalem’s Second Temple in 70CE. (2000, p. 30)
Looking at the medieval period, Malekandathil describes extensive trade and
commerce network that the Jews of Kerala were involved in. He notes the importance of
Jews as a mercantile group who successfully integrated themselves into Hindu society
and bolstered their economic status through matrimonial arrangements and firm family
ties. (2007, p. 7) Chakravarti echoes this assessment in his discussion of the evolution of
Indo-Judaic contact and trade from the first to the twelfth centuries of the Common Era.
(2007, p. 24-38)
A history of the Hindu-Jewish relationship in the modern period is chronicled by
Katz who, in addition to describing the pre-modern origins of the Jewish settlement in
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Kerala, describes the history and practice of the two other major Jewish communities in
Indian history: the Bene Israel of Bombay and the Baghdadi Jews of Bombay and
Calcutta. (2000) The earliest Western descriptions of the Bene Israel note how they
became low-caste oil pressers, scattered along India’s Konkan coast in the modern-day
state of Maharastra, eventually reaching numbers of 50,000 at one point. Their origin in
India is a topic of high debate, however. Despite claims of reference to the Bene Israel by
Maimonides at the turn of the thirteenth century, and a pseudo-history that attaches the
Bene Israel to the legend of the ten lost tribes of Israel, the time of their arrival in India
has not been determined. (2000, p. 92-93)
The Jews of Arab and Persian descent, who would come to be identified as
Baghdadis, established a community in Surat by the mid-eighteenth century. By means of
commercial and entrepreneurial enterprise these Jews quickly spread to India’s major
port cities like Bombay and, by 1798, eventually established the first Baghdadi
community in Calcutta. (Katz, 2000, 128-130) Joan Roland’s extensive research on the
Jews of India gives a narrative of all three of the previously mentioned Jewish
communities in India, particularly the Baghdadis. Roland highlights the arrival of many
Baghdadis to India due to increasing persecution in their countries of origin as well as the
rise of the great Sassoon family whose success as merchants, beginning in 1833 and
lasting until the early twentieth century, is one of the most well-known in modern India
history. (1998, p. 15-19)
Since the establishment of Israel in 1948 and a consequent trend of immigration
there, India’s relatively small, thriving Jewish community has become a shell of its
former self. Bombay still maintains the largest population of Jews in India, and is said to
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have as many as five thousand. As for the rest of India, small numbers of Jews are
scattered in places like Delhi and Calcutta, where a few dozen can be found, and in
Cochin, where only a single-digit remnant of Jews remains in India’s most ancient Jewish
community.
The Jewish experience in India described by religious and societal freedom, and
absence of persecution, has greatly informed the Hindu-Jewish encounter of the modern
day by providing an inviting context within which a sound dialogue has been created. As
Bender (2014) details, in 2007 and 2008 the world saw the first Hindu-Jewish Summits in
Delhi and Jerusalem. This brought together leadership factions from each religion headed
by the Chief Rabbinate of Israel representing the Jews, and the Hindu Dharma Acharya
Sabha representing the Hindus. Included among the major breakthroughs at these
dialogue sessions were: 1) the Jewish acceptance of Hindu self-definition as monotheists;
2) the mutual recognition of both traditions as orthopraxic, non-proselytizing religions
threatened by Islamic and Christian conversion efforts, secularism and the terrorism of
religious extremism: and 3) the misrepresentation and distortion of sacred history and
symbols, most notably the ‘swastika’. (Bender, 2014) The dialogues are viewed as having
been a highly successful enterprise for understanding and growth between the two
religions and the societies which they inherently dominate and reflect. As Rabbi
Abraham Benjamin, India’s only current rabbi, stated at the first Summit in Delhi, “We
[the Jews] were never in fear of observing any of our customs, or losing our traditional
ways. We never faced persecution. This is what India has given to the Jewish
community” (Benjamin, 2007).
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Politics of Identity
Theoretically, the study of the politics of identity finds its place under the
umbrella of Constructivism and proposes a way to understand religion, ethnicity,
nationalism and other types of inter-subjective groupings. (Hopf, 1998) Wendt (1992)
emphasizes how the identity and interests of states are socially constructed within and
between each other. Hopf (1998, p. 193) also draws attention to the notion of differences
of identity within states, pointing out that the state is not one, but various different actors
as far as international relations and politics are concerned, with states behaving
differently towards one another based on the identities of or within each. While I do not
necessarily agree with Hopf’s conclusion that we should “expect different patterns of
behavior across groups of states with different identities and interests”, this basic
assertion regarding various actors operating within states holds great relevance to my
theoretical discussion on the simultaneous nature of states as “both composite and
unitary” (Mesbahi, 2011).
Weldes et. al. (1999, p. 13) reaffirm that actors act towards one another and
objects based on the socially constructed meanings those opposing actors or objects have
for them. Kratochwil (2008) highlights the notion that the things we perceive are a
product of conceptualization which, in part, is a result of our social constructions. These
ideas about perception play a key role then in defining our identity and the identities of
those who are not us (i.e. the “Other”), the effect of which implies interests, preferences
and consequent actions of states and non-state actors as well. (Hopf, 1998) Speaking
about states, Hopf (1998) emphasizes the Constructivist assumption that identities are
variable, formed by political, social, cultural and historical contexts. Considering this, the
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establishment of relations between India and Israel could be viewed at a basic level as the
result of similarities in the perception, and subsequent identification, of themselves and
one another.
Keating (2008, p. 99-100) also discusses using culture, a broad ranging form of
identity of which religion nationalism, ethnicity, etc. can be considered sub-categories, as
a manner for understanding social and political behavior and institutions. Here elements
of culture can provide a framework for interpreting and constructing visions of the world,
producing histories and traditions which work to legitimize group definition, group
values and dominant group interpretations. (Keating, 2008 p. 109-111) This process
seems to be evident in the construction of India’s identity as “Hindu” vis-à-vis a
“threatening” Islamic “Other” by Hindu nationalists, particularly in the efforts of the
Bharata Janata Party during its initial rise to political prominence in the 1980’s.
Katzenstein (1996) looks to the cultural-institutional context of the political
environment and the political construction of identity in his analysis of national security
and its source(s). Jepperson et al (1996) are in agreement with this sentiment and endorse
the notion that norms, identities and culture “matter” in that they take the primary role in
causal arguments about national security policy, which is ultimately formulated due to
the existence of a perceived threat. The framework that these authors (Jepperson et al.,
1996) present provides the centerpiece of my theoretical assertion about the Indian-Israeli
relationship and, as such, will be elaborated in the section entitled “Theories and
Analytical Framework”.
Kowert (1998) speaks about the link between national identity and national
security with the latter depending on the former for its ability to, in part, allow states to
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distinguish enemy from friend. In a similar tone, Barnett (1996) analyzes the potential
advantage that identity offers over Realist explanations concerning the threat construction
of states and the subsequent alliances or security cooperation they then choose to pursue.
He highlights the central role of the emergence of a germane “Other”, and points to
examples of pan-Arabism’s early years and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s post-Gulf
War security patterns. (Barnett, 1996) Rousseau (2006) concurs in his central conclusion
that threat perception is a social construct, while going even further to suggest that
Realist and Liberal predictions result from the line that actors draw between the ‘Self’
and the “Other”. Again, the emergence of an “Other” is highlighted as playing a key role
in threat perception and, subsequently, security cooperation. This is relevant when
considering the mutual threat construction surrounding Muslim extremism that is shared
by India and Israel. Lastly, Desch (1998) discusses the explanatory power of culture in
cases in which structural environments are indeterminate (i.e. where both internal and
external threats to the state exist or neither exist), a circumstance that arguably has
applied to both India and Israel at different points in history as well as today.
This review provides a brief, yet well-rounded inclusion of some of the most
important ideas emerging in the last two decades regarding the politics of identity and
how they may be general applied to the case of India and Israel

Politics of Identity in the Indian-Israeli Relationship
The fairly minimal amount of scholarship on Indian-Israeli relations has yielded
little that explicitly focuses on the role of identity in this relationship. A primarily
descriptive argument denoting the combination of several variables as responsible for the
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historical trajectory of India-Israel relations is found in several lengthier writings on the
topic. (Rubinoff, 1995; Nair, 2004; Kumaraswamy, 2010; Blarel, 2014). Rubinoff (1995),
Kumaraswamy (2010) and Blarel (2014) are keen to speak about the role of identity in
India’s policy towards Israel domestically, specifically with regard to the sentiments of
India’s substantial Muslim population, as well as internationally regarding their
discussion of India’s relationship with the Arab Muslim world. In particular,
Kumaraswamy’s lengthy conversation on the role of Islam in Indian politics highlights
the notion of Israel being perceived, understood, and articulated through an “Islamic
prism” throughout most of India’s history, including those years leading up to Partition as
most notably seen in Gandhi’s use of Islamic motifs in his vocal support of the
Palestinian cause. (2010, p. 68) Blarel (2014) contends that the notion of a monolithic,
unchallenged Israel policy is false and looks to specify India’s Israel policy over time,
rather than just identifying multiple variables important in the history of this policy.
While Blarel discusses religion, he does not, however, give it a centralized role in India’s
policy towards Israel.
Nair (2004) examines India’s evolving perception of and stance towards Israel
against the background of differing international political contexts, in particular those of
West-Asia in the second half of the 20th century and the dramatically dissimilar post-Cold
War world. As a part of this analysis, he includes a discussion that outlines India’s
historical West Asian policy, briefly touches on how Muslim identity affected India with
regards to the “Pakistani factor”, “the fear-psychosis of an Islamic bloc”, and “the
Kashmir issue” (Nair, 2004, p. 46-48) as well as the sentiment of India’s large Muslim
population towards West Asia (2004, p. 51, 63-66, 98) and the Indian National
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Congress’s (INC) historical support of the Khilafat movement in the years immediate
prior to and after WWI. (p. 61-63; Blarel, 2014, p. 54-60).
A more promising outlook on the progression of Indian-Israeli relations can be
seen in the instance of the future Indian diplomat K.M. Panikkar in 1947 who, while
emphasizing the important role of Islam in Indian polity, envisioned a possible “Hindu
Perception” towards Zionist aspirations for an Israeli state, particularly regarding Indian
defense policy and a future Israeli state’s ability to off-set alliances among Islamic
countries. Furthermore, Panikkar explicitly highlighted that he saw a “great deal in
common” between Hindus and Jews. (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 81-83; Kumaraswamy,
1995) Gordon (1975, p. 231-233) briefly touches on news articles that describe the
connection between Jewish and Hindu nationalists, that imply Hindu-Jewish affinities
and that talk about how these affinities play out for India and Israel in the conflicts that
both were engaged in at the time.
Related to the effects of Panikkar’s possible “Hindu Perception” of Indian defense
policy, Singh (1999) discusses the potential influence and role of “Hindu” identity in
India’s strategic culture since Partition. This notion, which becomes quite relevant
regarding the centrality of India and Israel’s security relationship, is further analyzed by
Rosen (1996) who expands the argument to include India’s political culture and the
profound impact that the Hindu caste system has on Indian politics. Until the rise of the
Bharata Janata Party (BJP) in the years immediately preceding normalization, only a
select few groups, such as the pro-Hindu Jan Sangh party and the Pro-Sikh Akali Dal
party, would voice a perception underpinned by the anti-Muslim sentiments that would
lead them to favor Israel. (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 158-159) Furthermore, some believe
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that it was parties like these, particularly the BJP, whose stance on Israel had directly
influenced and led to the establishment of relations with Israel in 1992. (Rubinoff, 1995,
p. 504-505) There also existed a contingent of socialist parties in India which identified
with and supported Israel on ideological grounds due to the prominence of labor
movements in the country during the first few decades of its existence. (Kumaraswamy,
2010) Beyond the groups in previously described examples, however, a more progressive
stance towards Israel never materialized, and India’s policy towards Israel for the next 45
years following partition would remain much as it did prior to Partition.
Despite the discussion that exists in these works, both implicitly and explicitly,
dealing with the role of identity throughout the history of the Indian-Israeli relationship,
an in-depth examination of identity’s role remains elusive in the literature, especially
with regards to Hindu-Jewish factors of identity.

The Significance of “Religion”: Hinduism in India and Judaism in Israel as Culture,
Nation and Religious Practice

Culture, Nation and Religion
In order to build confidence in the theoretical underpinnings of my argument that
will be discussed in the next section, it is necessary to discuss and define certain key
terms and concepts. Comprehension of the role of religion-based nationalism in India’s
historical relations with Israel must commence with an understanding of what exactly is
being referred to when discussing religion-based nationalism and other interrelated, yet
specific, designations such as religion-based culture and religion-based politics.
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However, I will first lay out working definitions of the terms culture, religion, and nation,
which will then be followed by a brief explanation of combinations of these terms.
To begin, I would first like to look at what I argue to be the broadest and most
inclusive term of this list: culture. One of the earliest attempts at defining and explaining
what exactly is being referred to when using the term culture, E.B. Tylor, the founder of
the sub-discipline of cultural anthropology, is quoted: “Culture or civilization, taken in its
wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art,
morals, law, custom, an any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of
society” (1913, p.1; Scupin, 2008, p. 8). Inherent in this definition are characteristics
commonly found within most explanations of religion, nation, and politics as well as the
equation of culture with civilization. In this view then, the cultural enterprise comes to
include nearly every aspect of human activity. As such, culture the becomes the broadest
category used in the attempted exercise of conceptualization of an Indian-Israeli
relationship whose history emanates, in part, from sources rooted in social constructions
of identity.
A more focused, yet still fairly broad, definition of culture can be cited from
modern anthropological conceptions which views culture as, “… a shared way of life that
includes values, beliefs and norms transmitted within a particular society from generation
to generation”, with society referring to, “… the pattern of relationships among people
within [or originating from] a specified territory” (Scupin, p. 8, 2008). Add to this
understanding of culture, “… the historical accumulation of symbolic knowledge that is
shared by a society and passed down through symbolic learning and language” (Scupin,
p. 9, 2008), and this provides a basic understanding of what is being referred to in using
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the term. Within this framework of understanding then, culture becomes a primary source
of identity formation and recognition between “Self” and “Other”. Also, note that it is
important to keep in mind here some of the key words used to define culture including
values, norms, and the significance of territory and symbolism. These are terms that are
frequently recurrent throughout this writing, the understanding of which becomes
paramount to my main thesis and my argument regarding the role of identity in the
historical Indian-Israeli relationship.
However, while the highlighting of various combinations of these characteristics
is used in most any attempt to separate one culture from another, there is no universal
combination which is recognized as the primary method for determining separation. I
would argue then that some combination of both the material (territory, structures, natural
formations, etc.) and the non-material (beliefs, values, norms, etc.) become integral
building blocks for creating a particular way of life that informs what Lawson (2006, p.
8) terms a “common spirit”. For purposes of this study then, I define the term “culture” to
mean:
a particular way of living that is identifiable by a specified set of material
and immaterial characteristics that have been adopted and given meaning
by a group of individuals who are united by a mutual recognition of a
“common spirit” among one another that is predicated on these shared
characteristics, ultimately serving to orient these individuals vis-à-vis one
another within the reality of a given society.
Keeping in mind this understanding of culture, I shift now to discussing the term
religion. The essential question that dominates this discussion is whether religion is
epiphenomenal (i.e. a by-product of) to culture or some other social, psychological, etc.
force, or whether it is sui generis (i.e., “its own category’), and therefore not reducible to
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anything else. Given this dichotomy, and much in the same as fashion as the term culture,
historical attempts to define religion have been difficult, hotly debated and have generally
resulted in broad, open-ended understandings of what exactly is being referred to when
the word is being used. Efforts to defined this term have come within a variety of
different disciplinary contexts, including philosophy, psychology, sociology, theology,
and finally religious studies, etc. The result of these efforts has greatly contributed to the
broad, open-ended nature of the term’s understanding. Therefore, in order to utilize an
understanding that best suits the constructivist theoretical underpinnings of this work, as
well as the religious dichotomy of “orthodoxy” vs “orthopraxy” shared by Hinduism and
Judaism that is to be explained in the next section, I will highlight several characteristics
that have frequently been identified in many of notable attempts at explanation of this
term throughout history, including those by Mircea Eliade, Clifford Geertz and Ninian
Smart. This will be followed by briefly discussing a portion of Talal Asad’s
understanding of religion as a socially constructed category and as a term which
ultimately cannot be decisively defined, but one that I argue should be analyzed within a
category in and of itself.
While I would concede that a singular, concrete definition of religion is elusive, a
working definition can be constructed for the purpose of this study. As a part of my
explanation of what I am referring to in my use of the term religion, I first highlight
several descriptive notions and characteristics inclusive in the term as presented by Eliade
and Geertz. I would be in basic agreement with Geertz (Hecht & Biondo III, 2012, p. xi;
Geertz, 1973, p. 87-125) and Ninian Smart (Hecht & Biondo III, 2012, p. xi; Smart,
1996) who both denote religion as a part of culture, a denotation that would apply within
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the definition I gave as well as within much more general definitions like that of Tylor.
To be considered a part of culture, however, does not mean that religion is synonymous
with the term nor does it mean that it is not worthy of analysis in its own right. For
example, “language” is a characteristic of culture but is also regarded as a phenomenon
or subject that is analyzed on its own terms. In any case, while the terms religion and
culture are interrelated and can be observed to impact one another with many contexts,
this denotation is not without its complexities. This is why I ultimately argue for a
separate discussion of the terms and for religion to be analyzed and understood in its own
right.
There are three major attributes that I would argue are required in order to
understand what religion is and how it functions in the context of this study: 1) the
“Sacred” or “Holy”; 2) symbolism; and 3) its normative function in society that
essentially can be described as a “blue-print” for life. The first attribute is discussed
within the context of religion as a general phenomenon and is my primary argument for
the categorization of religion apart from any other phenomenon or force. The latter two
attributes, while not argued to be historically exclusive to Hinduism and Judaism, are
present specifically with regard to each of these religious traditions and the way in which
I argue they relate to on another throughout this study. Before continuing, it is worth
noting here that the reason I work to formulate my own definition of the term instead of
wholly using that of Eliade, Geertz, Asad or Smart, is that I take issue with some of the
key modes of analysis and explanation found in their respective definitions.
The idea of the sacred, I argue, is significant to any understanding of religion,
particularly if religion is to be understood in its own terms. Eliade cites the attribute of
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the sacred as the most significant concept denoting the “autonomy” of religion as not
being a by-product of any other sort of phenomenon such as psychology, economics, etc.
(Pals, 2015, p. 230) Like Eliade, I would also argue that this notion ultimately provides
the best single measure for determining the “religious” apart from the “non-religious” in
nearly any context. According to Eliade, explanation of the “sacred” goes hand-in-hand
with the opposing idea of the “profane”, or ordinary, and can be summarized as follows:
The profane is the realm of everyday business- of things ordinary, random,
and largely unimportant. The sacred is just the opposite; it is the sphere of
the supernatural, of things extraordinary, memorable, and momentous.
While the profane is vanishing and fragile, full of shadows, the sacred is
eternal, full of substance and reality. The profane is the arena of human
affairs, which are changeable and often chaotic; the sacred is the sphere of
order and perfection, the home of ancestors, heroes, and gods. (Eliade,
1959; Pals, 2015, p. 232)
His language here denotes the sacred to be a broad-based perception of something that is
otherworldly and not of this reality, whether by virtue of G-d/gods, ancestors (i.e. the
dead), mythic heroes of a mythic past, or some other parallel realm (for example
Nirvana), all of which by definition are generally not part of our mundane world. In this
sense, notions of the sacred could include one or all of these attributes and are not
confined to the inclusion of a narrow or single concept, such as that of monotheism for
example. The enterprise of religion as a whole, works to promote contact or interaction
with the sacred, a process that is even found in secular societies in unconscious ways
through the use of nostalgia, existence of dreams and via various other forms of the
imagination, according to Eliade. (Pals, 2015, p. 234)
In a fashion reflective of Eliade’s understanding, Ninian Smart refers to the notion
of the “transcendent” of the perceived world in any attempt at a unified definition of
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religion. This notion of the transcendent includes ideas like that of G-d and Nirvana, both
of which lie beyond this world, and both of which work to separate religion from
comparable systems such as Humanism or Marxism. (Smart, 1979, p. 27) Smart
combines this notion with a second which he terms the “mythic concept of the unseen”:
In myths and symbolic representations of divine and other forces in the
world with which men conceive themselves to have relationships, it is
notable that they stand for entities which are both manifest and hidden. A
god can reveal himself to me (like Krishna in the theophany), but
essentially he remains hidden. In performing a rite or a sacrament, we see
outward actions and symbols, yet the true force of what is done is
concealed, unseen, mysterious. Indra (the atmospheric, warrior of the Rig
Veda), is not identified with the thunderbolts he unleashes or with the
great storm-clouds piling whitely and darkly into the firmament above the
great Panjab (sic) plain, but he manifests himself through these
phenomena. Nearly everywhere in the mythic aspects of religion we see
this tension between the seen and the unseen. (Smart, 1979, p. 31-32)
Together, Smart refers to these two aspects of religion as the “transcendently unseen”
(Smart, 1979, p. 33) to create a concept that closely parallels Eliade’s notion of the
sacred. It is the transcendently unseen or the sacred that ultimately delineates that which
can be considered to be religion. The sacred, therefore, becomes the single most
important characteristic in broadly defining the concept of religion, and in making the
argument for religion to be considered sui generis, as a phenomenon separate from
culture or any other.
Now I turn to the second attribute, symbols or symbolism. Both Eliade and Geertz
highlight the importance of symbols in their respective attempts at describing and
defining religion. Geertz’s definition of religion provides what basically amounts to a
summation of the key attributes outlined above and how they fit together according to the
narrative that will be constructed in subsequent chapters. My writing seeks to extract the
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phrasing and some of the ideas behind Geertz’s definition of religion which provides a
useful starting point for my own analysis of the term as he states:
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive,
and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating
conceptions of general order of existence and (4) clothing these
conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and
motivations seem uniquely realistic” (Geertz, 1973, p. 90).
I highlight here Geertz’s notion of symbols as representing an ordering force, or as a
concept that directs one to the force of order, and which can be a powerful motivation or
model for beliefs and actions of individuals or groups. Symbols provide a
comprehensible or a tangible representation of a concept or circumstance which I would
argue finds its source within the sacred.
For Eliade, symbols are an indirect form of expression where the language of the
sacred is to be found. Symbols are rooted in analogy where certain things, actions, or
circumstances resemble or suggest the sacred and they include myth in their narrative
form. (Pals, 2015, p. 237) Symbols act as a sort of intermediary providing individuals
with an avenue for conceiving of, and connecting to, the sacred from their position in the
mundane world. Symbols, therefore, are critical for connecting what would otherwise be
mundane action (implicit of beliefs) to the realm of the sacred. Symbols, therefore,
become indispensable as an easily understandable and motivating source for beliefs or
actions perceived to be deeply-rooted or emanate from the sacred. Without symbols, the
sacred would theoretically be beyond the reach of the individual due to its very nature as
being distant and otherworldly which would render the practice of, or participation in,
religion an effective impossibility as it would merely be an abstraction in the mind of the
individual. Further, symbols also play a critical role in the connection of one religion to
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another through creation of “shared” symbolism which denotes a similarity in belief,
action, experience or otherwise.
The final aspect of my explanation of the term religion looks at an important idea
highlighted by Talal Asad. Asad’s discussion challenges the idea of religion as a
distinctly autonomous phenomenon and, while I believe religion to be autonomous
insofar as it does not merely find its source in some other phenomena as Eliade believes,
this does not mean that religion cannot be inclusive of politics, social organization,
economics, etc. To clarify my position on the seeming discrepancy between Eliade and
Asad, therefore, I do not believe religion to be of these phenomena, but I do believe that
it can come to include these phenomena under its umbrella. Asad emphasizes the genesis
of the term religion as an essential result of Western historical processes that have been
inaccurately applied across the board in attempts to understand non-Western culture:
The insistence that religion has an autonomous essence– not to be
confused with the essence of science, or of politics, or of common sense –
invites us to define religion (like any essence) as a trans-historical and
transcultural phenomenon. It may be a happy accident that this effort of
defining religion converges with the liberal demand in our time that it be
kept quite separate from politics, law, and science– spaces in which
varieties of power and reason articulate our distinctively modern life. Yet
this separation of religion from power is a modern Western norm, the
product of a unique post-Reformation history. (Asad, 1993, p. 28)
As a part of his discussion critiquing the fundamental influence Clifford Geertz has had
in attempts to define religion, Asad notes the central role that belief eventually came to
play post-Enlightenment conceptions of religion, a notion which Geertz emphasized
“belief” as “…a state of mind rather than as constituting activity in the world” (1993, p.
47). The notion of making a division between what constitutes religion versus “nonreligion” by essentially bestowing primacy of belief over practice (i.e., activity) will be
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critical to my argument in the next section explaining what exactly could be identified
under the umbrella of both Hinduism or Judaism as “lived” religions.
At its most fundamental level, patterns of defining religion in the Western world
have come, first and foremost, with regard to belief in a supernatural and/or higher
power. Those traditions that lack belief in, or which may not place primary emphasis on
belief in, such a being(s) have tended to be more heavily scrutinized or, in some cases,
dismissed outright as not constituting an identifiable religion. While I recognize the fact
that belief in a higher power, deity(ies) or some sort of supernatural being is a primary
characteristic used in many attempted explanations of religion, I also believe that this is
only one of several characteristics that can be used in attempts to explain religion and I
certainly would not agree that such a characteristic is absolutely essential for all
understandings of religion. I believe this notion echoes Eliade’s inclusive understanding
of the “sacred” which does not narrow the idea of what is considered otherworldly or
outside of our reality to an exclusively theistic understanding.
To summarize, a combination of what the previously reviewed theorists
understood to constitute religion is used to designate a working definition for this writing:
A system inclusive of beliefs and actions that have a foundation in or are
undertaken in an effort to, connect to an agreed upon idea of the “sacred”
which serves to instruct, through the primary median of symbols and
symbolism, individuals and groups on how to behave in this world,
resulting in the constitution of ritual, social organization, laws, politics
(i.e. rule), and civil life, among other areas of human individual and social
living.
To reiterate, this definition places religion under the umbrella of culture, denoting it as a
subset that shares many overlapping characteristics with definitions of culture, but that
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also possesses distinct functional features, primary of which is the idea of the sacred, that
ultimately necessitates its own categorization that is sui generis.
The final singular term discussed here is “nationalism”, and more specifically, its
root word: nation. The ideology of nationalism essentially, “… involves demanding a
political program, in some formal way, for that identity [i.e. nation]” (Lawson, 2006, p.
104). Attention, therefore, shifts to defining the term “nation”. Like the previous two
terms discussed, the term nation has also been, and remains, a topic of vigorous debate as
to what it references and as to what the identification of a nation should be based on.
Definitions of this term have come to include several characteristics found in the
descriptions of the previous two terms as well. However, as with culture and religion, my
aim here is not to debate the meaning of the term itself, but rather to establish a meaning
or definition that is best suited for understanding the arguments for how the identity of
nation is perceived and how it functions within the settings and contexts presented
throughout this writing.
To succinctly summarize the debate on what exactly can be conceptualized as a
nation, there are two main approaches explaining what constitutes a nation and how that
constitution arises. These approaches have dominated the discussion in recent decades
and are known as primordialism and modernism. According to Hearn, the two approaches
can each be distinguished according to the several main themes or characteristics:
Primordialism- Dominant themes of common descent, territorial
belonging, and shared language in discourse; historical depth in the idea of
the organic evolution of nations out of pre-existing substrate of ethnicity;
underlying emotional bonds and feelings of attachment evoked through
national language and symbols ( 2006, p. 20)
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Modernism- Generation of relatively unified national identity resulting
from the demands of industrial and capitalist economies; the modern state
as a bureaucratic and legal institution generating new conceptions and how
this creates notions of ‘civil society’; the spread of literacy, linguistic
homogenization and standardized education as cornerstones of a mass
culture and unified national identity. (2006, p. 67)
The processes of social construction of particular facets of identity are, as
established in the introductory chapter, a key theme which the arguments of this
study largely rest upon. However, the perception of what constitutes a nation,
according to the various actors and agents references throughout this study of
Indo-Israeli relationship, conforms most closely to the primordialist approach.
This approach links conceptions of nationhood to a belief by its members of their
connection to one another via ancestral bonds that, in the modern nation-state era,
includes a, “… correspondence between cultural and administrative [i.e. political]
boundaries” (Barreto, 2009, p. 59). And while the Muslim nationalism that drove,
and eventually resulted in, the establishment of Pakistan is perhaps equally or
better explained through the modernist approach, the observed social
constructions of nationhood found in the Indian and Israeli examples are
legitimized, in part, through a narrative laden with references to emotional bonds,
a common language and decent from within an ancient territory, and shared
historical experiences. The primeval quality ascribed to Jewish nationalism and
Hindu nationalism as it is examined throughout this writing, will be demonstrated
to be of particular significance in the exercise of legitimization of these ideas by
their respective adherents. This is a major reason that primordialism is the
preferred approach for analysis here for, as Barreto notes, “Ultimately,
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nationalism rests its legitimacy on a pseudo geritocracy- the older a claim to
primordial origin the greater the legitimacy of the nationalist claims” (2009, p.
17). The seeming immemorial nature of both Hindu and Jewish civilization will
prove to be a key point in the attempted validation of claims and one that is used
to link the two civilizations. As such, the definition of nation and its derivatives
comes to refer to the views of the primordialist approach as defined here.
Revisiting both culture and religion, in addition to nationalism, references to
religion-based culture and religion-based nationalism are frequently used throughout my
writing and can now be explained. The reference to religion-based culture refers to any
given culture, as defined earlier, whose particular way of living and “common spirit”
have their foundations in religion which, most importantly, ultimately originates from
within conceptions of the sacred. While many practices from cultures around the world
may be based in custom, in practical rationale or perhaps even in reasons unknown, a
religion-based cultural practice is one whose source is traced back, in history, through
myth or otherwise, to sacred scripture, a sacred revelation, a sacred event or events, or
sacred symbolism. In this sense, many day-to-day practices within India take place
within a Hindu (i.e., religion-based) cultural context, even by individuals who may not be
what some consider as practicing Hindus. These individuals could be Buddhist, Sikh,
Muslim or even secular, but because Indian society’s oldest and deepest foundations
originate in “Hinduism” (as will be argued throughout this writing), those who may be
viewed as non-Hindus may ultimately, and routinely, engage in Hindu (i.e., religionbased) cultural practices.
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At a general level, religious-based nationalism, “… equates the religious
community with the nation and builds on a previously constructed religious identity” (van
der Veer, 1994, p. 80). Identity works to denote who the “Self” is, which leads,
subsequently, to instruction on how the “Self” whether for individuals or groups, should
act in their interaction with the “Other” (van der Veer, 1994, p. 80) and, in cases like this,
an “Other” that is ostensibly religious. Notions of religion-based nationalism then assume
the defining characteristics of the aforementioned primordialism with the understanding
that, like religion-based culturalism, the basic elements from which a nation arises (i.e.
history, territory, language, etc.) have their source in some sort of “sacred” origin. Nation
as emanating or undifferentiated from a religious community is a dynamic that is
recognized by large contingents of all three religious factions (Hindu, Muslim and Jew)
within India and Israel, albeit to differing degrees.
It is worthwhile to note an additional caveat regarding my use of the term
religion. I acknowledge the argument that some of the actors or groups discussed in this
writing may in fact not ascribe to the term “religion” within the definitional framework
previously given. However, while the essentially religious nature of such actions may be
rejected or go unrecognized by the actor(s) being referenced in favor of purely political,
social, cultural, etc. reasoning, it is worthy to note that many of the ideas behind these
positions and actions ultimately have their foundations in ancient traditions of Hindu and
Jewish “sacredness”. This notion finds parallel, for example, with the Jewish atheist who
keeps kosher. This type of individual may reject belief in G-d and sacred
commandments, noting cultural or practical reasons for keeping kosher, but the fact
remains that keeping kosher has its origins in divine command and the institution of
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Halacha (i.e. the Jewish legal system) among the Jewish people over two and half
millennia ago. This can also be seen with the non-practicing Hindu who insists on
marrying within his or her caste despite not believing in the divine source of this idea’s
Vedic 4 origins. As a result, these terms inclusive of religion (i.e. religion-based
nationalism and religion-based culturalism) can accurately be applied in the description
and explanation of actions, scenarios, circumstances and arguments that follow.
Nevertheless, an understanding of religiously based culture and religiously based
nationalism also requires further insight into the essential nature of the religious
community(ies) under question, Hinduism and Judaism in this case, and how these
religions are practiced and function in the respective societies and cultural context of
nation-states in which they are the religious majority.

Function and Society: Hinduism in India; Judaism in Israel
I continue by analyzing the critical role that Hinduism (in India) and Judaism (in
Israel) play in each respective society’s conception(s) of national, religious, cultural and
even political identity by each country’s majority-religion populations. The
demonstration of these roles will also work to highlight the religio-cultural similarities
and potential bridges of cooperation held between the two societies that create what I
term “civilizational resonance”, a notion which implies a deep-rooted, ideational bond
two ancient civilizations. It is this idea of “civilizational resonance” which will later be
argued to be an existing state of affairs which could provide an extremely stable and

4

Vedic is a term referring to the Vedas, a highly and widely revered set of Hindu holy texts dating back to
the first or second millennium BCE.
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secure foundation for interaction of these societies, and ultimately the countries they are a
apart of, in the present and moving forward into the future. It is a foundation which I will
argue had a role to play beginning with the normalization process and which has the
potential to provide a deep-rooted base on which seemingly limitless cooperation
continues to be built in areas of political relations, economics, and strategic military
affairs, in addition to areas of cultural endeavors.
In the broadest sense, traditional conceptions of these religions posit them as
“non-universal” traditions, a label buttressed by the understanding that Judaism and
Hinduism are traditions that are deeply linked, historically and culturally, to a piece of
geography, a nation of people and a sacred language. (Bender, 2011, p. 31) For the
Jewish people this land is Israel and the language Hebrew, and for the Hindus it is India
and Sanskrit. This goes in contrast to a “universal” tradition, such as Christianity for
example, which has no deep rooted connection to a specific ethnic group, piece of land or
sacred language in the way Jewish and Hindu traditions do. (Bender, 2011, p. 31)
One area that the non-universality of Hinduism and Judaism becomes identifiable
is with the examination of the absence of an initiative to proselytize and processes of
conversion. Not only is there a marked absence of conversion efforts in these religions,
but proselytization has actually been seen as a threat to both civilizations throughout their
respective histories. (Bender, 2011, p. 31-32) For those not born into any given religious
movement, some type of conversion is typically the only way of gaining formal
recognition by, or acceptance into, a religious community that one wishes to be a part of.
Traditional Hindu or Jewish religion makes this process very difficult, if not impossible,
due their very nature and the characteristics they possess as non-universal religions.
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Regarding Hinduism, there is no standard conversion process for an individual
who wants to convert or be a member of the religious community. An individual’s
recognition within a given community could vary, but in most Hindu circles they would
not be recognized as a Hindu because of its strong tie to an ethnicity, culture, and history
that is specific to location, time and a particular people or nation. (Bender, 2011, p. 32)
As such, one essentially must be born into the Hindu community in order to be
considered a legitimate part of it in most cases. However, the theology(ies),
philosophy(ies) and sacred scripture(s) of Hinduism do address the issue of non-Hindus
and the role they play within the Hindu worldview, integration into which, deals
primarily with ideas of eventual reincarnation or rebirth as a Hindu into Hindu society.
Judaism, in contrast to Hinduism, does have a loosely standard process for
conversion, although this process does vary from denomination to denomination.
However, for an outsider who wants to become a member of the Jewish religious
community, it is typically not an easy process. This especially holds true within Orthodox
circles, the most traditional denomination of Judaism and the official denomination
affiliated with the Israeli state regarding the civil matters of Jewish citizens. While
ethnicity, a hotly debated notion within Jewish and academic circles alike, does not
present as much of an issue in Judaism as it does in Hinduism, strong ties to culture,
nation and history are an inseparable part of the tradition. It is, in part, for these reasons
that it is not uncommon for a rabbi to deny an individual’s conversion request several
times before agreeing to convert an individual, regardless of denomination. In the same
fashion as Hinduism, Judaic theology and philosophy also provides instruction on the
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role of non-Jews in the Jewish worldview. The seven Noachide laws 5 are all that need be
followed for a non-Jew to successfully integrate into the Jewish world, deeming
conversion virtually unnecessary in addition to being quite difficult. In my interview with
Rabbi David Rosen, the Director of the American Jewish Committee's Department for
Interreligious Affairs and the special advisor to the Chief Rabbinate of Israel on interreligious affairs, he both confirmed and summed up the Jewish position regarding this
issue:
For Jews, the absence of an imperative to convert comes out of reasons
rooted deep in their history. This understanding of a non-conversion effort
emerges out of a tradition which is culturally particular, historically
specific, and based on particular experiences, therefore making it senseless
to expect or require outsiders to covert to or follow it (Rosen, Personal
Interview, 2010).
The same understanding would follow for the Hindu tradition as well which, as
previously discussed, is also culturally particular, historically specific, and based on
particular experiences. The result, therefore, is a degree of innate exclusiveness that is
traditionally a part of each religion and is essentially maintained through constructed
notions of nationality, peoplehood, a sacred land and language, and a particular history.
The key to comprehending the role and impact these religions have on their
respective societies from top (the state government level) to bottom (the individual level)
lies in the combination of their inherent non-universality with an understanding of

5

In Jewish scripture the Seven Laws of Noah are basic, universal laws or moral prescriptions provided for
mankind to live by, particularly non-Jews, (i.e., those who did not receive the laws of Moses and are not
bound by Halacha). The Laws of Noah include the following commandments: 1. Do not commit idolatry
(i.e., deny the existence of the singularity of G-d); 2. Do not blaspheme G-d; 3. Do not practice sexual
immorality; 4. Do not steal; 5. Do not tear a limb/eat from a living animal; 6. Avoid bloodshed; 7. Do
establish courts of justice. (Katz, 1997, p.35) For further reading on this topic refer to "Jewish concepts:
The…" (2008); “Jubilees, Book of” (2011).
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Hinduism and Judaism as traditionally being religions of orthopraxis. Within the
religious context, the dichotomy between orthodoxy and orthopraxy, or “right teaching
vs. right practice” (Hopkins, 1971, p. 73; Bender, 2011, p. 32), provides a unique link and
commonality among the majority religious populations of Indian and Israeli society. This
commonality, when recognized by both parties involved, provides a deep, almost
primordial-like connection between the two civilizations which would theoretically
permeate state-society at every level. Ideas of “right belief” vs. “right practice”, therefore,
become relevant insofar as there is a “natural” alliance that is formed as a result of the
orthopraxis found in the religions that traditionally underpin the organization and
function of each society. (Bender, 2011, p. 33)
Before further explaining the particulars of orthopraxy, it is very important to note
that neither Hinduism nor Judaism should be defined solely within the confines of
orthopraxis. Each of these religious traditions, theologically and in practice, intrinsically
possess characteristics of both orthodoxy and orthopraxy, with the latter ultimately the
more prevalent of the two and hence their designation as such. For as Katz notes, “Most
Hinduisms and most Judaisms, on the contrary [to Christianities], value practice over
doctrine, and the primacy of orthopraxy over orthodoxy…” (1997, p. 33). By contrast,
religions described as traditions of ‘orthodoxy’ will ultimately possess varying degrees of
‘orthopraxis’.
In order to establish what will be a point of counter-comparison and
understanding, I briefly look at a tradition which values orthodoxy over orthopraxy. All
forms of Christianity hold central in their theology the crucial importance of belief in
Christ as savior of mankind, a belief that ultimately becomes essential in the
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determination an individual’s salvation (Bender, 2011, p. 34). This is especially true for
a multitude of Protestant denominations, the Southern Baptist Convention for example,
whose membership is almost exclusively based on acceptance this belief. The centrality
of this belief, a nearly universal aspect of Christianity worldwide, is the primary reason
that Christianity is classified as a religion of orthodoxy as opposed to orthopraxy. Karl
Barth, one of the most well-known theologians of Protestant Christianity of the twentiethcentury theologian, highlights the idea that that individuals are saved “by faith alone” in
Jesus Christ, as reveled through in Holy Scripture (Knitter, 2002, p. 24-25,). As a primary
figure of the neo-orthodoxy movement within Protestant Christianity, Barth
unequivocally reaffirms the critical importance of Christian belief in which Christ was as
perhaps the only relevant element of theology found within this tradition (Galli, 2000).
This is not to say that all Christians take this approach, however. The dichotomy
is explained in Peter Kreeft’s book on Catholic catechism when he states, “The
controversy that primarily provoked the Protestant Reformation was the controversy
about faith and works. Luther taught that we are justified and forgiven by faith alone,
while the church held that good works were also necessary for salvation” (Kreeft, 2001,
p.126). In the contemporary day, “inclusivist” 6 traditions such as Roman Catholicism, by
far the largest fraction of Christianity, hold the value of works, actions, and rituals of
equal importance with belief in Christ. However, the fact of the centrality of the belief in
Christ as universal savior in Christian religion remains. (Bender, 2011, p. 34)

6

With regards to religion, an ‘inclusivist’ tradition refers to one that claims that , “One's own group
possesses the [whole] truth; other religious groups, however, could contain parts of the truth” (Brill, 2010,
p. 22). The theological category of ‘inclusivism’ used here is one of three in a typology first described by
Alan Race (1983) which also included the categories of ‘exclusivism’ and ‘pluralism’ as well. Alan Brill
(2010) adds to this typology a fourth category of ‘universalism’.
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Traditional practice of Hinduism and Judaism, as religions of orthopraxis, are
commonly referred to as “lived” religions. Their shared notion as “lived” religions results
from the traditional emphasis on particular ritual action as the central element of each
religion, generally speaking. That being said, I believe it is important to describe where
the pattern lies within each of these respective traditions as far as orthopraxy and
orthodoxy are concerned, while noting specific reasons for labeling each tradition as
orthopraxy-dominant.
The labeling of Judaism as a religion of orthopraxis relies heavily on the
dominance of Halacha in Judaic religious life. There are 613 commandments derived
from the Torah that bring a central focus on the way the individual lives his or her life
with no reference to salvation. As Rabbi Alfred Cohen states, “For the 613
commandments in the Torah, there is no mention of any reward” (1984, p. 308), a
statement which implies the importance of action alone. (Bender, 2011, p. 35) The focus
on action is also highlighted by Rabbi-Professor Daniel Sperber, a Bar Ilan University
professor who won the Israel Prize in Talmud, when he noted that, “We [Judaism] have
very little in the area of dogma. There are two basic concepts: the concept of intention,
thought intention and the concept of deed action. In Hebrew we say ‘Kavana ne maase’.
In Judaism there is no doubt that action plays a greater role, more dominant role than that
of intention” (2008, p. 40). Judaism’s nature of orthopraxy is therefore demonstrated in
its downplay of dogma in favor of a focus on action.
Orthopraxis in Hinduism is highlighted by the concept of dharma which is
codified in the Dharmaśāstra texts. This dharma allows men to live in society and work
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toward the distant, but desirable, goal of mokśa 7. It dictates how humanity should act and
it includes all actions by which men define and express their place in the cosmos
(Hopkins, 1971, p.73). Referring to priestly social and ritual standards, Thomas Hopkins
notes that:
The details of these standards had been worked out from the time of the
Brāmhanas onward, but in the period after 500 BCE there was a great
increase in the number of texts dealing with duties of men in everyday life.
The result was a large body of Brahmanical teachings on social as well as
ritual responsibilities. These responsibilities were collectively called
dharma, “that which is established”, or in more specific terms, “what men
ought to do. (1971, p. 73)
Swami Parmatmananda, secretary of the Hindu Dharma Acharya Sabha (H.D.A.S.) 8,
further explains dharma in a simple yet succinct manner in the statement that, “Though
today it [dharma] has been limited to religion or a belief system, but primarily Dharma
means a duty based life. Indian culture, Indian upbringing always emphasized on duties
rather than the rights” (2008, p. 45).
Both Halacha and dharma provide a set of rules, laws and procedures for the
individual within each respective tradition that essentially creates a blueprint for how to

7

Mokṣa is a Sanskrit term which refers to the liberation or release from samsara, or the endless cycle of
death and rebirth. The concept of samsara is one that is quite prevalent to many Indic-founded religion
traditions including Buddhism and Jainism, in addition to Hinduism. For further information on this topic
refer to Hopkins (1971)

8
The Hindu Dharma Acharya Sabha’s is an umbrella Hindu leadership organization designed to be, “a
unifying body that provides leadership, guidance and a collective voice for the Hindus” (‘The Hindu
dharma’). According to them, this organization provides a typically unorganized, divided religious
community with the platform and the means to come together, to be acknowledged, and to be heard
throughout the world. This apex Hindu body was formed by the late Swami Dayananda Saraswati, who
passed away in 2015, and convened for their first ever conference in Chennai, Tamil Nadu from
11/29/2003-12/01/2003. Unfortunately the website for the H.D.A.S detailing their mission, events,
membership, etc., no longer seems to be functioning. However, for further available reading on the
H.D.A.S please refer to Bender (2011), ‘Hindu Dharma’ (2010), and Puri (2006).
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behave within society and how to act in life. At their most basic level then, the emphasis
of these two concepts lies primarily within individual action. As a consequence, action
becomes the foundation of each religious tradition and ultimately the society in which the
religion is predominant.
In addition to an extensive structure of criminal and civil laws, the existence of
strict dietary laws is a marked and unique aspect that Hindu and Jewish practice also
shares. The dietary laws that both traditions impose on their practitioners are a prime
example of their nature as religions of orthopraxis. In the eyes of many outsiders,
everyday diet expands well beyond the realm of what would commonly be considered a
religious concept. (Bender, 2011, p. 36) The existence of dietary laws in both religions
opens another lane by which each society is able to culturally connect with the other as
Katz notes, “While Hindu and Jewish dietary codes do not coincide, they do overlap, and
these are areas in which communication and cooperation can be developed” (1997, p. 38).
The concepts of dharma and Halacha and the existence of strict dietary laws all
play into the notion of a “lived” religion which is commonly associated with religions of
orthopraxy. As non-compartmentalized, non-universal traditions that are entire ways of
life, everyday activities from eating to bathing to simply waking up in the morning all
take place within what can be defined as a religious framework. For individuals of these
traditions the boundary between religious and non-religious related activities is extremely
blurred if not completely non-existent in many cases. Dr. L.M Singhvi, a constitutional
expert and former member of the Indian parliament, stated that “Dharma is that which
sustains and keeps us together. Like us Hindus, the Jews unite with us in their adherence
to righteous living” (2007, p. 23). He depicts the vital importance of dharma to
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Hinduism, and therefore subsequently a majority of Indian society, while also affirming
how this concept ties Hindu practice with that of the Jews. (Bender, 2011, p. 37) During a
meeting between Hindu and Jewish leaders in 2007, Rabbi David Rosen highlighted this
one of a kind bond:
There are many commandments, which tell us that to live a Jewish life is
to be alive to the consciousness. It is a way in which the language, culture,
and religion are intertwined. This is not found anywhere, except in Hindu
culture, where the religious culture and society are similarly connected.
(2007, p. 25)
Dr. Singhvi and Rabbi Rosen, one as a political leader and the other as a religious leader,
are both keen to verify the all-encompassing role that their respective religions play in the
society of each of their state’s, in addition to emphasizing the unique bond that Hindu and
Jewish societies share in this regard. As religions primarily of orthopraxis then, Hinduism
and Judaism go well beyond compartmentalized notions of ritual practice by essentially
providing a blue-print for the construction and function of nearly every aspect of their
respective societies, which are inherently inclusive of ideas of nationhood, common
culture, law political organization, etc. .
By taking into account the previous discussion on the role of Hindu and Jewish
religion in their respective state societies, the explanation of the usage of the terms
culture, nationalism, religion, and associate terms can now be better understood. These
terms are used in conjunction with one another at different times throughout the writing
since they are all distinct yet equally legitimate facets of each of these religions of
orthopraxis. At the same time, however, the usage of one term rather than another
becomes necessary to accentuate and discuss particular attributes of each religion as they
pertain to the discussion at hand.
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Theory and Analytical Framework
The preceding discussion provides an extensive definition for what is being
referred to when the terms “Hindu religion”, “Jewish religion” or any of their derivatives
are used in this writing. Furthermore, this discussion works to highlight the significant
role these religions play in each of their respective societies as all-encompassing,
orthopraxic traditions. Using this understanding as a foundation for what follows, I now
move to theoretically frame the extent of the functional or normative role identity plays in
the Indian-Israeli relationship historically and in the contemporary day. With this in
mind, I anchor my discussion in three distinct, yet complementary analytical approaches.
In order to properly understand application of my theoretical framework, it is beneficial
to bring the previously described religious and cultural explanations into a more concrete,
politically-based realm as this is the single most significant arena for the official
interaction of states in the current international system. A brief summary of what political
culture is and how it functions in a given state, therefore, becomes useful. Political
culture here would be the mechanism through which the identity(ies) of society
become(s) manifest in a given state’s domestic and/or foreign policy. Richard Wilson
provides a working definition of ‘political culture’ in arguing that:
In the most general sense political cultures are socially constructed
normative systems that are the product of both social (for example, rules
that coordinate role relationships within the organizations) and
psychological (for example, the preferences of individuals) influences but
are not reducible to either… (Wilson 2002, p. 264; Lantis, 2002, p. 106)
Additionally, Thomas Berger provides a more functional description of political culture
where he contends that it is best understood as a combination of norms and political
institutions that:
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…exist in an interdependent relationship each relying upon the other in an
ongoing way. Formal institutions play a role in anchoring broader society beliefs and
values and provide continuity and permanency to them. Culture forces, in turn, influence
the shapes institutions take and provide them with legitimacy and meaning. The
interaction between formal institutions and the beliefs and values prevalent in a given
society becomes particularly relevant in periods where the political systems are
undergoing change. (1998, p. 11-12; Lantis, 2002 p. 107)
The melding of the two descriptions of political culture given here, provide a definitional
and functional base from which to begin theorizing about the role of such conceptions in
the Indian-Israeli relationship.
The first, while not a “theory” itself, is highly useful as it looks at the process of
mutual constitution between norms and identities, how this regulates the behavior of
actors (i.e. states in this case), and the causal effect this has on national security policies
(Katzenstein, 1996; Jepperson et al., 1996), an understanding I extend and apply more
broadly to formation of state identity and the potential effect of this process on state-tostate relations. The second describes a tri-partite framework consisting of geo-political,
geo-economic and geo-cultural structures that is both unitary and composite (Mesbahi,
2010; 2011), which works to explain the interaction of societies from top to bottom and
the impact these interactions have on the nature/functionality of state-to-state relations.
The third is supplementary, implemented specifically for its application to the IndiaIsraeli security dynamic, and borrows from the sectoral approach to security taken by
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde. (Buzan et al, 1998) This will work to explain how referent
objects other than states become securitized, who has the power to meaningfully do this
securitizing and, subsequently, how this can affect state-to-state interaction.
Applicable to Indian-Israeli relations is Katzenstein’s notion that, “… security
interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors” (1996, p. 2). The
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constructed identity of states, governments and political actors comes to play a central
role in the creation of norms that constitute these identities and/or regulate the behavior
of the actor(s) under examination (Katzenstein 1996, p. 4-5), a circumstance that can be
found in the Indian-Israeli case. Thus, norms can be defined here as something that,
“…describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors within a given
identity” (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 5). In Hindu-majority India, norms operate to construct a
shared identity with Israel that has its foundations in viewing Israeli culture, and Israel’s
majority/defining religion of Judaism, as also having historically shared the perception of
a threat from the Muslim (and Christian) “Other”. Furthermore, norms also work to
“regulate” the behavior of a Hindu-majority India towards Israel and the Muslim and
Christian “Other”. By contrast, concerns over external perceptions of India’s view and
treatment of the Muslim “Other” held by historically dominating political factions of the
national government became the primary conduit of the anti-Israel norm that existed for
the first 40+ years of the country’s existence.
In their discussion dealing with causal arguments about national security policy,
Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein use a simple schema (shown below) to summarize the
variety of arguments found in their edited volume, thereby demonstrating how cultural
and institutional elements of a state’s environment affect identity, interests and policy,
and how the affected identities/policies then work to reproduce and reconstruct the
cultural/institutional structure of the environment. (1996, p. 52-53) The chart below is
explained by the following, with the numbers in the five explanations corresponding to
the numbers labeling the pathways of the figure:

48

1. Effects of norms (I). Cultural or institutional elements of states environments
shape national security interests or (directly) the security policies of states.
2. Effects of norms (II). Cultural or institutional elements of states’ global or
domestic environments shape state identity.
3. Effects of identity (I). Variation in state identity, or changes in state identity,
affect the national security interests or policies of states.
4. Effects of identity (II). Configurations of state identity affect interstate
normative structures, such as regimes or security communities.
5. Recursivity. State policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and
institutional structure. (Jepperson et al 1996, p. 52-53)

(Jepperson et al 1996, p. 53)
Cooperation between the two countries in the contemporary period is highlighted most
notably by their shared security threat of cross-border terrorism and the main perpetrators
of these terrorist acts, Muslim extremists. And while the Indian-Israeli relationship
currently is developing most extensively within the realm of security cooperation, there
are several other areas, particularly within the realms of culture and the economy, that are
quickly gaining ground on the well-established security co-op and that have also been
historically important as well.
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The schema above, therefore, becomes useful in framing the shifts in the identity,
policy and environmental structure as they pertain to India and Israel both currently and
historically. Furthermore, in addition to notions about security, this chart also can be used
to provide a broader understanding of how societal elements of a state, such as identity
and interests, directly impact and influence policy generally speaking, not just in the
security realm. The result of this impact and influence is the creation of an environment
conducive to the long-term perpetuation of such a policy towards another state.
Identity and interests embodied in a given society, however, neither act in a
singular fashion nor do they act at a single level. Any given state-society is composed of
innumerable layers which interact with one another and with other state-societies, from
the individual at the bottom to the national government at the top. The interaction within
and between actors, levels, and societies can result in what can be identified as a state-tostate relationship. In his article dealing with Iran’s interaction with the international
system, Mesbahi lays out a useful framework which aids in explaining this complex
system of state-societal interaction which affirms three broad theoretical assertions:
1. The international system is a tripartite system with three interrelated yet distinct
structures which includes the coercive-military (i.e., geo-political), the normativesocial (i.e., geo-cultural), and the economic-developmental (i.e., geo-economical) 9
2. The agent (the state) is simultaneously unitary and composite, interacting
distinctly with the corresponding structural components of the international
system
3. The net assessment of any state’s position within the international system must
take into consideration the symbiotic impact of the interaction with all three

9
The three terms– geo-political, geo-cultural, and geo-economic –are used by Mesbahi in a different article
as alternative terms to describe of this same analytical framework. (2010, p. 165-166)
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structures, and the cross fertilization and cross compensatory dynamics between
them
(2011, p. 11)

Mesbahi’s (2011) framework posits that the state is unitary with regard to the
coercive-military structure, the state’s “official” identity as represented through the
national government, while being composite in both the normative-social and economicdevelopmental structures and, as Mesbahi notes, “Each structure deals with the state in a
manner most conducive to its own elemental attributes, extracting and re-projecting a
particular and prevailing “identity” (2011, p. 11).
At the highest level of the international system (i.e. the systemic structure that
agents interact within) the sovereign state acts in a unitary fashion through the coercivemilitary (geo-political) structure, which other agents (i.e. states) recognize and engage
with. With regard to the normative-social and economic-developmental structures,
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however, the state will be dealt with and interact in its composite form made up of
innumerable factions and groupings including, but certainly not limited to, institutions,
interest groups, NGO’s, political parties, businesses, etc. Some groupings are more
official than others and it is these groups which tend to wield much more power and
influence when it comes to the decision-making process at the highest levels of all three
structures and how these structures function in any given state-to-state interaction.
Lastly, in order to provide a more in-depth look at what and how non-state actors
securitize and how this can reflect state-level security policy, I refer to Buzan, Waever
and de Wilde. (1998) The concept of ‘securitization’ used in my research refers to an
extreme form of politicization where an issue is presented as an existential threat which
justifies the use of emergency measures and/or actions that transgress the common
boundaries of political procedure. (Buzan et. al., 1998, p. 23-24) In this manner,
securitization becomes a self-referential process and requires only that a target audience
accepts the presented issue as an existential threat in order for that issue to become
securitized, regardless of whether a real existential threat exists or not. (Buzan et. al.,
1998, p. 24-25)
Buzan and colleagues have devised a five-sector analysis which analytically
allows for the differentiation of types of interaction (military, political, economic, societal
and environmental) within and between states in the realm of security. (Buzan et al.,
1998, p. 27) The adoption of this framework allows us to “widen” the securitization
apparatus beyond the state and ‘traditional’ notions of security, which exclusively fell
under the military (i.e. material) umbrella. My dissertation focuses particularly on the
interaction among three of these sectors: military, political and societal. Analyzing

52

security issues in terms of these sectors will aid in linking identity to securitization and
security concerns, while also demonstrating a security threat to sub-state actors can
influence and become a part of state security narrative and policy. The resulting
securitization measures, I argue, then work to reify the overall perception of a “shared”
identity with the Israeli state and its majority-Jewish society.

Methods
My research reflects a combination of approaches and techniques. A comparative
approach is utilized in combination with a method of historical institutionalism (Steinmo,
2008; Keating, 2008). With this combination, an analysis of the history that has existed
between India and Israel from Israeli independence up through the present is undertaken
in order to track the development of their relationship and analyze the discourses that
existed between these nations during the time period under review. This works to provide
an historical context that demonstrates why there were no formal Indian-Israeli relations
before 1992 and why the choice was made to forge that at that time. These
techniques/approaches will be implemented in an empirical analysis of first, second and
third-hand literary sources and archives and further supplemented by interviewing
individuals who are a part of groups whose identities and interests are normatively
recognized as having a greater and more direct influence on state policy towards, and
interaction with, other nation-states.
Keating’s discussion on “culture and social science” posits that culture is, “…
used to explain how people’s preferences and motivations are formed in the first place”
(2008, p. 116). His explanation of “new institutionalisms” (Keating, 2008, p. 104)
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includes ideas that allow for the integration of culture into the argument presented
throughout this writing, with particular reference to “historical institutionalism”.
According to Keating, historical institutionalism is complemented by the concept of
tradition which also informs historical explanations by, “… showing how beliefs are
transmitted, adapted and reinvented over time” (2008, p. 116). The utilization of this
approach is done so under the assumption that history is not a chain of independent
events (Steinmo, 2008, p. 128), and in which institutional change in the political realm is
directly correlated to changes in ideas held by actors. (Steinmo, 2008, p. 130) It is the
ideas of these actors who are ultimately responsible for setting, maintaining and changing
ideas that are institutionalize in functional and normative ways. These actors make
history “path dependent” in a sense that the longer and deeper these ideas are embedded
(i.e., institutionalized) into the fabric of society, the more difficult it will become to alter
this path and its expected outcomes as history progresses (Keating, 2008, p. 104).
Therefore, a careful analysis of the historical record, and the processes that took shape
during the years between Israeli independence and establishment of relations with India
where issues of or relating to religious identity are demonstrated to have had a
discernable impact, is undertaken to answer the questions found in the introductory
chapter. The combination of these approaches allows for the consideration of the
inherent complexities of historical events while also providing an excellent tool for
explaining individual cases. (George & Bennett, 2005)
Archival research was completed at various sites including India, Israel, the
United Kingdom and the United States. Archival research is a key method for providing
primary sources that relate to the history of Indian-Israeli interaction. These include, but
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are not limited to, official foreign policy reports, records of parliamentary sessions at
which state-to-state relations were discussed, transcriptions/audio recordings of speeches,
etc. To access them, I have visited several archives and libraries including: the British
Library and the National Archives (UK); the National Archives, the State Archives and
the Zionist Archives (Israel); the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, the National
Archives (India); and the Library of Congress (Washington DC).
The last tool used in my research was interviewing. My initial approach to the
interview process was Naturalist. I went into these interviews with some general question
prompts while allowing the interviewee some flexibility in dictating the direction of the
conversation. This allowed for a more natural flow of conversation, which is important
when dealing with sensitive issues like religion and politics, especially in Indian society.
As I completed more interviews, I ascertained a better idea of what sorts of topics I
should include on a more standardized questionnaire as a part of all subsequent
interviews that I did. The primary purpose of the interviews was to gain insight into how
certain members of Indian and Israeli society view the identity (whether implicitly or
explicitly) of themselves, one another and, for non-Muslim interviewees, the Muslim
“Other”. My goal was to discern a more thorough and current understanding of the role
identity plays or does not play in relations between the societies and governments of
India and Israel. My interview pool consists of the following: 1. top religious leaders
from each state most familiar with Hindu-Jewish or Indian-Israeli relations (the Hindu
Dharma Acharya Sabha organization in India and the Chief Rabbinate in Israel); 2.
politicians and individuals knowledgeable of the each respective country’s defense
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sector; 3. academics in India and Israel with expertise pertinent to my research area; and
4. activists involved in the countries domestic politics.
Despite the wealth and importance of information that can ultimately be gathered
from interviews, I concede the supplementary nature of this technique due to the
unpredictability of the interview process. Note that although I have had moderate success
in my attempts to interview individuals from the four previously described groups, the
sensitive nature of the research topic and current events taking place in each of the
countries impeded access to some potential interviewees and ultimately impacted the
quality of this venture as a whole.
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FOUNDATIONS OF INDIAN-ISRAELI HISTORY: RELIGION-BASED NATIONALISM AND
RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF IDENTITY FROM PRE-PARTITION TO 1980

Since the onset of their respective dates of independence in 1947 (India) and 1948
(Israel), the Indian-Israeli relationship is best defined by ‘non-relations’. It would be
nearly forty-five years from these movements before normalization took place. It was a
period defined by a cold unwillingness on India’s part to accept Israel’s well-known and
repeated desire to establish official relations. From its youngest days as a nation, Israeli
was poised to establish official relations with the recently independent Indian
sovereignty, but its success was minimal. According to Kumaraswamy:
Since the founding of the Jewish state, India reacted and responded, often
negatively, to various Israeli efforts toward recognition and normalization.
India was active when violence erupted in the Middle East and did not
accommodate Israel’s concerns and fears. While Israel eagerly sought
close ties, Nehru’s India was reluctant and coy. For over four decades, it
was India that decided, shaped, and controlled bilateral developments.
(2010, p. 2)
The effects of the critical years have been at the forefront of international attention since
the six plus decades that they commenced. Twenty-three years after the establishment of
a sovereign Israeli nation, this undesirable dynamic continued to persist as Dr. Dov B.
Schmorak, the director of foreign publicity of Israel during this time, still echoed, “We
will be pleased if India also comes forward to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.
From our side we are always prepared to accept it but unfortunately it is India that is
always giving a negative response” (“Israel offers diplomatic,” 1971). Unfortunately it
would be over two more decades until Dr. Schmorak and the state of Israel’s offer would
be accepted by India.
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It was in 1992 that India decided to accept the establishment of formal diplomatic
relations with Israel. Despite the cold-natured, sometimes seemingly antagonistic
demeanor of India towards the Israelis at times, there had been interaction between the
two nations dating back 60 years. The warm nature of their relationship since
normalization occurred in 1992 is, as previously described, quite a contrast to what their
relationship was like for the 45 years preceding that date, despite India recognizing Israel
as a “Jewish homeland” in the fall of 1950. As P.R. Kumaraswamy notes:
The establishment of formal diplomatic relations between India and Israel
on January 29, 1992, marked the successful completion of a political
process that began in the early 1920s when Indian nationalist leaders were
drawn into the Arab-Jewish conflict. Despite India’s liberal, benevolent,
and friendlier attitude toward Jews, Indian nationalists were unable to
understand and unwilling to appreciate Jewish political aspirations in
Mandate Palestine. (2007, p. 212)
Even more perplexing was the fact that India’s antagonistic behavior toward Israel during
the decades preceding normalization was largely devoid of any direct conflict or discord
with one another. Beyond the existence of an Israeli immigration office since 1949 and
the establishment of consular relations in 1953, India’s policy towards Israel would
remain the same until 1992. (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 126-127)
This chapter will also detail sources of India’s policy of non-relations with the
Israeli state which emanated from issues of, or related to, religious identity. While the
chapter will be descriptive, it will not be a full “play-by-play” history of India’s
relationship with Israel during the timeframe under analysis, which runs from several
years prior to Indian Partition until approximately the early 1980’s. As such, it will
instead be organized into four sections. The first section will detail the rise and trajectory
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of religion-based nationalisms up until approximately 1947-48. The three sections
following, organized chronologically, will detail several issues where religious identity
played an observable role and which influenced India’s foreign policy towards Israel
during time the period under review. Note that most of the issues described in sections
two through four of this chapter continued to influence India’s policy towards Israel well
beyond the timeframe in which they are described as entering the scene. The issues are
organized and discussed based on the time when they became a relevant factor in India’s
active foreign policy towards Israel.
The first section will detail the history and formation of religion-based
nationalisms in India and Israel up until approximately 1947-48. In order to accurately
assess the influence and impact that Hindu nationalism had in the area of domestic
politics during the time period immediately preceding normalization as will be discussed
in the next chapter, it is first necessary to explain the ideological, social and historical
foundations of the identity that pervades and informs Hindu nationalism from the genesis
and development of the Hindutva movement beginning in the 19th century, the
subsequent formation of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh organization within India’s
political arena and the progressively gradual influence of the RSS in this arena from the
1920s to Partition. Included in this analysis of Hindu nationalism’s rise will be the greatly
significant and parallel development of the Muslim national movement, and the landmark
creation of the All India Muslim League. Syed Ahmad Khan once stated as a part of a
speech made at Meerut in March 1888 that, “Whatever will be our [Muslims’] fate, so too
will be the fate of Hindus in this country” (Devji, 2013, p. 54). Sure to Khan’s words, the
mutual fears and concerns that Hindu and Muslim constituencies held towards one
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another regarding the control of the Freedom Movement’s political apparatus would have
debilitating consequences for the future of an independent India. The result of such
concerns would be the concurrent formation of both religious and non-religious
nationalist movements and, ultimately, the partition of British India essentially based on
the division of religious identities.
Additionally, a brief timeline of the parallel rise of the Jewish nationalist
movement known as Zionism will be set out as well with the intention of drawing out
ideological and historical similarities between Zionism and the Hindu nationalist
movement in a comparative fashion which can then be categorized as links that aid in the
establishment of a socially constructed civilizational resonance between the two ancient
cultures in chapters 3 and 4.
The next section will detail India’s political development as a whole vis-à-vis its
relation to Israel from the time period prior to Partition until approximately 1956. It was
in the decades preceding Indian-Pakistani Partition that the conversation on the
Palestinian issue, and the formal stance on the possibility of a future Israeli state, began.
This time period also saw various instances of direct and indirect communication
between what would eventually become some of India’s and Israel’s first and most
important leaders. The section extends analysis to approximately 1956 as this marks
historical milestone in the first phase of India-Israel relations. It was by 1956 that nearly
all discussion by Nehru and India’s government regarding potential establishment of
relations had subsided and that any potential modes of progress in the matter became
closed, leading to a period of what can essentially be deemed ‘non-activity’ until over a
decade later.
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Section three of this chapter details the years from 1967 to approximately 1983.
During this time period we see renewed activity on behalf of India’s leaders and the
development of the country’s policy towards Israel. This renewal of activity, and the
relevance of certain religiously-related issues vis-à-vis India’s Israel policy, took place
within the context of two major military engagements between Israel and the Arab world:
the Six-Day War (1967) and the Yom Kippur War (1973). These critical eve ints the
historical time-line of the Arab-Israeli conflict ultimately resulted in the Indian
government’s reconceptualization of certain attitudes towards Israel, while
simultaneously working to reinforce other, previously established views held since the
days of Partition.
This section also highlights developments that took place from the late 1970s until
approximately the early 1980s, the final years preceding the rise of the Hindu nationalist
BJP within Indian politics. When the first critical conciliatory event of the Arab-Israeli
conflict took place in 1978 with the Egyptians under the leadership of Sadat agreeing to
peace with Israel, India’s policy towards the Israelis, by contrast, was arguably at its most
hostile. Despite the partial degree of rapprochement between Israel and certain members
of the Arab world, India’s combative stance towards Israel reached new levels under the
leadership of Indira Gandhi and her reinvigoration of India’s seemingly absolute, proPalestinian stance from decades prior. This time period also becomes relevant as these are
the years immediately preceding the onset of normalization and, as such, can provide key
insights as to ‘why’ and the ‘when’ of the eventual shift in policy towards the Israeli
state.
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Identity Politics: Religion-Based Nationalism’s Birth in Israeli and Indian
History

Zionism: The Quest for a Jewish National Home
The state of Israel has a sovereign history nearly identical in length to India’s that
is also riddled with strife and conflict with a neighboring Muslim-majority nation. Unlike
India, however, the genesis of Israel as sovereign, Jewish nation was inhibited by several
circumstantial disadvantages for those leading the charge. These included Jewish
minority status in the region and the lack of formally recognized political institutions
within the territory, like the Indian National Congress in India, which created an
organized political front that could be utilized against the British in the fight for selfdetermination. Furthermore, the beginnings of Jewish nationalism started not in the land
that would become Israel, but a half-continent away in Central and Eastern Europe.
The beginnings of the conflict may be seen to coincide with the advent of
Zionism. Moses Hess is credited with making the first clear reference to the desire for a
Jewish homeland in his 1862 work, Rome and Jerusalem: The Last National Question,
and was followed by other writers such as Leon Pinsker and Eliezer Ben-Yehuda up
through the end of the 19th century. (Scheindlin, 1998, p. 219) It was the Hungarian-born
Jew Theodore Herzl, however, who can be credited with turning this idea of Zionism into
an international movement before his death in 1904 when he wrote The Jewish State in
1896 and organized the First Zionist Congress the following year. The First Zionist
Congress, which included 204 delegates from the world over and took place in Basel,
Switzerland, was a critical junction in the genesis of Zionism. (Bickerton & Klausner,
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2002, p. 25) At this marquee gathering, Jewish leaders clearly defined Zionism’s primary
objective and came to a basic resolution stating, “Zionism aspires to the securing of a
national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, guaranteed by public law” (Gelvin,
2014, p. 77; Scheindlin, 1998, p. 220).
The political nature of this venture is clear and the appeal it would have to many
traditionalist Jews of Eastern Europe as a trend that would, “…preserve Judaism and the
Jewish tradition through the reestablishment of a religiously based Jewish culture located
in the traditional Jewish homeland of Eretz Israel 10”, resulted in the creation of the
political ideology of modern Zionism and the ideological base of what would become the
world’s only sovereign Jewish state in 1948. (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002, p.26) The
statement regarding Zionism’s primary objective, therefore, highlights two very
important characteristics that relate to Israel’s current and past conflicts with its neighbor.
The first is the notion of a national home in Eretz Israel (what was then Palestine) for the
Jewish people. This roots nationalistic desires in a foundation of Jewishness that
embodies a people of a shared cultural, ethnic and religious identity. Secondly, this home
was to be founded on land that had historically sacred ties to Judaism, but was at that
time neither under the dominance nor the control of Jewish people. One of history’s most
famous modern Jewish philosophers, Martin Buber, was keen to cement the link between
Zionism and of the “sacred” in a series of speeches given in Prague between 1909 and
1911. In his summary discussion of the ideas Buber expounded in these speeches, Baum
notes:

10

Hebrew for ‘Land of Israel’.
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At the very outset of these speeches, Buber explains that the Jews are a
nation and at the same time more than a nation, for they are defined by a
unique relationship to the Eternal One. Yet it would be a mistake, he
[Buber] continues, to dwell on the spiritual dimension without appropriate
attention to concrete Jewish history, the succession of generations, and the
great event that had shaped their common destiny. Jewish identity is
defined by the spirit and the flesh.
Since Jewish existence is both a spiritual and a bodily dimension, Jews
cannot escape their dividedness while living in countries founded by other
nations. Jews can experience their liberation only in Zion; only there will
they be able to experience the unity between spiritual roots and societal
institutions. (2001, p. 22)
Several of the characteristics of the ‘primordialist’ approach towards ‘nationhood’ are
touched upon including territory, shared history, a common spirit embodied in destiny,
and an inseparable bond to the “sacred”, envisaged here as infinite and monolithic being.
The utility of reference to religion-based nationalism is demonstrated in this description
which works to create a conception where the social becomes inextricable from the
divine.
During the time period entering into the 20th century, the land of Palestine was a
sparsely populated area that was primarily inhabited by Muslims of Arab decent and
under the control of the declining Ottoman Empire. While Zionist aspirations to establish
a future Jewish State in the land of Israel frequently propagated a seemingly ideal vision
of this answer to the Jewish problem in Europe, and even romanticized the notion to an
extent, the reality for Jews in Ottoman Palestine early on in the 19th century was less than
desirable. This was a society based on a principle of Muslim superiority which, in part,
resulted in varying degrees of conflict between Jews and Muslim-Arabs, thereby creating
a historical precedent prior to the Balfour Declaration for the modern-day conflict that
currently exists:
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Jews were subject to a number of discriminatory regulations. For example,
their testimony against Muslims in a court of law was not accepted; they
were normally not eligible for appointment to the highest administrative
offices; they were forbidden to carry arms or to serve in the army; and
they were subjugated to oppression, extortion, or violence by both the
local authorities and the Muslim population. (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002,
p. 20)
While conditions for Jews there did improve in the second half of the 19th century, the
collective memory of those events and conditions was not forgotten and the notion of a
sovereign Jewish state in Palestine would be embraced by many. The subsequent increase
in Jewish immigration to Palestine and the support that early Zionist ideas received did
not go unnoticed by the local Muslim-Arab population. As early as 1891, Zionist Asher
Ginsberg (aka Ahad Ha’am) noted that:
The Arabs, and especially city dwellers, understand very well what we
[the Jews] want and what we do in the country… when the day will come
in which the life of our people in the Land of Israel will develop to such a
degree that they will push aside the local population by little or by much,
then it will not easily give up its place. (McDowall, 1989, p. 187)
With the growing propagation of the Zionist idea amongst the residents of Palestine
during this time period, a divide began to set in between neighbors and friends. This
divide came as the result of complex social constructions based initially on religious
identities of being either Jewish or Muslim and eventually evolved into the basis of the
ethnic identities of being Jewish or Arab. These people had always been Jewish, Muslim,
and Arab, but the impending reality of Zionism now caused a shift in the social
construction of these individuals and how they would now perceive their neighbors as
either friend or foe.
The political development and history of the attempt to establish the sovereign
nation of Israel from the early twentieth-century up until the commencement of WWII
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can largely be explained within the context of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and three
critical pieces of writing: 1.) the correspondence between King Hussein of Arabia and Sir
Henry McMahon; 2.) the Balfour Declaration (the promises contained within these
documents essentially formed the Mandate for Palestine); and 3.) the British ‘White
Papers’. Correspondence between King Hussein of Arabia and the High Commissioner in
Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, in 1915 and 1916 seemed to guarantee Arab independence
in a post-WWI Middle East, which the Arabs believed would include the land of
Palestine. (Ciment, 1997, p.29) While not a formal agreement for political autonomy,
King Hussein used his forces to initiate the Arab Revolt of 1916 in support of BritishAllied forces fighting the Ottomans in Arabia and other parts of the Ottoman Empire,
including parts of modern-day Israel and the Palestinian territories. While these forces
would play a relatively minor rule with regard to British military efforts in the region, the
support given by Hussein’s Arab nationalist forces to the British was to be in exchange
for the right to establish an Arab “state or states” within the Arab territories of the
Ottoman Empire. Despite the ambiguity of British promises, Hussein took this promise as
being inclusive of the territory of Palestine. (Gelvin, 2014, p. 81)
October 1918 brought with it the end of Ottoman rule over the land of Palestine,
but the plans for administration of former Ottoman territory were initiated two years
earlier in 1916 with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. In a move seemingly opposite the
“gentlemen’s” agreement outlined in the Hussein-McMahon letters, the British and the
French essentially took all the areas formally under Ottoman control and carved out areas
of direct colonial influence and governance. During the same timeframe, however, the
British would further complicate the issue raised around Arab self-determination and the

66

governance of Ottoman Palestine by holding discussions and making similar “promises”
to those leaders at the forefront of the Zionist cause.
Since its beginning as an international movement two decades prior, the Zionist
movement had gained considerable support among Jews and was becoming a clear threat
in the eyes of the Arabs who inhabited the highly coveted land of Palestine. The support
given to British forces by Zionist leaders as well as Hashemite Arabs in the fight against
the Ottomans during WWI merited both the Zionist and Arab factions’ simultaneous, yet
conflictual, promises for an independent nation in what was then British controlled
Palestine. These “promises” of independent nations to both Zionists and Arabs would
only foster the rising development of a nationalist zeal. This zeal was rooted in both
ethnic and religious contexts and would substantially increase regional conflict in the
decades following.
In 1917, as promised to Zionist leaders, the British seemingly issued an official
statement granting Jews a “homeland” in Palestine. The statement, known as the Balfour
Declaration, was a part of what would become the British Mandate for Palestine in 1920
under the San Remo agreement. This mandate would be backed by the newly formed
League of Nations and also included a provision for the establishment of a degree of
Hashemite control over the Trans-Jordan under the leadership of King Hussein.
(Blumberg, 1998, 40-43) Lord Balfour’s declaration stated the following:
His Majesty’s Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine
of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best
endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the
rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. (Ciment,
1997, p. 29; Gelvin, 2014, p. 81)
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Again, the conflictual nature of British promises to the factions involved is reflected in
both the ambiguity of this declaration and the course of action the British would pursue
up until the establishment of the Israeli state. This is a declaration that leaves the entity in
question to be a vague territory without definitive borders, while saying nothing about the
economic, political or national rights of the non-Jews who were living in that territorial
entity at that time. (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002, p. 41)
During the three decades between the Balfour Declaration and the Israeli
independence in 1948, Zionists faced an increasingly up-hill battle against the British and
their foreign policy while at the same time dealing with continually increasing conflict
with a larger, but less internally well equipped, Arab rival. The Cairo Conference of 1921
would establish the son of Sharif Hussein, Abdullah Hussein, as the emir (i.e. prince) of
the “Trans-Jordan”, a detached territory east of the Jordan River taken from the Palestine
mandate and an area where Jewish immigration was all but halted. (Gelvin, 2014, p. 88)
While Zionists faced an increasing multitude of difficulties throughout this
timeframe, several important institutions arose to support and maintain the Zionist dream
including the Haganah, 11 the Histadrut, 12 and the Palestine Foundation/Jewish National
funds, both of which would finance the purchase of Arab land. (Ciment, 1997, p. 29-30)
By contrast, there was relatively little internal institutional support from within the
Palestinian Arab ranks. Much of the relative “success” the Arabs of Palestine had during
the thirty years preceding the establishment of Israel was due to policies enacted, and

11

A clandestine, civilian defense organization, the creation of which was instituted in 1921 as a resulted of
repeated Arab attacks on Jewish settlements. (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002, p. 46)
12

Israel’s socialist labor union (Blumberg, 1998, p. 49) founded in 1920
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actions taken, by the British government who sought to balance conflict between the two
factions. In reality these policies and actions benefited the Palestinian cause and its
leadership who at the time was commissioned to the Higher Arab Committee headed by
Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. (McDowall, 1989, p.189-90)
The British White Paper of 1922, also known as the “Churchill Memorandum”,
which limited Jewish migration by virtue that it, “… cannot be so great in volume as to
exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new
arrivals” (Cohn-Sherbok & el-Alami, 2003, p. 125), created yet another obstacle in the
drive for a sovereign Jewish state in Palestine. By 1924, the British would renounce their
commitment to the Balfour Declaration. Furthermore, the years 1921 and 1929 brought a
series of Arab riots which resulted in the deaths of scores of Jews, while the great Arab
revolt of the 1930’s against Zionists as well as British forces would result in the deaths of
many more Jews as well as over 5,000 Arabs. (Ciment, 1997, p. 31) In 1930 and again in
1939, the British government issued White Papers in a move that further limited Jewish
immigration to the region, essentially appeasing Arab demands, while working to set
back the efforts of the Zionist faction. As David McDowall notes:
In 1939, the Higher Arab Committee made another disastrous error of
judgment in rejecting the British White Paper. This promised most of what
the Arabs wanted, restricting Jewish immigration to ensure the Arabs
remained the majority and the promise of an eventual Palestinian
government that would in due course acquire sovereignty. (1989, p. 190)
Predictably, Zionists outright rejected the recommendations put forth by the British
White Paper and became intolerant of Britain’s continuously disadvantageous treatment
of them. This latest installment of the White Papers basically brought Zionist political
ambitions for the establishment of a Jewish state to a near complete halt and seemed
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make the promise of a future, independent Arab state in Palestine all but certain. As a
result, the Zionist campaign for an independent Israeli state became increasingly more
violent in the years leading up to 1948 as break away extremists like the Irgun 13 and the
Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (also known as the Stern Gang) continued to violent
attacks and bombings against both Arab and British targets. (Ciment, 1997, p. 32)
The sheer horror of the Holocaust, what it did to the European Jewish community,
and the growing issue of Jewish displaced persons, all combined with the actions of
zealous Jews in British Palestine to create a situation that required an immediate answer
for the populations in question. Finally, in considering the previous turn of events leading
up to the eve of Israeli independence, and its repeated failures to find a solution, the
British government handed over responsibility for the problem in Palestine to the United
Nations in May 1947. It was the UN’s eventual partition plan that would become the
central disagreement in the ongoing struggle for Palestine. (McDowall, 1989, p. 191) A
UN special committee on Palestine, known as UNESCOP, was established in order to aid
in dealing with the Palestinian issue. After considering the Zionist partition plan and the
Arab plan for a unilateral state, two alternatives were offered by UNESCOP: (1) a
partition onto two states with an international zone surrounding Jerusalem and (2) a
proposal for a federal state, the first of which was supported by Zionists and neither of
which was supported by the Arab faction. (Ciment, 1997, p. 33)
We see here initially an acceptance of a potential sovereign state of Palestine on
the part of what was to become an independent Israel. The plan of partition, which the

13
An underground paramilitary group, organized along military lines, whose function was to strengthen the
armed capabilities of Palestine’s Jewish population (i.e. the Yishuv) for what was believed to be an eventual
conflict with the Arabs and/or the British. (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002, p. 73)
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UN would eventually vote to implement, brought the issue of territorial allocation to the
forefront of the conflict, where it remains even until the present day, by granting large
sections of Arab-majority land to what would be the newly form Jewish controlled state
of Israel. (Ciment, 1997, 33-34) On May 14th, 1948, the sovereign state of Israel was
established in what became a unilateral declaration of independence due to the rejection
of all plans by the Arab faction. The result would be an Israel that was no longer
obligated to recognize an independent Palestinian state and an Arab faction that refused
to recognize the sovereignty of the newly established state of Israel.
Although clashes had been taking place since early 1948, war would officially
ensue immediately after the declaration of Israel’s independence. Israel’s War of
Independence would be the first of several violent conflicts between themselves and their
Arab-Muslim neighbors over the next several decades, conflicts that stemmed from a
territorial dispute that was ultimately rooted in the concerns over the ethnic and religious
identity of the groups in control of these lands.

Religious Identity and Indian Politics: The Rise of Religious Nationalisms
Nationalism on the part of both Hindus and Muslims took hold under the watchful
eye of British colonialists. India has traditionally long been identified with a Hindu
culture that, with the advent of the concept of Hindutva in the early 1920’s, came to
feature hostility to all but indigenous religious practices, including Hinduism, as its main
unifying factor 14. The implementation of this concept in Indian society marked Muslims

14
Indigenous religious practices of India in the context of Hindutva refer to major world religions that have
their origins on Indian soil including not just Hinduism, but Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism.
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as “Other” and to be excluded since Islam is not a religion indigenous to the Indian subcontinent. This sentiment was the primary catalyst for partition and embodied a
nationalistic ardor opposed to securing rights and privileges for British India’s largest
religious minority population, the Muslims. As the 1920’s began to unfold, a series of
competing nationalist discourses vying for Indian self-rule unfolded with it:
The competing visions all tried to address the most pertinent question of
the day, namely, the relation between cultural communities and the
question of which community the Indian nation was going to belong to.
(Hansen, 1999, p. 44-45)
From this context would develop concurrent yet divergent movements to separate British
India’s population based along the lines of social, political and national differences, each
of which was embodied in a religious identity ultimately believed to be in contrast to the
other.
The development of religiously-based, nationalist movements of Hindus and
Muslims in British India has resulted in political and communal violence between the
groups that has been ongoing for more than a century now. The eventual partition of
India and Pakistan worked to invigorate the clash of nationalist ideologies that has left an
enduring hostility between Hindus and Muslims within, and between, the two sovereign
states. Over the years, this hostility would become more and more evident in the rhetoric
of both Hindu and Muslim nationalists. For India, the consequences of the formation of
these identities would ultimately play out in the domestic political and social spheres, as
the construction of Hindu identity would become synonymous, in part, with that which
was opposed to the Islamic “Other”.
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The Early Days of Hindu Nationalism
The roots of Hindu nationalism can be found in the religious Hindu reform
movements of the early 19th century beginning with the Bengali reformer Raja Rah
Mohan Roy. Roy, a Hindu who was greatly influenced by rationalist Western
philosophies, founded in 1843 the Brahmo Samaj 15 which sought to do away with the
social evils of Hinduism such as the caste system and the notion of the inferiority of
women while encouraging cultural and intellectual activities. (Malik et al., 2009, p. 21) A
little more than a quarter-century later, Gujarati Brahmin Swami Dayanand was another
active voice in the reform movement of the time period, as is evidenced by his creation of
the Arya Samaj 16 in 1875. Like the Brahmo Samaj the Arya Samaj similarly sought to do
away with evil Hindu social practices in a manner that was somewhat ‘revivalistic’ as
opposed to ‘universalist’, however. (Sharma, 2002, p. 21) As such, and in a fashion
dissimilar to the Brahmo Samaj, Swami Dayanand took a largely rejectionist stance
towards the West and its influence, vehemently opposing Islam and Christianity, while
simultaneously glorifying the Hindu past. (Malik et al., 2009, p. 21-22) In comparative

15

The Brahmo Samaj sought social and religious reform of Hinduism by introducing and institutionalizing
what they believe to be modernizing, rational concepts. These included, but were not limited to, concepts of
monotheism, rejection of idol worship, emancipation of women and the doing away with India’s ancient
caste system. For a thorough and more detailed discussion on the origins and history of the Brahmo Samaj
refer to Kopf (1979).
16

The Arya Samaj worked towards many of the same social goals as both their reformist predecessors and
their British colonizers, but on the basis of Hinduism’s own historical traditions and sacred scriptures, the
Vedas, rather than on the basis of Western philosophical thought or ideas. The ideological rhetoric of the
Arya Samaj categorically rejected British or Western influence in India’s religious revival, while seeking to
restore Hinduism to a perceived greatness of a past ‘golden age’. In this way it became a more divisive
element than any previous reform movement in its contribution to imminent processes of the formulation of
the religious nationalisms. For further reading on the Arya Samaj, and how it affected the Hindu-Muslim
divide taking place during this time period, refer to Fischer-Tiné (2000).
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fashion, Swami Vivekananda preached of the greatness of the Hindu tradition while also
highlighting its superiority over the Western culture characteristic of India’s British
overlords. (Malik et al., 2009, p. 22)
The significance of these reform movements, which have their base and
inspiration in the Hindu religion, worked to create a cultural revival in India and
encouraged a collective Hindu identity united under a single banner. The resulting aim of
these efforts is summed up in the following:
It was not surprising, therefore, that the glorification of Indian history
became a staple of writings in various regional languages in India. In
addition, literary elites and political leaders used Hindu religious symbols
to arouse patriotism. They identified Indian nationalism with Hinduism
and deified the motherland. Recollection of the glories of the past was
essential to the creation of a sense of national respect and a new national
identity. (Malik et al., 2009, p. 22)
Here one can gather the essential role that the reform movements had in the process of
development of Indian nationalism. Despite the various movements towards a united
Hindu identity taking place and the foundations of Hindu nationalist thought beginning to
materialize during this time period, the situation on the ground in India was still quite
fluid, and could even be described as conflated, prior to 1900. Indian society was
generally quite accomodationist with regards to non-Hindu elements, especially Muslim
ones, at both political and social levels. For example, this reality of Hindu indifference
towards Islam was particularly evident when observing Hindu displays of reverence for
certain Muslim shrines and saints. (Sharma, 2002, p. 11)
As British India forged ahead into the twentieth century, ideas of rigidity
concerning religion coalesced, while nationalist concepts and movements within society
took on a more organized and coherent front. The hallmark feature of plurality and the
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accustoming nature traditionally found within Hindu and Muslim practice of India began
to dissipate under the rapidly changing social and political conditions under way at this
point in India’s history. At this juncture, accommodation seemingly became less and less
of a reality. Sharma summarizes the pernicious environment, stating:
The first development [i.e. religion] meant that political differences based
on religion could not be accommodated regionally. Given the emergent
concept of a nation they had to be dealt with at the national level, in the
singular. Moreover, the monolithisation (sic) of the Hindu and Islamic
traditions closed off the fissures of adjustment between them socially and
locally, and made them face, and then confront, each other as single
consolidated entities. (2002, p. 12)
The progression of Hindu nationalism can be seen in its development through,
and occupation of, institutions such as the Indian National Congress and the Indian Civil
Service (ICS). With the establishment of the INC in 1885, the nationalists were provided
with an avenue to more effectively deal with the British and issues related to selfdetermination. In 1915 Hindu nationalists converged under the banner of its first political
party known as the Hindu Mahasabha. Evolving from the regional political group, the
Punjab Hindu Sabha which was established in 1907 sought to band together a
recognizably disunited and disorganized Hindu front that would represent “Hindu
interests” on the national stage in the face of a recently organized effort by British India’s
Muslim community with the same goals. (Hansen, 199, p. 76-77) While the influence of
this party was rather marginal both before and after the Partition movement, it never the
less became significant as the the original political platform from which Hindu
nationalists officially participated in India’s domestic political process. Further, it also
provided V.D Savarkar and his Hindutva ideological framework a political stage on
which it could be developed and from which it could be propagated.
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By 1915, with the arrival of Mohandas K. Gandhi onto the scene, the INC
developed into a mass political movement and created a more unified Hindu nationalist
fervor with which to combat British imperialism. (Corbridge and Harriss, 2007, p. 15-16)
During this time Hindu nationalists were operating primarily through the political
apparatus of the INC alongside the majority Gandhians, or “territorial nationalists”, as
well as the other minority Muslim nationalists of the All India Muslim League. (Sharma,
2002, p. 21) While a united effort existed beginning in 1919 under the guise of the
Khilafat movement, the collapse of this movement saw the divergence of these
nationalisms in what became the period shortly following the introduction of Hindutva
into British India’s independence narrative and just prior to the formation of the
Rashtriya Swamsevak Sangh (RSS), perhaps the most prominent symbol of this breach.
(Sharma, 2002, p. 21)

Hindutva
One of the first and most influential attempts at bringing social and political
cohesion to the Hindu nationalist movement during this time period was Vinayak
Damodar (V.D.) Savarkar. In 1923, Savarkar was the first to use the term Hindutva and
would create the foundation for the ideology that the BJP would adopt as their creed over
six decades later. Paralleling my earlier discourse describing the orthopraxic nature of
Hinduism, Savarkar’s discussion of Hindutva and Hinduism began by distinguishing
between these two closely related, yet distinct terms, whereby Hindutva comes to
encompass all that characterizes Hinduism and more. According to Savarkar, the essence
of Hindutva could only be understood by first differentiating it from who or what could
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fall under the label of “Hindu” 17. For Savarkar, the term “Hindu” was primarily a
reference to a people united by the love of and, identification with, a common motherland
(Rastra) as well as by common blood or race (Jati). (1969, p.84) Hindutva, while
inclusive of notions of common recognition of a sacred land and common blood,
additionally reflects the recognition of a common civilization, or Sanskriti as Savarkar
calls it. (1969, p. 92) Civilization, of course, is a loaded term in and of itself and includes
several marked characteristics, many of which in this case were highlighted in the
previous conversation on Hindu orthopraxis and which will be examined again in the
next chapter as themes of the 2007-08 Hindu-Jewish dialogues. He first highlights the
historical component found among those who describe themselves as part of a
civilization. For those Hindus who fall under the banner of Hindutva, from “Ceylon to
Kashmir”, Savarkar notes that, “We [those from Ceylon to Kashmir] had kings in
common. We had stability in common. We had triumphs in common and disasters in
common” (1969, p. 94), all of which are documented in a common literature written in
and connected by the common sacred tongue of Sanskrit. (1969, p. 95)
Further characterizing a united Hindu civilization are common architectural
designs, laws, institutions, and the observation of “feasts and festivals” which Savarkar
notes are celebrated by the people who have, “… deliberately refrained from referring to
any religious beliefs that we as a race may hold in common” (1969, p. 99). In distancing
17

Note that for Savarkar, to define who or what a Hindu is, was essentially an exercise of impossibility due
to the all-encompassing nature of the term which he believed to be greatly limited by any existing
definition/description. Furthermore, any attempt to do so would also be an inherent exercise in Orientalist
thought, ignorant and grossly misleading. See Savarkar (1969) for further information regarding his views
on defining the term Hindu. This term is traced historically from its semantic origins in the term ‘Sindhu’,
which refers to the ‘Indus’ river and was purportedly first used by the Aryan race of the Vedas, according
to Savarkar. Refer to Sharma (2002) for a detailed academic analysis describing and differentiating
between the terms ‘Hindu’, ‘Hindustan’, ‘Hinduism’ and ‘Hindutva’.
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himself from any narrow religious definition(s) of Hinduism, Savarkar sought to avoid
any potential political fall-out (Sharma, 2002, p. 22), or disintegration of his effort of a
united front against what he perceived to be “non-Hindu” influences in the Indian
freedom movement, that that may have resulted from such an exclusivist exercise. This
sort of understanding defined members of Indic-derived religions, those deemed to have
left Hindu “orthodoxy”, as legitimate Indian nationals based on their recognition of
India’s intrinsic holiness and the existence of a majority of their major holy sites in the
modern Indian state. (Abraham, 2014, p. 116-117)
Again, this line of thought is indicative of a Hinduism that is not simply a
religious phenomenon, but an entire way of life embodied in a distinct and primordial
civilization, thereby bringing other “religions” into the fold. He is keen to highlight his
concerns about the exclusion of other indigenous religions of India in this regard and in a
direct message of assurance to those he views as his indigenous “heterodox” Indian
brethren, including Jains, Sikhs, Lingayats 18 and Buddhists, he declares:
If you identify the religion of the Hindus with the religion of the majority
only and call it orthodox Hinduism, then the different heterodox
communities being Hindus themselves rightly resent this usurpation of
Hindutva by the majority as well as their unjustifiable exclusion. The
religion of minorities also requires a name. But if you call the so-called
orthodox religion alone as Hinduism then naturally it follows that the
religion of the so-called heterodox is not Hinduism. The next most fatal
step being that, therefore, these sections are not Hindus at all!” (Savarkar,
1969, p.106)

18

Lingayats are an Indian religious community with a monistic conception and who worships of the Hindu
god Shiva as their sole deity while outright rejecting any authority of the Vedas. (“Lingayat”, 2015) This
contrasts to, and is distinct from, the Brahmanical-based practice of Hinduism of Savarkar and many
Northern Indian communities.
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Therefore, this works to distance such practices, typically viewed in the West as
“religious” activities, away from compartmentalized definitions of religion and towards
the more expansive and inclusive, orthopraxic Hindu worldview. Thus, this creates an
identity that can be referenced in the context of an entire civilization.
To summarize then, Savarkar’s Hindutva is comprised of three requisites: a
common nation (Rastra), a common race (Jati) and a common civilization (Sanskriti).
(Sharma, 2002, p.22; Savarkar, 1969, p. 116) Throughout his tenure in Indian politics,
both prior to and after the Partition movement, Savarkar’s rhetoric and his writings are
thoroughly laden with language that, not only highlights these three requisites on a
consistent basis, but that frequently does it in the context of an imminent threat from
Islam and India’s Muslim constituency. Within this context Savarkar heeded the call for a
Hindu militarization movement aimed at ensuring a dominant position for Hindus in an
independent India (1969, p.4-7), he vehemently advocated for the exclusive use of
Devanagari script and Hindi, in combination with other indigenous Indian languages,
across Hindustan with his ‘anti-Urdu campaign (1969, p. 115-119, 170-173), and even
discussed a perceived covert effort on behalf of Indian Muslims at rallying Chinese
Muslims to their ‘anti-Hindu’ Pakistani cause prior to being partitioned. (1969, 48-51)
While some of Savarkar’s concerns regarding the perceived threat of Islam to the
social, cultural and political landscape of an independent India could, in hindsight, be
legitimized to varying degrees, there is no arguing the extreme tone that characterizes
many of his ideas and rhetoric. Nowhere are these ideas better documented than in his
frequent criticism of a Gandhian-dominated ideology embraced by the INC:
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If the Moslems do not want to be friendly with the [Hindu] majority, trust
it, and be loyal to the Indian State then they can never escape from the fear
of Hindu domination which is bound to be the factor irremovable from
Hindusthan (sic). Once you approach the Moslems avowedly “to please
them” with unjust and anti-national concessions, they can never be pleased
until they come to dominate Hindusthan. It is this mad hope of pleasing
the Moslems and calling it [‘territorial’] nationalism which has been at the
root of rendering the so-called national movement more dangerous and
fatal to the Indian Nation than the British occupation itself. (Savarkar,
1969, p. 161)
If the Moslems have their own political ambitions, possible or impossible,
then let them not forget that the Hindus have their own political
aspirations. Their racial soul is still cherishing to realise (sic) the
achievement of an absolute political independence of Hindusthan wherein
no anti-Hindu would be able to raise his head to browbeat. Our Hindu
history, at any rate, bears out the truth of this belief from Vedic days and
has consequently enabled our race to survive and revive during the world
struggles for existence down to this day. (Savarkar, 1969, p. 153)

It is therefore crucial to understand this fundamental point of how Savarkar’s threat
perception of Islam and the Islamic “Other” becomes a key factor in legitimizing his case
for Hindu-nationalist supremacy in Indian politics, society and culture. It is the language,
heavily present on the preceding quotes, which highlights Savarkar’s narrative that
became the dominant rallying call in the historical development of Hindu-nationalism,
and which would thereafter be embodied within the concept of Hindutva.

The Rashtriya Swamsevak Sangh
In 1925 the Rashtriya Swamsevak Sangh (RSS), an offspring of the Hindu
Masabha, was founded. With its creation came the establishment of an institution that
provided an organized social core from which the Hindu nationalist movement could
operate. The somewhat clandestine RSS sought to objectify Muslims as the “Other”
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within what was perceived to be an unabashedly Hindu India, while also perpetuating
Sarvakar’s ideology of Hindutva that essentially declared those with ancestral roots in
India, and who did not practice Islam or Christianity, to collectively constitute a Hindu
nation. The resulting understanding essentially equated religion with nationalism in a
manner that would gradually become politicized.
The founder of the RSS, K.B. Hedgewar, was of the Brahman caste and took his
inspiration for the formation of this organization from stories of a Hindu king from the
Indian state of Maharastra who became legendary for his resistance against the Mughals
and the British alike, resulting in what would become the RSS’s militant vision of the
Hindu state. In line with the central role of the king in his inspiration in the founding of
the RSS, it is no surprise that Hedgewar envisioned the RSS to be, “… the
kshatriyatized 19 antithesis to Gandhi’s nonviolent, ‘effeminate’ bhakti inspired Hindu”
(Hansen, p. 93, 1999). Hedgewar’s summation of the role of the Hindu in the developing
Indian national movement at the time echoe’s that of his contemporary V.D. Savarkar
and the ideology of Hindutva:
Hindu society living in this country since times immemorial is the national
society here and the main responsibility of this country rests with this
society. The same Hindu people have built the life-values, ideals and
culture of this country and, therefore, their nationhood is self-evident.
(Goyal, 200, P.47)

19

Kshatriya are one of the four ancient Varnas (or classes) found within Vedic scriptures in which Indian
social organization had been based for centuries until the establishment of the modern-nation beginning in
1947. The Kshatriya were the warrior/ruling class. They are second in the social hierarchy after Brahmins
(the priestly class) and are followed by Vaishyas (merchant/artisan class) and Shudras (service/labor class).
Although officially abolished after partition, remnants of this social system still function today to varying
degrees, especially in rural areas of India.
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Again, the notion of Hindu identity becomes inclusive of value, ideals, culture and
ultimately nationhood. As one method of synthesizing these ideas, the organization
placed particular emphasis on the relationship between physical prowess and spiritual
practice while largely conceding the belief of the superiority of Indian spirituality. (Van
Der Veer, 1994, p. 71) The militant tradition they sought to espouse would be reflected in
the celebration of their main festival of Dessehra which is based on the victory of the
Hindu god Rama over the demon-kin Ravana, one of the most important epics of Hindu
lore. The physical and the spiritual are synthesized in different martial arts, wrestling and
yogic events whose practice symbolized power, with its displays of physical strength, and
spiritual purity, with its young members’ adherence to celibacy, in a combination that
would, “…relate these ideas to a more political vision of the social hygiene of the nation”
(van Der Veer, 1994, p. 72).
Under the guise of the Hindutva worldview, the RSS notably developed concepts
relating to the link between “Hindu” culture and territory as well. Their heavy insistence
on the inseparable connection, both tangible and symbolic, between spirituality and
conceptualizations of nation-state worked to contextualize the Hindu claim to Bharat 20,
the Hindu nation, a claim that transgressed far beyond the state boundaries that would be
established during Partition approximately two decades later. This conceptualization of
the nation placed more importance on the spiritual principle as a measure of the
boundaries of the nation, rather than political power over the state in its administrative
form. (Jaffrelot, 2011, p. 31) The Hindu nation, Bharat, therefore, included any piece of

20
Bharata, or India, is a name found in ancient Hindu cosmogony that is short for “the Land of the Sons of
Bharata”. It refers to the southern zone of the southern continent of Jambudvīpa that was separated from
the rest of this continent by the Himālayas i.e. India. (Basham, 1967, p.490)
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land that was considered “sacred”, a condition directly correlated with the existence of
religio-historical ritual places or pilgrimage sites, and any land where Hindu culture was
indigenous and currently widespread, in Nepal for instance. (Jaffrelot, 2011, p. 31)
By 1940 an individual by the name of M.S. Golwalkar (aka Shri Guruji) ascended
to the top of RSS leadership with the death of Dr. Hedgewar. Golwalkar would go on to
become the chief ideologue of the RSS, while leading the organization through the most
controversial period of its entire history up until, and including, the modern-day. In his
writings in the late 1930’s, Golwalkar sought to highlight the critical role of cultural unity
as a prerequisite for the feasibility of the state. He attempted to demonstrate this notion
by using a framework that identified five “unities” that defined statehood including
racial, geographical, religious, cultural and linguistic. (Hansen, 1999, p. 80-81)
The overlap with Savarkar’s ideology is quite clear in the RSS’s propagation of a
definition of Hindu that is wholly inclusive of concepts of religion, ethnicity, culture and
nation, and the propagation of a sovereign India that is contingent on these conceptions.
However, while operating within a broad narrative similar to Savarkar’s with several
inter-related concepts being perpetuated, Golwalkar’s vision was primarily cultural as
opposed to political. This was due to Golwalkar’s belief in the “impure nature of politics”
and in, “… Hindu society as constituted by culture rather than any strong or viable state”
(Hansen, 1999, p. 83). So while Savarkar tended towards instigation and mass
mobilization within the political realm, Golwalkar was focused on cultural activism and
the character of the movement.
In 1937 Savarkar was elected to the position of president of the Hindu
Mahasabha and the division between it and Golwalkar’s RSS widened. Here, Savarkar
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pushed on a campaign built around anti-Muslim rhetoric and full-fledged political
activism, while Golwalkar maintained his cultural strategy aimed at a more gradual
transformation of Indian society’s habits, norms, and moral standing (Hansen, 1999, p.
92-94). This was not the only division plaguing Hindu nationalist efforts at the time,
however, as the RSS itself became increasingly divided between those who accepted
Golwalkar’s strategic vision of the organization and those who sought to create an RSS
that much more closely resembled the hardline, and at times radical, position put forward
by Savarkar. As Andersen and Damle note:
As the RSS took a “cultural” path and terminated many of the public,
high-profile activities, considerable internal tension arose. Two camps
evolved during the organization-as tendencies rather than factions-one
consisting of “traditionalists”, the generation, mainly Maharastrians ,
favoring character building; and “activists”, the younger generation,
mainly north Indians, favoring agitation and mass action. (1987, p. 108109; Hansen, 199, p. 95)
This divide began to increase and manifest itself more violently in the years and
months approaching the Partition. The “activists”, in contrast to what Golwalkar and
other leaders were urging, increased their engagement in communal violence and justified
it through a narrative built around what was perceived as a clearly threatening Muslim
enemy. The onus of responsibility for the eventual partition of Bharat as viewed by many
of these “activists” was placed squarely on the political leaders of the INC, judged as
corrupt and morally weak, and its influential supporters, including Gandhi. (Hansen, p.
95, 199)
The apex of this violent and extreme behavior materialized in January of 1948,
just five and half months post-Partition. RSS member Naturam V. Godse, a Hindu radical
and avid follower of Savarkar, would assassinate Gandhi and, in the process, strike a
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severe blow to the aim and cause of the RSS. The murderous action created a shock
effect among the populous that now saw a shift in support towards the Indian
government’s vision of secularism and Hindu-Muslim unity, while allowing the
government to subdue Hindu communalism. This turn of events would result in the
outlawing of the RSS for a few years while essentially extinguishing the “flame” of
Hindu nationalist influence for decades thereafter. (Wolpert, 2009, p. 375)

Muslim Nationalism
In a similar fashion as their fellow Hindu compatriots in British India, ideas of
Muslim nationalism found their roots in the Islamic religious reform of the century prior
to the Partition movement. The evolution of this reform process demonstrated attempts at
establishing in colonial India an ummah 21 of an orthodox nature, while also distancing the
community’s identity and ritual practice away from what were perceived heterodox forms
of Islam, particularly as embodied in certain Sufi practices. (Van der Veer, 1994, 58-64)
When religion is viewed in the context of a basis for national identity, the basic reason
for such a move towards a more orthodox version of Islam becomes much clearer. This
was essentially due to the syncretic nature of Sufi practice which could be observed to
include or accept certain elements traditionally associated with Hinduism, and whose
saints and shrines commonly drew the devotion of practicing Hindus. Thus during the
19th century, there was fear that the lines identifying who was a Hindu versus who was a
Muslim could become substantially blurred, if not invisible, in such a reality. Much of the

21

An Arabic word referring to an Islamic community
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conversation and debate over religion during this time would, therefore, have inextricable
relevance in the case for the Muslim nation-state in the years just prior to the onset of the
Partition. As van der Veer notes:
In historical writing on Indian Islam during the colonial period the
reformist attempt to define Islam by condemning certain established Sufi
practices is interpreted as being linked to the political assertion of
boundaries between the Muslim community and the Hindu community.
Emphasis on the social and cultural exclusiveness of the Muslim
community was used in the political struggle for a separate Muslim state.
(1994, P. 62)
The implication here is that religious identity and practice formed the foundation for the
dichotomy between “Self” and “Other” during this time in colonial Indian society and,
subsequently, two distinct nations based on this foundation. This put forth the beginnings
of a narrative where such nations would be entitled to self-determination, and ultimately,
their own sovereign state and right to self-governance.
Shortly after the INC came into existence in 1885, some of the first concerns
voiced regarding the minority status of Muslims within this newly organized political
apparatus, were iterated by Syed Ahmed Khan. India, as a country numerically
dominated by Hindus, led Khan to naturally believe that they would dominate the politics
and political agenda of any future nation as well. As Devji is keen to note:
Even the limited forms of democracy envisaged by Congress, then, struck
Syed Ahmed Khan as being potentially oppressive, as they might rely
upon the weight of numbers rather than rather than negotiation and good
will to ban such [Hindu forbidden] practices [like cow slaughter], to say
nothing of other liberties claimed by minority groups. (2013, p. 53)
Although a staunch modernist himself, Khan’s concerns about majoritarianism in the
domestic politics of India, independent or otherwise, aided in opening the discussion on
minority politics and religion in the country’s political realm. Furthermore, Khan was
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known to have made the assertion, albeit primarily within an academic setting, that two
nations based upon religion existed in India and that it would be “inconceivable” to ever
think that these nations could “remain in the same throne room in equal power”. (Callard,
1957, p. 11) And so, with Khan’s death in 1898, came a major shift in Muslim politics of
India. This shift would move away from the focus on the elitist-led, Muslim regionalism
envisioned by Khan, and towards a more pan-Islamic model which saw representation
from Muslim communities across India and its class spectrum. (Devji, 2013, 52- 68)
The development of Muslim nationalism in the political realm officially came to
fruition in the early 20th century as a response to the majority status of Hindu individuals
involved in leading the independence movement and also due to the growth and
ideational application of Hindu traditionalism within India’s native political realm as
well. The seeds of doubt and insecurity had been planted with the initial idea of the “twonation” theory, as Khan alluded to, and the political developments underway involving
the INC at this time. The majority perception by the Muslim constituency of the
developing situation, according to Callard, was an unfavorable one to say the least:
The Indian nationalist leaders, including some Muslims, might talk of
secular equality, but the Muslim reply was that firstly they distrusted the
reality of secularism among the majority of the Hindus, and secondly, that
they themselves had no wish for a secular state. Islam was their way of life
in public affairs as in private, and they were not prepared to renounce it
merely because some Hindus professed a willingness to make some like
sacrifice. (1957, p. 12)
This assertion, and understanding of the political developments it espouses, would
provide the foundation for a rallying call to action among India’s large Muslim minority.
This call came in an effort to avoid what they feared and perceived as an India that would
come to be dominated at every level by Hindu values, ideals, religion and culture.
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In the autumn of 1906, on what would come to be recognized as the eve of the
establishment of the Muslim League, India’s Muslims took their first step in their effort
to protect themselves against Hindu majoritarianism when they were granted a separate
electorate in the domestic political arena under the terms of the Morley-Minto Reforms.
The desire of Muslims for a separate electorate found its base in the concern over their
disproportionate numbers vis-à-vis the Hindu constituency. In addition to separate
electorates under this arrangement, councils and legislatures would be required to reserve
a number of seats for (religious) minorities that was markedly greater than the
representation that the minority population would otherwise warrant. In this regard,
Minto argued for increased Muslim representation that, “should be commensurate not
with merely their numerical strength but also with their political importance and the value
of the contribution which they make to the defence (sic) of the Empire” (Wolpert, 2009,
p. 288). This policy, known as “weightage”, was premised on non-numerical arguments
such as those that Minto endorsed and was implemented in an effort to provide minorities
with what was perceived to be a more effective form of representation in governance.
(Devji, 2013, p. 68) By 1909 Britain’s government would bring these reforms to fruition,
effectively empowering Muslim nationalists, while further incubating a scenario where
by a separation of religiously-based nations would gradually be perceived as the only
viable solution to the issue at hand.
As the early part of the century progressed, the INC took a central role in Indian
politics and was coming to be dominated by Hindus. This parallel development to the
Morley-Minto reform movement would further rally Muslims into political activity,
thereby resulting in the creation of the All-India Muslim League in 1906. Led by
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Muhammed Al Jinnah, this institution provided what would become a strong, stable body
for India’s Muslims. The Muslim League can be seen to have pursued a policy of relative
cooperation with the INC for approximately the next three decades following the Muslim
League’s establishment. Up until this time, the vast majority of the Muslim constituency
was not considering the end of British rule as a real possibility. This resulted primarily in
efforts of defense against the perceived Hindu threat within the established political
framework, rather than within a framework of a future, independent, Muslim-nationalist
state. (Callard, 1957, p. 12)
It became apparent at this juncture, however, that a Hindu-dominated INC was
pushing hard for a strong central government once independence was achieved, which
would have disadvantaged the Muslim minority in the eyes of the Muslim League. In
fact, at this time Ali Jinnah was putting forward an argument that was seemingly
paradoxical to the one that had primarily defined the Muslim League’s narrative based in
the minority status of Muslims in British India. Relative to India’s Hindu population,
which stood at approximately 75%, the Muslim minority population which stood at
slightly less than one quarter of the population (approx. 90 million 22) is indeed a fairly
substantial minority. However, in absolute terms, 90 million is a considerable number of
individuals, and greater than the total population of the majority of the world’s nationstates that existed during that time period. With this notion in mind, Jinnah highlighted
the concentrated nature of Muslim populations in British India and, riding on
constitutional legitimacy of the Muslim constituency established through the Morley-
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(Devji, 2013, p. 88)
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Minto Reforms, made an argument that these factors combined to create a political entity
too distinct to be regarded simply as a religious community. (Devji, 2013, p. 83) In
support of such a notion, Jinnah stated in 1939 that:
The Congress in insistence that they, and they alone, represent the people
of India is not only without any foundation, but is highly detrimental to the
progress and advancement of India. They know that they do not represent
the whole of India- not even all the Hindus, and certainly not the Muslims,
who are often wrongly described as a minority in the ordinary sense as
understood in the west. They are in a majority in the north-west and in
Bengal, all along the corridor stretching from Karachi to Calcutta. That
part of the Indian continent alone has double the population of Great
Britain and is more than ten times in area. (Devji, 2013, p. 83-84)
During roughly the same timeframe, in 1937, the Muslim League suffered a notable
setback in the provincial elections that year by winning only about twenty percent of
Muslim seats. This again resulted in the implementation of a defensive strategy that
reified the notion of “Islam in Danger” at its core. (Malik et al., 2007, p. 150) In March of
1940, the Muslim League adopted what is known as the Lahore resolution as an official
call for a separate Muslim state:
Geographically contiguous unit of British India are to be demarcated into
regions which should be constituted, with such territorial adjustments as
may be necessary, that the areas in which Muslims are numerically in a
majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be
grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent unit
shall be autonomous and sovereign. (Malik et al., 2007, p. 151)
In the days following the announcement by the Muslim League at Lahore, Jinnah
affirmed the basic core issue of the Muslim League’s concerns and their desire for an
independent state:
The Muslim minorities are wrongly made to believe that they would be
worse off and be left in the lurch in any scheme of partition or division of
India. I may explain that the Mussalmans (sic), wherever they are in a
minority, cannot improve their position under a United India or under one
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Central Government. Whatever happens they would remain a minority.
They can rightly demand all the safeguards that are known to any civilized
(sic) government to the utmost extent. But by coming in the way of the
division of India, they do not and cannot improve their own position. On
the other hand, they can, by their attitude of obstruction, bring the Muslim
homeland and six crores of the Mussalmans (sic) under one government,
where they would remain no more than a minority in perpetuity. (Jinnah,
1976, p. 19-20)
By the time of the 1945-46 provincial elections, the Muslim League’s efforts
showed signs of great reinvigoration and came to be regarded as the INC’s most
formidable rival as well as the biggest obstacle impacting the vision of a unified,
independent Indian nation that encompassed the entirety of the mighty sub-continent.
They captured nearly ninety percent of the seats in Muslim-majority provinces, while
keeping in mind that independence from Britain was imminent at this point and becoming
more and more vehement in their demand for a separate sovereign state as outlined in the
Lahore resolutions, the ultimate goal now being the creation of the world’s first Muslim
Nationalist state.

Partition: The Legacy of Religio-Nationalism
As a result, in part due to the critical years of division and conflict just prior to
Indian independence, the INC sought to bring Hindu nationalist more into the fold. They
sought to do this by rallying for their inclusion into the ICS and by successfully
reworking the politics of civil disobedience and non-cooperation, which urged Indians to
act as an independent nation. Policies such as these, organized and executed by the INC,
eventually led to the introduction of the India Independence Bill to the British House of
Commons in 1947. (Corbridge and Harriss, 2007, p. 16)

91

This historical timeline, which looks at the evolution of the religion-based
nationalism from reform to institutionalization to sovereign government, brings us to the
eve of an independent India. Wide spread dissention amongst India’s Hindu and Muslim
populations was the result of the outcry by the Muslim League, thereby making the
potential for civil war a serious possibility once independence was achieved. In a move
that went against their ideal vision of an independent India, the increase in violence and
tension ultimately pushed the INC to an agreement on the partition of India on the basis
of religion. (Malik et al., 2007, p. 29) The Mountbatten plan of partition, outlined and
implemented by the British, is summed up nicely in the following assessment by Mcleod:
Territories which had been governed directly under the British Raj
between 1858 and 1947 would be divided on the basis of religious
prominence. Areas where there was a Muslim majority would cede to one
of the two wings of Pakistan and areas of Hindu majority would accede to
India. The Princely states which had existed under British paramountcy
during the Raj, would accede two sovereign states. (2008, p. 71)
On August 15th, 1947 independence from Britain and partition descended upon India all
at once. The Indo-Pak conflict endures today because of four main areas of interrelated
concern: the deep ideological divide between the two nations, a history of military and
violent conflict, the Kashmir struggle, and cross-border terrorism. According to Sumit
Ganguly, a professor of Political Science at the University of Indiana-Bloomington, the
Indo-Pak rivalry should be one characterized by “unremitting hostility” of which the
underlying element can be traced back to fundamentally divergent ideological elements
of nationalist elites during the rise of the anti-colonial movement. (Misra, 2010, p.14)
This can be captured to a degree in the explanation I gave dealing with the rise of Hindu
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and Muslim nationalism and the tensions and rivalries that mounted between the INC and
the Muslim League prior to partition.

The Critical Early Years: Pre-Partition India until 1956
A significant influence on India’s choice to not establish relations with Israel can
be found in the debilitating process of partition with Pakistan and the sovereign nation of
India’s very beginnings. Prior to 1947, the potential partition of what was then colonial
India into two sovereign states based primarily along a religious divide, was an idea
unequivocally rejected by Congress leaders from its very inception in 1940. This
rejection was founded, first and foremost, on the staunch secular character brought to the
Indian freedom struggle by its leadership and those that would become India’s first
elected officials as a sovereign country, with Mahatma Gandhi and its eventual first
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru leading the charge. (Nair, 2004, p. 66-69) The influence
of such individuals is widely recognized by many, including some of India’s current and
best-known political leaders. As Indian politician Dr. Shashi Tharoor, Indian National
Congress party member and current Lok Sabha 23 elect from Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala,
notes:
Nehru was an extremely pro-Jewish person, particularly seen in his stance
and behavior towards Jews and their struggles within Hitler’s Germany.
He did not, however, have any sympathy towards the Zionist cause. Since
Pakistan had just been created on the basis of religion, the notion that
Israel was also being created along the same basis was an anathema to the
Indians. We rejected the notion because our entire state rests on the
principle of all of us having the same political allegiance to our country,
regardless of our faith. (Tharoor, Personal Interview, 2014)
23
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Similarly Dr. Abishek Singhvi, Indian National Congress party member and current
Rajya Sabha 24 elect representing the state of Rajasthan, confirmed the same in an
interview:
The historical evolution of India, especially during the contextual time of
partition, and what we came through, meant that Nehru rightly always
emphasized the secular, non-religious ethos of India and it was a very
important contextual thing. Everybody fought everybody else in hindsight,
but if you look at the context the upper most projected image was a secular
country’s image and you can link it with the non-aligned in the foreign
policy field or an objective stance, etc., but these were all the same
Nehruvian projections. (Singhvi, personal interview, 2014)
Because Gandhi was assassinated less than six months after the partition movement, the
onus of guiding and leading a newly independent India fell heavily on the shoulders of
Nehru and his supporters in the Indian National Congress. The impact and high degree of
influence that Nehru’s perception of the world and his ideas of governance had on India
early on, therefore, cannot be overstated here. It was his vision and the aims of the Indian
National Congress party which he led that would be primary in shaping India’s direction
as a nation, while also setting the tone for India’s foreign policy for decades to come.
A predominant characteristic of a secular India envisioned by both Nehru and
Gandhi was that of anti-racialism, a notion that played well into a grand narrative
depicting India as an unabashedly secular country that strives for objectivity in the world.
Both leaders of the Indian freedom movement professed a staunch commitment to antiracialism proclaimed what became India’s uncompromising stand on racial, ethnic and
religious equality that in turn would come to define India as a free, democratic and
secular nation. (Nair, 2003, p.35-36; Gandhi, 1947)

24
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Gandhi made his vision of a free and sovereign India clear in his well-known
message of tolerance, justice and extreme non-violence or ahimsa. When it came to how
he envisioned an independent India should function, he would consistently highlight the
aforementioned ideals but would frequently discuss these notions within the context of
India’s great plurality of religious identities:
Hindustan 25 belongs to all those who are born and bred here and who have
no other country to look to. Therefore, it belongs to Parsis 26, Bene Israelis,
to Indian Christians, Muslims and other non-Hindus as much as to Hindus.
Free India will be no Hindu raj, it will be Indian raj based not on the
majority of any religious sect or community, but on the representatives of
the whole people without distinction of religion. I can conceive of a mixed
majority putting the Hindus in a minority. They would be elected for their
record of service and merits. Religion is a personal matter, which should
have no place in politics. (Gandhi, 1947, p. 277-278; Joshi, 2007)

I do not expect India of my dreams to develop one religion that is to be
wholly Hindu or wholly Christian or wholly Mussalman (sic), but I want it
to by wholly tolerant, with its religions working side by side with one
another. (Gandhi, p. 257, 1947; Joshi, 2007)

Quotes like these illustrate that, although Gandhi envisaged a secular India in which no
group enjoyed any sort of special treatment or privilege, he still viewed the political and
social development of the nation primarily through a lens of inter-religious relations and
society whose members would identify one another vis-á-vis religious affiliation above
all else. In practice then, religion in India would become the ‘de facto’ means for social
organization and division as the centuries-old caste system began to gradually wane, a
process that is still very much underway today. Further, it seems as though Gandhi’s

25

Hindustan refers to a landmass comprised of modern-day India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

26
Note that this term refers to India’s community of individuals who belong to the ancient religion of
Zoroastrianism. The majority of India’s Parsis live in the modern-day city of Mumbai.
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notion of “religion having no place in politics” that he held with regard to India, did not
extend to the Israel-Palestinian issue. In the context of his long-running support for the
Khilafat movement, Gandhi made clear his unconditional refusal of any future nonMuslim governance in Jerusalem and Palestine noting that, “What non-Muslims could
not do was to acquire sovereign jurisdiction over Palestine” (Blarel, 2014, p.45). Despite
his clear call for the separation of religion from politics or governance, Gandhi is
recorded to have displayed a blatant preference for the political administration of any
future Palestinian state to exclusively be under the control of Muslims.
Nehru, in a similar fashion, also recognized the basic fabric of Indian social
organization to fall within the framework of its religious plurality, at least in practice. His
rhetoric acknowledged, although only implicitly at times, the role of religion as a key
component of India’s social organizing structure:
In a country like India, which has many faiths and religions, no real
nationalism can be built except on the basis of secularity. Any narrower
approach must exclude a section of the population and then nationalism
itself will have a restricted meaning than it should possess… Our
constitution lays down that we are a secular state, but it must be admitted
that this is not wholly reflected in our mass living and thinking… We have
not only to live up to the ideals proclaimed in our Constitution, but make
them a part of our thinking and living and thus build up a really integrated
nation. That does not mean absence of religion, but putting religion on a
different plane from that of normal political and social life. Any other
approach in India would mean the breaking up of India. (Nehru, 1980, p.
330-331)

It was Nehru’s perception then that religious identity, despite the great value he gave
religion, presented a considerable challenge to his vision of a united India whose citizens
would embrace a national, secular identity above all others.
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Despite the staunch commitment of Nehru and Gandhi to a secular India devoid
of religious favoritism, much of their rhetoric used during the Indian freedom struggle
was inclusive of language that referred to and identified India’s populous primarily in
terms of their religious identity. The argument here is that in the hard-pressed effort and
mission to ensure that the newly independent nation of India unquestionably remain a
democratic and definitively secular country, in both domestic politics and in its foreign
policy, it ended up doing just the opposite in some cases, specifically where their policy
towards Israel was concerned. Since normalization occurred, a multitude of scholarly
explanations have been put forward that attempt to explain the underlying reason(s) that
drove India’s policy towards Israel up until the time when relations were established.
Several of these alternate explanations will be addressed in the concluding chapter of this
work, but I continue here by putting forth an explanation where the politics of (religious)
identity can be seen to actively shape and drive India’s Israel policy.
In theory, India’s solidarity with the Palestinian cause was designed to be a clear
message to the Arab-Muslim world of their unwavering support for what they saw as an
objective and universally accepted injustice to a nation suffering under the yoke of
imperialism and brute force. As a leader of the developing world and as a secular,
democratic nation seen to be built on ideals of justice, tolerance and equality, there would
appear to be a natural expectation that India would support a disadvantaged people where
such ideals and inherent human rights were purportedly being violated and disallowed.
However in practice, I argue, this became an exercise of seemingly unconscious
(or unacknowledged) favoritism towards both domestic and foreign Muslim
constituencies as far as India’s stance towards Israel was concerned. The intense
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preoccupation of the majority of India’s leaders before, during and after independence
with not being seen as showing favoritism to its Hindu majority and maintaining an
undeniable secular character, actually led them towards a dynamic of favoritism vis-à-vis
the nation’s large Muslim majority in certain areas of domestic and foreign affairs. Hindu
nationalist members of the INC were the first to perceive and resist the existence of such
a dynamic, which of course was viewed by them as a policy of appeasement towards
Muslims. (Sharma, 2002, p. 23-24)
Domestically, several examples can be highlighted that would underpin the
perception or the actuality of Muslim appeasement. By the time of the creation of India’s
constitution, which was ratified in 1950, the debate over appeasement was already in full
swing:
… a number of [constitutional] framers, who were also ruling members of
the Congress Party, introduced legislation that transformed Hindu personal
law in the realms of marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Yet the same
legislators made a conscious effort to avoid changing Muslim personal
law, concluding that the still-fresh trauma of partition made it advisable to
defer legal reform of the Muslim minority’s religious practices to a later
time. This decision to defer the reform of Muslim personal law would later
play into the hands of Hindu zealots and political activists who could
disingenuously argue that the official secular state was actually a scheme
for pandering to minorities. (Ganguly, 2003B, p. 13-14)
Equality in civil law among Muslim and Non-Muslim Indians, and the country’s secular
credentials as a whole, were further put into question due to the disparity in legal
treatment between these two groups created as a result The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955.
This act formally legalized punishments, including imprisonment, for Hindus who
attempted to be involved in polygamous marriage unions while, at the same time,
Muslims were established to be free of such a restriction. (Jacobsohn, 2003, p. 112)
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Nearly 30 years on from the creation of the constitution, India’s Shah Bano case, which
lasted from 1978 until its final ruling in 1985, famously reiterated the previously
described controversy involving Muslim appeasement and particularly as it relates to
civil laws. This was a situation where an Indian court, in contrast to Muslim personal law,
ordered a Muslim man to pay alimony to his wife, a decision that was subsequently
overturned by PM Rajiv Gandhi and a move that still placed the degree of India’s
secularity and its seeming appeasement to its Muslim populace squarely into question.
(Ganguly & Mukherji, 2011, p. 154-155; Jacobsohn, 2003, p. 107-108)
A final example of India’s appeasement of its Muslim population during its
earliest years as a nation comes with regard to article 370 of the Indian constitution
which, among other things, “… prohibits the sale of immovable property in the only
Muslim-majority state in the Indian union, Jammu and Kashmir, to any non-Kashmiri ”
(Ganguly & Mukherji, 2011, p. 163). The fear here is that the overturning of this article
would allow Hindus to overrun the Jammu-Kashmir area and effectively change
demography in their favor. Therefore, it was with government policies such as these, that
the charges of appeasing India’s Muslim minority in the domestic sphere by the Nehruled Congress party were most notably found.
Regarding its foreign policy, secular India aimed to be perceived as a country of
objectivity, of cooperation, and of non-belligerence. India sought to promote an image of
neutrality to the world whereby its direct role in most any other country’s domestic
affairs was extremely minimal, if not non-existent. Nowhere was the attempt to
institutionalize this notion more apparent perhaps than in India’s central role as an
eventual leader of the Non-Aligned Movement established in 1961 in Belgrade. Prior to
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the establishment of this movement, however, several notable instances/events took place
that set the stage for India’s involvement in such a campaign.
Anti-colonial and anti-imperial sentiment had been a center-piece of the writing
and rhetoric surrounding India’s independence movement beginning many years prior to
its eventual attainment of self-rule in 1947. As McLane notes, “Colonialism’s
displacement of Indians from power induced anxiety and critical self-reflection, which
grew more intense as independence approached” (2010, p. 195). Within this context, an
interesting dynamic was formed through two notable characteristics of India’s identity
formulation and projection that become instrumental building blocks towards the
recognition and institutionalization of their ‘non-aligned’ status and, in certain ways that
will be explained later, to the eventual rise of Hindu nationalism in the 1980’s: notions of
historical victimization and notions of ‘Great Power’ status.
Identifying with victimization appears to have played a relevant role on both sides
of the political spectrum (i.e., the Congress Party on the left and the BJP on the right) at
certain time periods in recent Indian history. For the Congress party, this time period
featured most prominently from pre-partition up and through the establishment of NAM,
and for the political Right (i.e., the BJP), this narrative began in the mid-1980’s and was
still found to be present even at the turn of the millennium as will be demonstrated later.
With reference to the time period under review in this section (up until 1956), this theme
of victimhood was found to be present within the political narrative and functioned to
strategically assist India in defining India’s place in the international system and its
relationship with certain countries/regions.
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Identifying with the historical circumstance of imperialist victimhood was the
primary feature of the narrative(s) that underpinned much of the third-world’s
engagement with (former) imperial powers, and this was certainly the case for those
countries that would eventually join the Non-Aligned Movement. As Miller notes, “A
large category of states–states that have experienced imperialism and colonialism–do not
necessarily behave in the way that realists or liberals would necessarily predict because a
common transformative historical event contributes to a powerful ideology of victimhood
that dominates their decision calculus” (2013, p. 34). However, while notions of
victimhood were explicitly featured as a highlight of India’s policy towards the world as
self-perceived leaders of the struggle against colonialism, the absence of a real threat to
their sovereignty from any Great Power aided in the creation of a seemingly contrary
dynamic whereby their historical victimhood and status as a third-world country did not
inhibit them from practicing a fully independent policy as they viewed it.
India would maintain and play on its victimhood throughout this time-frame but,
unlike most other members of the anti-colonial movement that would eventually become
members of the NAM, India projected also itself as a special type of Great Power from as
early as 1948. As Nehru keenly conveyed:
I can understand some of the smaller countries of Europe or some of the
smaller countries of Asia being forced by circumstances to bow down
before some of the greater powers, because they cannot help it.
Nehru continued
We [in India] are not citizens of a weak or mean country (sic) and I think
it is foolish for us to get frightened, even from a military point of view, of
the greatest powers today. (Poplai, 1959, p. 24; Willetts, p. 6, 1978)

101

If we had been some odd little nation [sic] somewhere in Asia or Europe,
it (our independent policy) would not have mattered much. But because
we count.… Everything we do becomes a matter for comment…we are
potentially a great nation and power. (Poplai, 1959, p. 29; Willetts, p. 6,
1978)
India’s victimhood is implicit here as is an explicit degree of perceived equality with the
more traditionally recognized world powers of the time. As Amit Acharya of American
University, quoting Nehru, once stated, “Asian countries need to find a way of relating as
equals to the richer powers of the Western world” (Miller, 2013, p. 31). The humiliation
of colonialism created need to reacquire respect in international system and by affording
themselves Great Power status, India saw a means of accomplishing this feat. It did this
primarily by measure of “prestige”.
India’s sense of being a Great Power at this time came not from material wealth
or military might, but rather from its potential to attain these things given its large size,
amount of resources and massive population, and, more importantly, from the universal
“prestige” it believed it garnered from the “moralistic” policies based in Gandhian
tradition that it espoused. In this manner, “prestige” became a significant factor
influencing a state’s behavior through utilization by political groups as an end in and of
itself. (Miller, 2013, p. 31) The Gandhian tradition that provided the foundations for this
notion of “prestige” would therefore underscore the essence of India’s non-aligned
practice, as was succinctly summarized by Professor A. Appadorai, a former director of
the Indian School of Indian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, who stated its aim:
To keep the peace, try peaceful means–negotiation, inquiry, conciliation,
and arbitration; listen to the viewpoints of both parties to a dispute
expressed by their duly constituted representatives; hesitate to condemn
either party as an aggressor until facts proved by international inquiry
indisputably testify to aggression; believe the bona fides of both until
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[there is] proof to the contrary; explore fully the possibilities of
negotiation and at least localize war–this is India’s view. (Damodaran,
1982, p. 205)
India’s self-regarded “prestige”, combined with its potential for attaining more
traditionally recognized forms of international strength to create a novel image of a Great
Power that would be created markedly dissimilar to any other sort that existed at, or prior
to, that time period. The vision of how such a special type of power would independently
function in the international system and the role it would take on was clearly stated by
Nehru in 1948:
… we have to plough a lonely furrow in the United Nations…
Nonetheless… I am quite sure that by adopting that position, we shall
ultimately gain in national and international prestige… fairly soon… a
large number of the small nations… will probably look to India more than
to other countries for the lead. (Poplai, 1959, p. 17-18; Willetts, 1978, p.6)
Over the next several years, India would proceed to attempt reinforcement of such a view
through a combination of bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements, as well as through
means of international institutionalization.
This “moralistic”, non-partisan approach to the foreign policy of India was rather
vaguely codified in their 1954 trade and communications agreement over Tibet with
China in what is known as the Panchsheel 27 agreement. (Willetts, 1978, p. 7) The
principles of Panchsheel were then, in part, included in those found in the agreements of
the Nehru-organized Bandung Conference in 1955. India’s perceived position as a unique
Great Power that stood as the vanguard of the world’s former colonial entities that had

27
This agreement included five general principles: 1.) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity
and sovereignty ; 2.) mutual non-aggression; 3.) mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; 4.)
equality and mutual benefit; and 5.) peaceful co-existence. (Willetts, 1978, p. 7)
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historically been victimized by imperial powers 28 and were members of the third-world,
made it a “natural” fit for playing such a leading role in Bandung’s organization and the
political trajectory of these former colonial entities that would follow. Bandung, an event
which would precede the founding of the NAM by six years and prove highly influential
to it, included the participation of 29 sovereign states whose essential theme was
“condemnation of colonialism in all its manifestations” and the initial adoption of ten
principles 29 which “promoted world peace and cooperation”. (Potter & Mukhatzhanova,
2012, p.18)
From the very beginning of their sovereign nationhood, then, India’s philosophy
on foreign affairs was meant to highlight and project a sort of ‘open-door’ policy, a great
willingness towards consideration of relations with any nation. Nehru details this
philosophy during a speech to the Constituent Assembly in March of 1949, over a year
and a half after Indian independence:
And foreign relations, though they involve trade, business, etc., are not
like opening a branch of business firm as sometimes some of our business
magnates seem to imagine. It is very intricate and very difficult business
dealing with the psychology of human being, the psychology of nations,
involving considerations of their background and culture, language and so
on.

28

Including, but not limited to, the British, French, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, Belgians, Germans,
Italians, Russians, Japanese and Americas.
29
These principles included the following: 1.) respect for fundamental human right and objectives of the
charter of the United Nations; 2.) respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; 3.)
recognition of equality among all races and the equality among all nations, large and small; 4.) nonintervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of another country; 5.) respect for the right of every
nation to defend itself, either individually or collectively; 6.) (a) non-use of collective defence pacts to
benefit the specific interests of any of the great powers; (b) non-use of pressure by any country against
other countries; 7.) refraining from acts or threats of aggression, or the use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any country; 8.) peaceful resolution of all international conflicts in
conformity with the charter of the United Nations; 9.) promotion of mutual interests and cooperation; and
10.) respect for justice and international obligations. (Potter & Mukhatzhanova, 2012, p.18-19)
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… So our policy will continue to be not only to keep aloof from power
alignments, but to try and make friendly cooperation possible. Fortunately
we enter upon our independence as a country with no hostile background
in regard to any country. We are friendly to all countries. Our hostility
during the last 200 years was mainly directed towards the dominating
power here and because of India’s independence that hostility has largely
vanished, though it may survive in some people’s minds. So we approach
the whole world on a friendly basis and there is no reason why we should
put ourselves at a disadvantage, if I may say so, by becoming unfriendly to
any group. I think that India has a vital role to play in world affairs.
(Gopal, 1980, p. 367)

Nehru’s speech here implied that the very nature of India’s foreign relations would not be
limited by a state’s domestic identity or structure, and it explicitly stated that there should
be no reason why India could not have relations with any nation, a notion that by all
accounts should include Israel. This nature, purportedly anchored in Gandhian
philosophy, would be further underpinned and institutionalized as a founding party to the
Non-Aligned Movement, its precepts and all precedent agreements leading up to this
founding (i.e. Panchsheel, Bandung, etc.).
When it came to relations with the Jewish state, however, “background and
culture” ultimately did matter. Identity became a factor here despite Nehru’s words and
the very image that India claimed to project. It was not Israel’s background, culture or
identity that came into play, but rather the identity of those engaged in, or who perceived
themselves to be engaged in, direct or indirect conflict with the Jewish state – the ArabMuslim world and parts of the non-Arab Muslim world, including Pakistan – and India’s
desire to maintain the best relations possible with many of these entities. India sought the
friendship and support of the Arab-Muslim world for a variety of reasons relating to the
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size of their domestic Muslim population and, in particular, because of their on-going
dispute over Kashmir with Pakistan.
Nehru, however, seemed to be very well aware of the possibility that for some
states, identity, culture, background, language, etc., did in fact play a critical role in their
foreign policy, or at the very least that there were those who believed and propagated
such a notion. The Arab-Muslim world was one such example where this notion had been
raised as part of the international narrative on state-to-state relations. Twenty-odd years
prior to Indian independence Nehru, in writing about the foreign policy of a future
independent India, addressed such a notion:
Some people, living in a world of their own creation, imagine that there is
a pan-Islamic block which may threaten India. This is pure fancy. Every
one of the Islamic countries is developing on intensely rational lines and
there is absolutely no room in them for an external policy based on
religion. Indeed, even their domestic policy has little to do with religious
dogmas. The interests of these countries are and will continue to be our
interests. (Gopal, 1980, p. 338)
It can be presumed that when India did gain its independence, and Nehru took his
seat as the country’s first prime minister, his views on the matter remained steadfast since
neither his rhetoric nor his actions ever seemed to deviate from such a perception. And
while he may have been correct in that such a bloc did not and would not threaten India,
it is an historical fact that such a bloc did arise in the years following WWII, even if they
did not threaten India, and would last for several decades thereafter as a united front on a
select few issues with Israel being at the top of this agenda.
The point here is that not every nation-state endorsed such a seemingly “fair” and
“objective” take on foreign affairs as did Nehru and, by extension, India. In fact as early
as 1950, around the time India would recognize Israel as a state entity, the country’s
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Ministry of External Affairs was debating the nature of India’s future relationship with
Israel in terms of a Muslim nation’s concern over religiously related issues and the
possibility of a negative response from a particular state in the Arab-Muslim world as
Kumaraswamy has documented: “The displeasure of Saudi Arabia may also have serious
repercussions on Hajj pilgrimage by Indian Muslims and thus give rise to domestic
difficulties” (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 153). Whether or not the Saudis would in fact have
restricted the participation of Indian Muslims in Hajj at this time due to Indian
normalization with Israel can only be speculated on at this point in history. However,
given India’s sheer number of Muslims and the violence that took place between Hindus
and Muslims as a result of the recent partition process, the fear of domestic conflict
erupting or a significant deterioration in relations with Saudi Arabia haunted India’s
government.
Nehru appointed several Muslims, including Maulana Azad, to key posts
responsible for India’s Middle East policy in a move that was, in part, an exercise in
assuaging doubts of India’s secular character. (Kumaraswamy, p. 146, 2010) This was a
move that inherently put the potential for normalization with Israel at a great
disadvantage and essentially resulted in the exclusion of any pro-Israel consideration in
many regional policy matters.
Therefore, in dealing with types of states like Saudi Arabia, India and its first
prime minister would be required to take into account this radically different take on
foreign affairs. In the case of Israel, a widely perceived enemy of the Arab-Muslim world
and, by association, the Muslim world in general, India was required to disregard portions
of its own self-declared philosophy towards international affairs. While consideration of
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its religious identity may not have been much of a factor or any factor at all, in the
majority of the Muslim world’s state-to-state relations, Israel was an exception and an
exception that subsequently would be embraced by India due to historical, geographical
and demographic considerations.
The resulting support, or the “favoritism”, that Nehru and India’s first leaders had
shown towards Muslim factions domestically and internationally, was an outcome of the
recognition of previously described factors relating to religious identity between Arab
Muslims and their South Asian religious brethren, a circumstance which was beyond
India’s control. As such, despite India’s domestic and international stance against the
engagement of politics based on such factors like identity, India’s leaders were left with
few other options, all of which would ultimately risk the well-being of the Indian state in
their minds. Their overcompensation for what India’s leaders feared would be viewed as
anti-Islamic behavior, both domestically and in the Arab-Muslim world, resulted in the
preferential treatment that they sought diligently to unequivocally exclude from their
policy in their establishment of an independent, secular India. In focusing so intently on
being secular, it seems India’s leadership post-partition inadvertently did show favoritism
towards the cause and concerns of the Muslim constituency by pandering them through
what they believed to be fair treatment of India’s largest religious minority.
In their attempted effort to demonstrate equality and fairness towards all Indians
in their treatment of Muslims, Nehru and Congress actually ended up treating them in a
way that resulted in benefits reflective of almost a favoritism of sorts. This was done
solely in an effort to demonstrate the free and fair secular nature of the state and the
secular aims of Congress, but in fact it had a negative or disadvantageous effect on Israel
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due to the status of relations between the Jewish state and the rest of the Arab-Muslim
world. The “fair” and “equal” treatment Nehru’s India sought to afford to its Muslim
constituency equated, in part, to India’s staunch anti-Israel position.
Regarding his application of neutrality in international politics, the partiality with
which Nehru’s India treated Israel’s Arab-Muslim neighbors compared to the treatment
Israel received of course did not go unnoticed by Israel’s leadership at the time. Even
Ben-Gurion was noted to have remarked:
Nehru claims allegiance to neutrality… He is not even neutral in regard to
Israel and the Arabs, for he has close ties and normal relations with Arab
countries- but he has stubbornly refused diplomatic relations with Israel,
and in his frequent visits to the Middle East he has on every occasion-and
not by accident-over looked Israel. (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 126)
One of the more notable instances this played out was in July of 1960 when a formal
invitation was sent to Nehru to visit Israel. Shortly thereafter, Nehru replied that such a
visit would not be conducive to the improvement of international relations and noting the
difficulty with which it was for him to travel abroad, despite having visited Gaza just two
months prior. (Kumaraswamy, 2010, 126)
The religious demographics of India, with Muslims making up a substantial
minority, created a condition domestically that had a significant impact on Nehru and the
INC’s initial stance towards Israel that began prior to partition, as historical and anecdotal
evidence demonstrates. This balance of the religious make-up in India was embedded in
the legacy of a partition based primarily in the separation of religions, a circumstance that
ultimately worked to revive a foundation for the narrative of “Hindu v. Muslim”. In
addition to producing a popular narrative based in the separation of Hindus from Muslims
and generating a fragile demographic situation in India, the legacy of partition would also
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brought with it the creation of a Muslim-majority Pakistan and the complex situation of
territory allocation and border creation between the two newly created countries. The
conflict that ensued would be another factor that would bring religious considerations
into India’s foreign policy decisions in two ways:

1.) war with Pakistan, a Muslim

national state with a Muslim majority; 2.) subsequent control of a Muslim-majority state
of Kashmir.
Two months after partition, war began with Pakistan that would last well through
Israel’s establishment in 1948 and into January of 1949. While this conflict was
presumably not viewed as anything other than an inter-state war by many of India’s
leaders, this is not how the dynamic was perpetuated by some of Pakistan’s leaders.
Further, Nehru and the INC feared the manner in which this conflict would be perceived
by nations of the Arab-Muslim world given the nature of partition and the narrative that
was beginning to take shape. Unfortunately for India, Pakistan, as a self-declared Muslim
nationalist state, naturally always had an advantage in courting the political and
diplomatic support of an overwhelmingly Muslim Middle East. (Nair, 2004, p. 46-47)
The All-India Muslim League, the political party which sat at the vanguard of the
Pakistani nationalist movement, who eventually vied for partition and who would
produce Pakistan’s earliest leadership in the years following its split from India (Rao,
1972, p. 13), was feared by the INC because of the potential influence it was perceived to
have over Muslims in the entire sub-continent. Even after partition, the Muslim League
would continue to lay its claim as the representative of not only Pakistan’s Muslims, but
of India’s as well. From the time of the early 1920’s the Muslim League consistently
framed its “agitation”, both domestically and externally, in the context of the existing
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threat to Islam. (Rao, 1972, p. 16) This, combined with its hardline stance against Israel
and Jewish nationalism, created a situation that, “… naturally influenced and compelled
the Congress Party to accommodate the Muslim sentiments [in India] on Palestine”
(Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 78).
A major driving force in India’s conflict with Pakistan is the Kashmir issue. The
conflict over Kashmir goes back to the princely-state’s desire to remain an independent
entity, free from Indian and Pakistani control, after the conclusion of partition. Shortly
following this conclusion, however, there were fears by Kashmir’s leader, Maharaja Hari
Singh, of an imminent takeover by Pakistani forces or militants driven by the belief in
Indian plans for annexation of the region. Singh appealed to India for military assistance
and, in what is viewed as a moment of desperation, agreed to relinquish Kashmir’s
independence in exchange for this assistance. The result was a divided Kashmir region
with India controlling approximately 65% of the territory and Pakistan controlling the
remaining. (“A brief history”, 2001)
While the details of this turn of events are hotly debated on both sides, the
relevance here is India’s conflictual engagement with a Muslim entity (i.e. Pakistan) over
what is perceived as an inherently Muslim territory. Within a political and normative
context, India’s annexation of Jammu & Kashmir was and still is perceived by Pakistan,
much of the Muslim world, and even many Muslim residents within the territory as
illegal and oppressive. The portion of Kashmir that would come under control of India is
Muslim-majority at approximately 70% of the population, a prevailing condition that fit
nicely into the Muslim League’s “threat to Islam” discourse. Pakistan used this simple
fact of demography as justification for its desired possession of the whole of Kashmir, a
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notion that Nehru was well aware of speaking nearly a decade after the conflict there
began. (Gopal, 1980, p. 223-224) Furthermore, placed within a more fundamentalist
religious discourse, India’s annexation plays into the “Hindu v. Muslim” narrative
through an understanding of Kashmir as a Muslim land under forcible control of a kafir 30
ruler by virtue of the notion that Hinduism is a non-Abrahamic, polytheistic religion.
The notion of Kashmiri Muslims under “threat” from India that formed a part of
the Pakistani discourse being preached to other Muslim nations created a foreign policy
challenge for India. Since the Pakistani Muslims would never back down as far as
Kashmir itself was concerned, this discourse was one that would have to be countered by
India through other avenues that demonstrated to the rest of the Islamic world India’s free
and fair treatment of Muslims. These circumstances combined to create a highly
sensitive state of affairs vis-à-vis its relations with the Arab-Muslim world for India, a
circumstance which India’s leaders sought to ameliorate, in part, through their Israel
policy.
With the previously detailed series of circumstances ultimately founded on the
legacy of partition, and the division of the two countries along what were primarily
religious lines, India and its leaders were, to a degree, compelled to conduct policy based
in part on (religious) identity at particular times. During this period of time and within
this prevailing context, India’s government would have been obliged to take such action
towards Israel in order to offset any misperceptions the Arab-Muslim world might hold
towards India regarding both its increasingly conflictual and violent relationship with its

30
An Arabic term referring to those deemed to be ‘unbelievers’ in a monotheistic conception of G-d and/or
Islam’s religious message as revealed by the prophet Mohammed.
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Muslim neighbor Pakistan, and the controversial status of its rule over Muslim-majority
Kashmir. With the formation of the INC’s policy towards Israel being a product of both
historical circumstance and Nehru’s perceptions and leadership, India was placed on an
ideological path that would become more and more difficult to leave as time passed. The
passage of time, combined with the eventual onset of certain historical events and
subsequent reification of Israel as an enemy of the Islam across the Muslim world, meant
a shift in India’s official position on the Jewish state would require fundamental shift in
majority political ideology and leadership of India. For Israel this desired shift would
unfortunately not come for over three decades. While the potential for normalization did
exist for some years after India’s recognition of Israel in 1950, all successive attempts by
the Israeli government to expedite the process of normalization were ultimately rebuffed
by New Delhi, and the Suez Crisis in 1956 would effectively close the books on any new
developments between the two nations for over a decade. From this point on, relations
between the two fledgling nations would get progressively worse before they got better.

1956 to 1967: India and the Israeli Interwar Period
The international reaction to the 1956 Suez Crisis aided the Indian government in
“substantiating” its position towards Israel. It would now be the British playing the
frequent role of the go-between as far as India’s relations with Israel were concerned. The
official stance of India throughout this time period would remain supportive of the
Palestinian cause, accomodationist to the sentiments of the Arab-Muslim world and,
additionally, loyal to the policy directives of the newly created, Nona-Aligned Movement
(NAM) established in 1961. As mentioned, the formation of this movement owes a great
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debt to the cooperative efforts between Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and
Nehru himself, while providing this established partnership with another official platform
for their shared views on Israel. Even with Nehru’s passing in 1964 while still in office,
his impact and influence in shaping India’s official foreign policy towards Israel would
remain cemented, in-tact and inflexible for the next 27 years.
Despite this grim circumstance, however, a clandestine security relationship
began to develop during this time in what would later be revealed as the only tangible
development in the relationship for over a period in excess of ten years. In its infancy
Israel supplied India with ammunition and small arms during wars fought against China
and Pakistan in the 1960s. Israel was one of the only countries to provide this sort of
support to India at the time. From the 1960s onward, there exist several documented
reports of intelligence and training cooperation between the two nations which included
documented interaction between Israeli security specialists. (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p.
241)
This sort of behavior towards Israel, both the outwardly hostile and inwardly
supportive, would characterize and provide the narrative for India’s policy towards Israel
for the next three-plus decades. It was not until this time that a domestic challenge to the
INC’s political monopoly would arise with a narrative that, among other things, was
warmly conducive towards relations with a Jewish Israeli state vs those of Palestine and
the Arab-Muslim world.

1967 to the Early 1980’s: War in the Middle East and a Missed Opportunity for
Change
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In 1966 Nehru’s only child, Indira Gandhi, was elected Prime Minister of India
and with her would eventually come a seemingly renewed zeal aimed at courting the
affections of the Arab-Muslim world, which ultimately would drive India’s official policy
towards Israel to a new low. The Indian government’s Israel policy was carefully shaped
by Nehru’s legacy and his drive to maintain a secular character for India as it progressed
into modernity, but the government would continue to be unable to stand by its
conviction in this regard. Israel’s conflict with the Muslim world (as many Muslimmajority states framed it) continued to worsen, as did India’s situation over Kashmir and
with Pakistan. Religious identity would be an incessant factor in politicized
developments, both internal and external, that India’s leaders were obliged to take into
account when formulating policy despite their insistence that that was not the case.
Several incidents that took place during this time period reflected how
considerations of religious identity directly or indirectly impacted India’s foreign policy
towards Israel. Regionally, India re-engaged in all-out conflict with its Muslim neighbor
Pakistan. Just a year prior to Indira Gandhi’s election as Prime Minister, India became
embroiled in one of its last two major wars with Pakistan; the second took place during
the fifth year of her governance. The wars of 1965 and 1971 again brought attention to
the ongoing dispute that had plagued the relationship of these two countries since the
Partition, the type of attention India did not seek to solicit from the Muslim world.
During the border conflict of 1965, Pakistan receive an immense amount of
support from across the Muslim Middle East in the form of arms, money, equipment,
fuel, strategic assistance and even moral backing. This wealth of material and moral
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backing was given by all major players in the Muslim world (including Jordan, Turkey,
Iran and Saudi Arabia) with the exception of Egypt which not only remained neutral, but
who also worked to moderate the pro-Pakistani tone among its Arab-Muslim compatriots.
(Blarel, 2014, p. 157-158) Again in similar fashion to 1962, Israel provided arms to India,
but to no avail. At the end of the day India’s leaders continued their historical pattern of
disregarding the inordinate backing Pakistan continued to receive from the Muslim world
and the lack of any symbolic and/or tangible reciprocal support from the these states,
while publically and privately rejecting the notion any sort of Israeli assistance during the
conflict.
In June 1967 the world was again up in arms over a war that had erupted between
Israel and her Arab-Muslim neighbors. The clash of the Israeli military with Palestine’s
Arab-Muslim supporters, Egypt, Jordan and Syria, in the Six-Day War would leave an
indelible mark on the way the situation was perceived by the outside world, especially
India. This war, and some events that followed, provided India with an opportunity to
reassert its solidarity with the Palestinian cause. However, there was also the implicit
hope for some sort of positive reaction from the Muslim-world regarding India’s conflict
with Pakistan and the struggle over Kashmir. At times, the means by which India went
about demonstrating this solidarity was not so much reflective of support for the
Palestinian or Arab cause, but rather was indicative of its backing for what was perceived
as, and frequently verbalized to be, a pan-Islamic issue by the world’s Muslim-majority
states. The war heightened India’s historically persistent and well-documented fear of
deterioration of its relations with the Arab (i.e. Muslim) world. Indian leaders felt they
needed to demonstrate India’s unity with that world but couldn’t agree on how to do so.
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In the initial aftermath of the Six-Day War there existed quite a bit of
disagreement over India’s official stance on the conflict. Disagreements existed in and
among the public, the parliament and even the ruling Congress Party. However, this by
no means equated to support for Israel in the matter but rather a call for a more balanced
official view of the situation. (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 206-207) In any case, and in
keeping with past patterns of behavior, India continued to pursue methods of courting
Arab and Muslim approval.
A notable demonstration of the impact of religiously-related concerns with
reference India’s policy towards Israel can be viewed in two events that took place in
1969. In August of that year, a fire ripped through Islam’s third holiest site, the al-Aqsa
Mosque which is situated on the Temple Mount site of Jerusalem’s Old City. This
random act of property damage and defamation was perpetuated by a mentally unstable,
Christian tourist from Australia. Despite these facts, however, the issue was vocalized
and perpetuated as another instance of Israel’s conflict with the Arab-Muslim world and
as a direct transgression against Islam by the state of Israel itself. An opportunity was
created here again for India to offset its conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir through a
demonstration of solidarity with the Islamic world on the issue and so the Indian
government joined the voices of Muslims everywhere in condemning the act within this
religiously enveloped narrative.
Shortly after the incident, the Indian Foreign Ministry office in Delhi D.S.
Kamtekar sent out notifications to the heads of various Indian missions around the world
stating the following:
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We have received reports of Arab and other Muslim governments having
initiated moves for Joint Action to persuade various Governments to lend
active support for implementation of U.N. resolutions on Jerusalem with
particular reference to protection for holy places of Islam in view of
damage to AL AQSA MOSQUE (sic) by fire on August 21. You should
associate yourself with any such approach to Government of your
accreditation expressing our shock at outrage and emphasizing necessity
to implement Security Council resolution on Jerusalem without delay.
Statements by Indian political and religious leaders and newspaper
comments being morse-cast. (Archives-NAI, Kamtekar, 1969)
The implication communicated here is that India’s view and reaction to the al-Aqsa
incident should be mutually consistent with the views which “Arab and Muslim
governments” held, views which are undoubtedly religious in nature. Maharaj Krishna
Rasgotra, a diplomat in residence at India’s US embassy in Washington at the time,
responded to Kamtekar affirming approval of the idea of affiliation with the previously
described movement and noting his recent conveyance of such sentiments to the
ambassadors of Kuwait, Malaysia and Morocco in the US. (Archives-NAI, Rasgotra,
1969a) India’s cohesion with this religiously-grounded movement was further confirmed
in Rasgotra’s message to Tunisia’s Ambassador to the US at the time, Rachid Driss:
We understand that Governments of Muslim countries have initiated or
intend to initiate moves for joint action to persuade various governments
to lend their active support for implementation of the U.N. resolutions on
Jerusalem with particular reference to protection pf the holy places of
Islam in view of damage to the sacred Al Aqsa Mosque by fire on August
21. The government of India wish to be associated with such moves, and
we shall appreciate if any approach that may be made by the concern
Missions here to the Government of the United States of America in this
connection to shock and concern of the Government and people of India
may kindly be expressed at the outrage on the famous Al Aqsa Mosque.
We should also like to join the concerned Missions in emphasizing the
necessity to implement the Security Council resolutions on Jerusalem
without delay with particular reference to the protection of the holy places
of Islam. (Archives-NAI, Rasgotra, 1969)
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According to Indian leadership, their view was adopted within the context of,
“…the rights of Palestinians [not Muslims] and the preservation of holy and sacred places
[generally speaking]” under Israeli control (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 210), there by
publically refusing to admit the religious nature that the issue was overwhelmingly being
presented as by the majority of both Arab and non-Arab Muslim states and populations.
Even Indira Gandhi vehemently denied India’s viewing the incident as an Islamic issue.
However, although publically India attempted to frame this as a Palestinian issue, its
private correspondence from to the Tunisian government and various Indian missions
located in Arab lands, demonstrates otherwise. Further, the domestic response to the
incident in India by large swaths of its Muslim population indicated that this incident was
indeed being viewed through a Islamic lens, with rallies all over the country and a protest
in Calcutta that saw an estimated ten million Muslims refrain from going to work for a
day. (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 210) The rhetoric at many of these rallies was clear and
newspapers heralded the Muslim masses as conveying the message that, “[Muslims] all
over the world will shed the last drop of their blood to restore the sanctity to their holy
places” (Kumaraswamy, 2010, P. 210).
The Indian government was aware of the strong reaction to the incident and,
despite its efforts to frame the issue with a non-religious context, knew that action had to
be taken on its part due primarily to its fears over Muslim concerns and outcries. Indian
leaders demonstrated their agreement with the rhetoric of Muslims and Muslim state
leaders who clearly identified this as an Israeli-Muslim issue and not an IsraeliPalestinian/Arab issue. This occurred despite India’s definitive claim that religious
matters played no role in its foreign policy and that this was an incident that was neither
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perpetrated nor supported by the Israeli state or an Israeli citizen, let alone by Israel as an
act of deliberate violence or desecration against the Islamic world and its sacred sites.
This series of events then demonstrates that some of India’s policy decisions were based
on, or at least seriously informed by, concerns related to religious identity.
The al-Aqsa incident was the primary catalyst for a gathering of Muslim countries
and entities in Rabat, Morocco, less than a month later. The Rabat Conference as it came
to be known was significant, in part, for its creation of the pan-Islamic organization
known as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). In the broadest sense of the
word, the OIC exists as, “… the collective voice of the Muslim world and ensuring to
safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting
international peace and harmony among various people of the world” (About OIC, 2005).
From its very beginning, the OIC has given vociferous attention to the issue of Jerusalem
as Israel’s declared capital; what they collectively term Al-Quds Al-Sharif 31.
While India continued to press the notion that its position on the al-Aqsa incident
was grounded in non-religious reasoning, their insistence on being a part of a conference,
the very nature of which was best described as, “… an Islamic gathering in name,
content, composition, and future course of action” (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 213),
demonstrated otherwise. India would again be involved in policy stances and official
positions directed at Israel due to its large domestic Muslim population and due to its
conflict with Pakistan. These circumstances required India to attempt inclusion in this
conference since it, “… could not leave an open space for Pakistan to gain the sympathy
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Arabic word that can be translated as ‘Holy Jerusalem’
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of Muslim states in West Asia” (Blarel, 2014, 179-180). India attempted to justify its
secular credentials in the face of the matter by highlighting that it sent a non-state
delegation comprised of Indian Muslims, thereby trying to pretend that attendance was
not being official state business. In any case, the insistence on inclusion by the Indian
government resulted in nothing less than what can be termed a “diplomatic fiasco” due to
calls by several members, led by Pakistan, for non-inclusion on the Indian delegation in
the conference. Moreover, India’s “secular” West Asian policy come under heavy
scrutiny. (Blarel, 2014, p. 181-182) The Rabat incident provides yet another clear
example of how concerns over matters of religion were integrated in India’s foreign
policy towards Israel.
In 1971, India engaged in its most large-scale war with Pakistan, a conflict that
would be significant mainly due to India’s sound defeat of Pakistan and the subsequent
independence of the new state of Bangladesh. When the war began at the end of March,
India pledged its support for the independence movement in what was then East Pakistan.
By the end of the year, India was supporting the Bangladeshi military on the ground and
was engaged in open conflict with (West) Pakistan, a series of events that would
ultimately lead to the swift defeat of (West) Pakistan and ensure the independence of
newly named Bangladesh. Again, as in both of India’s previous major conflicts in the
1960’s, Israel provided invaluable support in terms of arms (Datta, 2013) and
humanitarian support (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 215). Also again, just as was the case in
their previous wars with Pakistan, much of the Arab-Muslim world remained steadfast in
their support of Pakistan and in their criticism of India for meddling in what was viewed
as a domestic Muslim issue within the country. While questions were raised regarding
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India’s political stance toward the Arab world, India’s Congress-led government
ultimately continued to court the approval of the Muslim world through its Middle East
policy and to the further detriment of its relations with Israel.
What eventually came to be seen by India as a “re-agitation” of the Islamic world
in its defeat of Pakistan was coupled with the fact that, on March 1, less than a month
prior to the beginning of hostilities between East and West Pakistan, Indira Gandhi and
India’s Congress party completed one of their finest showings in the national elections to
date. Their clear majority in the Lok Sabha equated to 350 out of 515 total seats, reducing
opposition to a paltry sixteen members, and solidifying their power for the foreseeable
future. (Wolpert, 2009, p. 407) The Congress Party’s electoral sweep resulted in Indira
Gandhi’s power consolidation and, subsequently, a thorough re-institutionalization of
Nehru’s Israel policy. This combined with India’s perceptive need for reinforcement of
its Middle East policy that would conclusively, albeit in an implicit manner, demonstrate
a pro-Muslim stance, both domestically and internationally.
A matter less related to conflict, but just as significant in India’s calculations
towards both Israel and the Arab-Muslim world, related to certain facets of India’s
economy. Beginning in the 1950’s, immigrant labor began flowing into what was mainly
the (Persian) Gulf region of the Middle East or, in other words, the Arab-Muslim
countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. By 1973, the
worldwide oil embargo pushed prices for oil way up and, subsequently, also the need for
foreign workers due to the lack of indigenous workers present in these Gulf countries.
(Naufal & Genc, 2012, p. 33) This was the beginning of the eventual mass migration of
both skilled and unskilled labor from several Asian countries, especially India, into the
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region in order to fill the need that now existed. Not only were critical labor opportunities
being provided to India’s burgeoning population, keeping larger and larger numbers of its
citizens employed, but much of the money earned was, and continues to be, sent back to
India in the form of remittances. The number of Indian workers in the Gulf began to
gradually increase from this time onward; one estimate puts the number of Indian
workers there at 260,000 by 1975. (Naufal & Genc, 2012, p. 45)
This circumstance of migratory labor added another layer to India’s Israel policy
and India fear of an unfavorable reaction from the Muslim-majority Gulf countries, in
addition to the already existing concerns over trade opportunities and India’s increasing
need for energy. (Kumaraswamy, p. 173, 2010) India feared the possibility of falling out
of favor with these Muslim Gulf nations should they perceive India’s foreign policy as
anti-Islamic, whether referring to India’s relations with Pakistan or Israel. As India
perceived it, falling out of favor with the Gulf States could mean country-wide energy
shortages, the downsizing of trade with an important region and a devastating reduction
of labor for hundreds of thousands of Indians and counting. In addition to factors already
explained, India’s heavy reliance on Muslim nations in these three sectors would add
great impetus to the necessity of demonstrating a pro-Muslim, and therefore anti-Israel,
foreign policy.
In October 1973, Israel and the Arab-Muslim world engaged in its most recent
major war; it was known as the Yom Kippur War named after the Jewish holiday on
which the conflict began. The Congress-laden government that dominated India at the
time was all too eager to side with the attacking Arab forces citing the Indian
government’s historical solidarity with the “Arab” cause and blaming Israel for its refusal
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to evacuate territories conquered from the Arabs during the war in 1967. (Kumaraswamy,
2010, p. 188) The Gandhi-led Congress government predictably used Israel’s perilous
circumstance in an effort to build on what it perceived as India’s fading rapport with the
Arab Muslim world.
As a result, the mid- to late-1970’s brought a sharp decline in Indo-Israeli affairs.
In 1975, India became the first non-Arab state to give recognition the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO). The Indian government allowed the PLO to open an
office in the national capital, New Delhi, and also in 1975 went on to lead the “Zionism
equals racism” vote at the United Nations. In early autumn 1978, the signing of the Camp
David Accords took place, establishing a formal peace between Israel and Egypt. In
1977, while Indo-Israeli relations were arguably at their worst, Gandhi was ousted from
her leadership position for a period of three years, with the Janata Party coalition coming
to power and some of the Indian government’s views on Israel were briefly relaxed a bit.
(Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 217)
This relaxed political circumstance did not last long, despite India’s brief respite
from the rule of Indira Gandhi and despite Israel’s normalization of relations with India’s
historically close ally Egypt, an Arab-Muslim nation and founding member of the Nonaligned Movement. The Indian policy towards Israel remained staunch and cold for
several years and Indo-Israeli relations approached what would eventually come to be
recognized as a new historical low. It would be then that the rise of a political force that
would challenge Gandhi and the Congress party’s essential monopoly on India’s
government dating all the way back to Partition would begin to emerge and,
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subsequently, considerations of religious identity, for better or for worse, would bring
progression in the Indian-Israeli relationship.

The Analytical Framing of Relations until the 1980’s: The Inhibitive Nature of Religion
The historical processes of India outlined from pre-partition up until the early
1980’s were underpinned by a constantly imminent concern with being perceived as antiMuslim by India’s large, domestic Muslim minority and the Islamic world at large,
particularly the Muslim nations of the Middle East. The fear of the consequences of such
a perception, from the political to the social and even the economic, ultimately equated,
in part, to an anti-Israel foreign policy stance. As a result, when these historical processes
are placed within the proper conceptual foundation, factors of religious identity be seen to
have played an instrumental role as a force inhibiting India’s potential for establishing
diplomatic relations with Israel.
Revisiting the basic analytical framework of Katzenstein, Jepperson and Wendt
(1996) to explain national security policy, we apply it here in a broader fashion to foreign
policy as a whole (a notion inclusive of national security concerns) and are able to
understand exactly how religious identity came to influence and become gradually
integrated as a driving force in India’s policy of non-relations with Israel. Ultimately, an
analysis on India’s foreign policy towards Israel over the designated timespan could
accurately be described as coming full-circle as an exercise that sought to ensure the
social, economic, military and political security of the nation-state.
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(Jepperson et al, 1996, p. 53)
Within the confines of this research, the schema above provides a visual
representation of the mutually constituting and cyclical nature of the process involved in
the formulation of India’s foreign policy towards Israel. The sectors labeled
“Environmental Structure” (i.e. normative structure), comprised mainly of cultural and
institutional elements, and “Identity” both emerge gradually through a complex
interaction of historical processes. They work to continually constitute one another in a
simultaneous fashion, creating state “Interests”, and ultimately effecting “Policy”.
“Policy” then, through its recursive nature, works to continually reproduce or reconstruct
the “Environmental Structure” that underpins the narrative responsible for India’s antiIsrael stance.
Operationalization here can become problematic in that there generally exists no
temporal and/or tangible measuring point for the formulation of such processes,
especially where identity and norms are concerned. However, in light of the fact that
India’s foreign policy towards Israel is the process under review, the analytical starting
point commences with the date of independence of Israel, the second of the two nations
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to become independent. The normative structure and identity present in India at the time
of its independence were the results of the convergence of several key historical
developments that played out in the decades prior to independence. These included the
rise of religious nationalisms, the political cohesion and subsequent division that played
out, the violent legacy of a Partition movement framed within a context of “Hindu vs.
Muslim”, and India’s substantial remaining Muslim minority. Taking Israel’s historical
trajectory with Arab-Muslim nations (and by extension the Islamic world) over the same
time period into consideration, and India’s perceived need to maintain exceptionally
positive relations with such nations, the resulting developments combined to
institutionally solidify the normative anti-Israel stance of India’s most important political
leaders, while ensuring the role of religious identity in the process through India’s efforts
to display a pro-Muslim stance.
Through this method of understanding, India’s “Interests” are seen to mirror the
interests of the Arab-Muslim world which demonstrated a pro-Muslim stance that was
absolute in nature with reference to concerns over a Jewish-majority state. This
circumstance was, in the end, reflected in India’s official “policy” towards Israel. Once
established, the recursive nature of this policy continually worked to reproduce the
original cultural and institutional structure that had such a significant effect on the state’s
normative stance regarding Israel. The various international and domestic developments
described to have taken place throughout this time period provided opportunities which
the Indian state capitalized on to reproduce this structure, continually shaping state
identity, determining interests and, ultimately again, formulating policy.
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Nehru’s political legacy, carried on through his influence and by his family
members, as well as the Congress Party’s essential domination of India’s political scene
up until the 1980’s, worked to ensure the necessary coherence and continuity in the
process that determined India’s Israel policy. While there did exist small pro-Israel
contingents within India’s political, social, and academic apparatus throughout this time
period, their power and influence over the country’s Israel policy relative to that of
Congress Party, Nehru, and his legacy, had a negligible impact. As leaders of India’s
independent vision, Nehru, Gandhi and the INC came to be favored by and represent a
large majority of India’s populous. This allowed them to dominate key leadership
positions across India’s political realm heading into independence and thereafter. With
these key leadership positions came the ability to shape the nation’s identity and aided in
ensuring certain normative cultural and institutional elements.
The accomplishments of the Congress Party and its leaders in achieving what was
perceived to be a free, independent, and secular India, garnered the admiration and
support of a majority of non-Muslim Indians, while their accomodationist stance towards
its massive Muslim minority worked to secure nearly the entire base of the Muslim
constituency at this time. Any sort of potential influence that India’s pro-Israel contingent
(i.e., mainly the Hindu Right) might have possessed heading into independence was
shattered with Gandhi’s assassination by a Hindu National extremist, further solidifying
the fate of India’s Israel policy. Furthermore, with the exception of information provided
to Indian’s Muslims by the rest of the Islamic world, most non-Muslim Indians
presumably would have very little about the Jewish people and this small, newly created
state of Israel. As such, a vast proportion of Indian societal actors at the sub-state level
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would have been unknowing, uninterested or, at best, apathetic towards Israel. The only
individuals influential in the discussion about Israel were those who vehemently opposed
its actions or existence.
With a few exceptions then, the indifference or hostility toward Israel
characteristic of much of Indian society up until this time was reflected not only in the
lack of state-to-state level political engagement but also in the lack of cultural exchange
and in the essentially non-existent economic relationship. India’s government dominated
the narrative on Israel within Indian society and, combined with a strong voice of support
from India’s Muslim minority and the essential non-existence of knowledge or even
interest in the Israel issue on the part of the vast majority of India’s non-Muslims in the
Israel issue, meant that neither a state nor a sub-state influence was present that would be
able to pressure India’s Israel policy into a shift. The historical events and circumstances
necessary to effectively alter the identity or normative structure of India in Israel’s favor
did not begin to exist, I argue, until approximately the early 1980’s. At that time, a statelevel shift occurred within India’s domestic political demographic that was brought on by
certain internal and external events. This shift would lay the foundations for a degree or
reconstruction in India’s “identity” and “environmental structure” thereby creating a path
for normalization of relations with Israel at the state-level as well as creating an outlet for
relations to develop between innumerable levels at the sub-state level.
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THE RISE OF THE BJP AND THE CASE FOR RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

This chapter aims at highlighting the dynamic of India’s foreign policy towards
Israel from the 1980s to 1992 in light of a perceived political and societal threats posed
by India’s large, minority Muslim population. It was during the 1980s that India’s build
up towards normalization with Israel began. The discussion here focuses on several
factors involving Islam, religion-based national politics, and security that influenced this
build-up that would eventually culminate in full diplomatic relations with Israel.
From the time of the partition movement in 1947, as I have argued above, it was
the Muslim “factor” that was the main catalyst for India’s lack of normalized relations
with Israel. India’s parliamentary parties needed to appeal to a domestic Muslim
constituency. In addition, India used its support for the Palestinian struggle as a principal
means to establish its pro-Arab credentials and reinforce its desire for a progressive
Middle East policy. (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 14)
By the late 1970s the seeds for a shift in India’s foreign policy towards Israel had
arguably been planted. Internal and external developments taking place in the Islamic
world played a very important part in this shift, but it is the role of Hindu identity,
specifically in the realms of domestic politics and society, that played an instrumental
role in bringing this shift to fruition. Islam’s perceived role as a threat to India’s domestic
and regional sphere was internalized by Hindu nationalist groups during this roughly
decade-long prelude to India’s normalization of relations with Israel. The rise and
influence of the “neo”-Hindutva (the people of the Hindu land) movement, initialized
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first in 1951 by the Bharatiya Jana Sangh party and eventually lead by the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) by 1980, coincide with the process of normalized relations with Israel
and played a critical role in the facilitation of eventual normalization. This is the point at
which the BJP’s socially constructed threat that Islam poses towards a Hindu Indian
society becomes key. This is a threat construction brought about by historical factors
relating to: 1.) the formation of nationalist identities that resulted from the historical
legacy of the partition movement; 2.) the rise of a counter Muslim nationalist movement
that would ultimately result in the establishment of the sovereign of Pakistan; 3.) the ongoing Indo-Pak conflict, highlighted by the Kashmir issue; 4.) the concern over domestic
Islamist movements in Indian politics and society, and since the late 1990s and early
2000s; and 5.) the threat from cross-border terror perpetrated primarily by radical,
Muslim fundamentalists backed by the government of Pakistan in many cases. The BJP
of today endorses similar, albeit a noticeably toned down, rhetoric highlighting the
Islamic threat as it did over two decades ago during its rise to prominence in India. The
official website of the BJP states:
We must realize that we have a problem on hand in India, the problem of a
stagnant and conservative Islamic society. The secular leaders and parties
tell us that the problem on our hands is not Islamic fundamentalism, but
the Hindutva ideology. This view is good only for gathering votes. The
fact is that we have a fundamentalist Muslim problem, and our problem
cannot be divorced from the international Islamic politics and the world's
reaction to it. (Gurumurthy, 2009)
It is within this context, then, that this chapter works to assess the degree to which the
rise of the Hindutva movement from the 1980’s onward, embodied politically in the BJP
and rhetorically in its narrative based on the Islamic threat, can be correlated with the
normalization of relations with Israel.
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A detailed discussion on the rise of the BJP starting in the 1980’s up until
normalization, and its role in the normalization, will be the central focus of this chapter.
The argument for this role is built on the explanation given earlier for the foundations of
Hindu nationalism and the genesis of the Hindutva movement and demonstrated through
the integration of my previously described theoretical framework emphasizing the impact
of identity formation and identity perception within this process. Special attention will
first be given to Savarkar’s writings regarding Jews and Israel, and the chronicled rise of
the BJP will then segue into an initial discussion about the influence of the RSS and
development of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), which was established in the mid1960’s.
Prior to the analysis outlining the BJP’s development and evolution, however, a
comparative historical timeline of India’s and Israel’s military conflicts with factions of
the Islamic world since their respective independence movements will be necessary. This
colloquy is included in an effort to exhibit a bridge of connection via a “shared” history
that can be socially constructed between the civilizational states of a Hindu India and
Jewish Israel. This “shared” history of conflict with a perceived common enemy
legitimates the security cooperation of these two ancient civilizations, a Hindu India and
a Jewish Israel. The result was the creation of a circumstance of identity construction
through analogies of conflict. The manner that these histories have been perceived and
depicted, then, will later be demonstrated to have great significance for the construction
of the base narrative initially used in linking the two nations and maintaining this link in
the years that would follow.
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The tumultuous history portrayed between Hindus and Muslims prior to and after
the partition movement would provide Hindu nationalist groups with the identity that
drives their agenda. The BJP has continued to perpetuate the fallout of this history while
constructing an identity defined until recent years by anti-Islamic sentiment and
mobilization. The BJP’s rise to power in India’s political system closely parallels the
normalization process with Israel and it this rise to power which I argue is a primary
factor, not only in the normalization which officially took place in 1992, but also the
connection and cooperation between India and Israel today.
With this combined analysis, I set the context for the rise of Hindu nationalism
that began in the 1980’s highlighted by the formation of the BJP, and the subsequent
effects of this rise on India’s relations with Israel. It is here we see the formation of a
particular Hindu identity that is largely defined in contrast to an Islamic identity and
society which is believed to pose an inherent and fundamental threat to India’s
indigenous Hindu culture and civilization. It is an identity that, I argue, provides the
primary impetus from which the normalization process began.

The Histories of Conflict

India and Pakistan: Nations Divided
The late 1940s brought the beginnings of monumental change in both India and
what would become Israel, the effects of which we see playing out even in the present
day. During this time period India became independent from British rule immediately
after the partition of Pakistan from the land that would be India (1947), the Israeli State
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became independent, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict started (1948). Common
characteristics of both independence movements included disputes over territorial claims,
and the clash of identities and ideals over some combination of contrasting religious,
ethnic, and nationalistic fervor.
Creation of the new sovereignties of India and Israel brought to a head serious
issues with serious implications. In India, the partition of Pakistan that preceded Indian
independence by only minutes required both the Indian government as well as its people
to immediately recognize the sovereignty of this newly created state carved from what
was traditionally part of the ancient Hindu land of Bharat. Israel’s sovereignty began
from a different starting point in that it was created from the former territory of Palestine
with no enforced obligation placed upon it to recognize the sovereignty of this former
territory’s people once independence was achieved. Despite the opposing starting points
of each country in their respective struggles, I believe that India and Israel have
demonstrated similarities in the processes and developments that have shaped their own
conflictual relationships with neighbors. Patterns of war, violence, struggle and even
reconciliation at times, have characterized the on-going conflicts in which Israel and
India are currently involved. Of the seemingly innumerable minor and major conflicts
and resolutions have taken place during this sixty tear timeframe, I have highlighted a
select few that have had the greatest impact on the relationship Israel and India have had
with their neighbors up until the present-day.
The Indo-Pak conflict endures today because of four main areas of concern, many
of which overlap. These include a deep ideological divide between the two nations, a
history of military and violent conflict, the Kashmir struggle, and cross-border terrorism.

134

The most recognizable catalyst for the continuing conflict between India and
Pakistan is their history of military engagement and violence towards one another. The
best way to categorize this catalyst is as a “spatial rivalry” in which, according to Misra,
the states engage in conflict over territory. (2010, p.13) Nowhere has this spatial rivalry
been more apparent than in the northwest Indian frontier state of Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K).
The first confrontation over this piece of land occurred within months of the date
of partition and is known as the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 or the First Kashmiri War.
J&K was a princely state at the time of partition and was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh
who initially avoided accession to either India or Pakistan as was required according to
terms of partition. However, Pakistan’s alleged involvement in the Poonch Revolt
prompted Singh to appeal to Delhi for military assistance in order to combat the
Pakistani-backed insurgents attempting to overthrow his rule. (McLeod, 2008, 74-75)
This appeal ultimately resulted in the accession of J&K, where over two-thirds of the
people are Muslim, to India. Pakistan refused to recognize the accession of J&K because
its rulers believed Singh no longer possessed power to make such a decision since the
revolt had overthrown his government. At this point in time Indian Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru airlifted India troops into Kashmir, beginning a war which would last
until 1948 at which point a political decision was made to cease fire via the UN.
(McLeod, 2008, p. 75-76)
The mid-1960s brought a focus to the Kutch-Sind border issue, and with it, India
and Pakistan’s second major military confrontation, the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. The
roots of this conflict had their origin about a decade earlier, as Ashutush Misra explains:
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The dispute emerged in April 1956; when Pakistan put forth its
claim to 3,500 square miles above the Twenty-forth Parallel, a
claim that led to the initial exchange of arguments and counter
arguments between India and Pakistan with regard to the location
of the boundary in that sector. (2010, p. 95)
The issue of the India’s Western border with Pakistan involved five identifiable territorial
disputes in the years preceding the war in 1965. Surprisingly, four of these disputes, Chak
Ladheke, Theh Sarja Marja, Husainiwala, and Suleimanki headworks, were all resolved
on the negotiating table prior to the war. (Misra, 2010, p.96) This demonstrated the
existent ability, and even the future possibility, of the two respective factions involved in
the Indian-Pakistani conflict to work with one another to a degree and concede to
mutually agreed upon reconciliatory measures, absent the use of force or military
measure. The fifth dispute, that over the Kutch-Sind territory, however, was not readily
resolved.
A series of claims in 1965 about the movement of military personnel in the Rann
of Kutch region of what is now Pakistan’s Sindh province, ignited a series of violent
clashes between Indian and Pakistani forces. (McLeod, 2008, p. 80-81) On June 30th of
the same year the Kutch agreement was signed and then approved by India’s Congress
Parliamentary Party (the majority party in Parliament) three days later putting an end to
this dispute and demonstrating once again the ability of both sides to negotiate
successfully. (Misra, 2010, p. 97) The words of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister at the time of
this signing were widely quoted, “Rann of Kutch was not a dispute per se. It forms a part
of a much bigger issue. The heart of the Indo-Pakistani dispute lies in the Srinagar
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Valley” 32 (Misra, 2010, p. 81). Sure enough, only a month and half later, Pakistani forces
implemented a covert attack on Indian forces in J&K known as Operation Gibraltar that
led to violent clashes over the next month which were eventually halted, ending in
another stalemate by a UN brokered cease-fire. (McLeod, 2008, p. 85-87)
The war in East Pakistan 33 of 1971 was characterized by notable violence and
blood-shed despite only lasting thirteen days. Initially a Pakistani civil war, India was
drawn into the war for two reasons:
The flight of an estimated 9.2 million refugees from East Pakistan
into Indian Bengal and Assam posed a serious threat to political
stability in India. The refugee crisis also presented India with an
opportunity to act against East Pakistan and undermine the
philosophical justification for Pakistan by demonstrating that the
bond of Islam was not sufficient justification for the existence of
Pakistan. Such an undermining of two-nation theory in the East
would also damage Pakistani claims to Kashmir because the
Pakistani claim to Kashmir is also based on this ideology.
(McLeod, 2008, p. 108)
West Pakistan ultimately lost this war and East Pakistan seceded and became the
sovereign nation of Bangladesh. Again, this example highlights the notion of territory
being at the center of the Indian-Pakistani conflict while reminding us of the religious
element of the conflict and redirecting the focus to the on-going dispute over Kashmir.
The last two decades of the conflict in Kashmir can be characterized by the Kargil
Operation (War) of 1999 and since that year, the threat of renewed military confrontation
initiated by cross-border terrorism. The Kargil War is the last overt military confrontation

32

Srinagar is the summer capital and largest city by area and population in the state of Jammu and
Kashmir. The Valley that takes its name has been at the center of much of the fighting this conflict has seen
historically.
33

Modern-day Bangladesh
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between the two powers and is significant due to the fact that both nations had attained
nuclear capabilities by the time this dispute commenced, raising the stakes of arm conflict
considerably and causing Indian-Pakistani relations to regress to a new low. (Misra,
2010, p.37)
In December 2001, a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistani
militants led to complete cutting of diplomatic, economic, political and commercial ties
with Pakistan by India’s government. The ties were not restored until 2003, after several
peace initiatives on India’s part that were in turn reciprocated by Pakistan. (Misra, 2010,
p. 37-38) In the years following, Pakistani-based extremists have been responsible for
repeated terror attacks throughout India, including in downtown Mumbai where two of
the more infamous attacks took place in 2006 when bomb blasts went off on a train and,
as mentioned in the introductory chapter, in 2008 with the attacks on the Hotel Taj Mahal
Palace and the Nariman House.
These are just a few of the more notable instances of non-state inflicted conflict
that have taken place since India’s last war with its historical neighboring enemy.
Although Indian-Pakistani relations seem to be on the upswing, their border still remains
one of the most dangerous in the world and its progress of relations between them is
continually being held back because of terrorist undertakings such those described above
as well as the continued destabilization of the domestic security situation in Pakistan.

The Israeli-Palestinian Dilemma
From the moment the state of Israel was established on May 14 1948, a violent
and bloody conflict with its Palestinian neighbors has permeated its borders and its
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people. Motivated by the partition plan implemented by the UN which gave Israel its
independence and recognized its sovereignty, Arab forces wasted no time in striking their
now sworn enemy. Their dissatisfaction with the partition comes primarily with regard to
territory allocation and the demographics of that territory which awarded a smaller
population of Jews a greater percentage of the land compared to their Arab rivals. On
May 15, 1948, five of Israel’s Arab neighbors sent military forces into the newly born
independent state resulting in a thirteen month war that ended in Arab defeat and the
proposed Arab state of Palestine losing a considerable amount of land. This dispute ended
with an armistice and Israel controlling nearly three quarters of Palestine, but both sides
refused to sign a peace treaty or responsibly deal with more than 300,000 refugees who
were displaced because of the war. (McDowall, 1989, p. 28)
The loss of territory as well as the absence of formal peace treaties have become
aspects all too characteristic in the on-going struggle between these two factions. After
Israel’s War of Independence of 1948-49, the Rhodes Armistice was put into place to
give some measure of assurance of the cessation of hostilities; however, tensions between
Israel and the Arab world only proceeded to swell, and conditions in the region continued
to deteriorate. In the years leading up to the Suez Crisis of 1956 the situation between the
two sides would be absent of any major military engagements, but the struggle persisted
in other forms. Conflict during this time period was characterized by the onset of crossborder raiding by various individuals and groups of Palestinian refugees from Jordan and
the resulting retaliatory responses from the Israeli military. There were also several
recorded instances of military-to-military engagements on the Syrian border and incidents
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by Egyptian “infiltrators” on Israel’s border with Gaza and the Sinai. (Bickerton &
Klausner, 2002, p. 117-120)
The belligerent cross-border activity and the steady onslaught of raiding that had
been occurring since the end of Israel’s first war were still ongoing come the eve of the
1956 Suez Crisis (aka the Sinai War). In July of 1956, Egypt’s recently established
president, Gamal Nasser, announced the nationalization of the previously foreigncontrolled Suez Canal. With this move Egypt further inhibited Israel’s already limited
access to key maritime trading routes within the Gulf of Aqaba down through Straits of
Tiran. Aggravation over the loss, combined with a keen desire to deal with the several
years of cross-border raiding and violence on their Egyptian border, provided the Israelis
with a pretext for a preemptive strike. (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002, p. 127-129;
Bregman, 2000, p. 37)
By late autumn, and in collaboration with French and British forces, the Israelis
attacked Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula. In little more than three months, Israel
had achieved outright victory and occupation in the Sinai at a cost of 172 killed and 700
wounded to Egypt’s thousands killed, with many more wounded and over 5,500 POW’s
taken. (Bregman, 2000, p. 39) As a result, and in part due to a newly established UN
force in the Sinai and Gaza strip, Israel’s previously described maritime issues were
resolved and the cross-border raiding by Egyptian and Palestinian factions along their
southwest borders ceased. (Bickerton & Klausner, 2002, p. 131-132)
During the slightly more than a decade that separated the war in the Sinai from
Israel’s next major confrontation with the Arab world, the region was relatively free from
physical conflict until approximately the mid-1960’s when two key developments got
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underway that would have implications for the next major war. The first was the
institution of Ba’ath military rule in Syria beginning in 1963. The Ba’athist leaders
brought with them a highly radical, anti-Israeli vision to Syria which criticized the rest of
the Arab world for being too passive towards Israel and issued an open call for
Palestinian groups to engage in guerilla war against the Jewish state. (Bickerton &
Klausner, 2002, p. 140) The second development was the establishment in 1964 of the
Palestine Liberation Organization, which led to formation of the Palestinian Liberation
Army (PLA) for the purpose of “…liberating Palestine from its colonialist oppressors, the
Zionists…”, with “armed struggle” being the primary method for achieving this aim.
(Bickerton & Klausner, 2002, p. 145) This organization was formed under the auspice of
Yasser Arafat and the Fatah political party, and for decades thereafter would spearhead
the nationalist driven effort to destroy the Zionist entity while seeking to create a
Palestinian state. Subsequently, raids and guerilla strikes were incurred on Israeli territory
leading up to the beginning of the Six Day war of 1967. (Ciment, 1997, p. 40-41)
This war was a major strategic turning point in the nature of the military conflict
between Israel and its Arab neighbors, who again attacked and were ultimately defeated
by Israel in a swift and dominant fashion. As a result of Israel’s decisive military victory,
territory again exchanged hands with Israel taking control of large swaths including the
Sinai Peninsula (Egypt), the West Bank (Jordan), East Jerusalem (Jordan), and Golan
Heights (Syria). (McDowall, 1989, 29-30)
The Six-Day War increased tensions between Israeli and the Arab powers,
inducing an ever hardening attitude toward one another that would ultimately only
continue to progress. Shortly after the culmination of the Six Day conflict, several Arab
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states involved in it adopted what was known as the Khartoum Resolution which was
based on four guiding principles: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no
negotiations with Israel, and action to safeguard the Palestinian people’s right to their
homeland. (McDowall, 1989, p. 30) The situation was again exacerbated in October 1973
when Syria and Egypt launched a surprise attack on the Jewish homeland during the
holiest day of the Jewish year in what would come to be known as the Yom Kippur War.
This attack put Israel under a serious threat which only came under control with
assistance from the United States. (McDowall, 1989, 30-31) Israel would soon end this
military onslaught, dealing another serious blow to the confidence of its Arab neighbors.
Because this war took place on Yom Kippur, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar, the
attack sent a symbolic message to Israel and was a response by Arab forces that was in
large part due to Israel’s territorial gains from the war in 1967. The end of the Yom
Kippur War brought a familiar scenario with a cease-fire being brokered and
implemented largely due to the efforts of the United States and the UN Security Council
and with Israel increasing its hold on a Golan Heights territory that was once a part of
Syria. (McDowall, 1989, p. 31) Four years after the culmination of the Yom Kippur War,
there was a turn of the tides in the Arab world with regard to the attitude towards Israel.
In 1977, Egypt’s president Anwar El Sadat signed the Camp David accords in an
official peace treaty that was mediated by American officials and which gave all
Egyptian territory occupied by Israel back to Egypt, normalizing relations between the
two in the process. (McDowall, 1989, p. 34) This was the first of Israel’s Palestine
supporting neighbors to create and agree upon normalization of relations with the Jewish
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state and added to the already increasing trend of the PLO and the Palestinians of taking
control of their fight against Israel.
By 1987 other issues, particularly the Iran-Iraq War, seemed to be garnering as
much attention from the Arab League as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The people of
occupied Palestine, feeling very frustrated and vulnerable at this point, decided to take
matters into their own hands and began what is termed the First Intifada. This Intifada
would last for nearly five years and was characterized by continual riots, mass
demonstrations, and the throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails by the Palestinians.
(Ciment, 1997, p. 53-55) The Oslo Accords, signed in the summer of 1993, was a step in
the right direction between Israel and Palestine, but once again left the parties in an
ambiguous dilemma as Ciment notes when he writes:
By late summer of 1993, those negotiations [between Yitzhak
Rabin and the PLO in Oslo] led to Israel’s recognition of the PLO,
as well as the Declaration of Principles (DOP), also known as the
Oslo Accords. Ratified with a historic handshake between Rabin
and Arafat on the White House lawn on September 13, the DOP
was neither a detailed plan for Israeli withdrawal from Occupied
Territories nor a declaration of Palestinian independence. Instead,
it was merely a blueprint for further negotiations that would settle
the status of the Palestinians and Palestine. (1997, p. 59)
The inability of the two factions to come to terms on the issue of Palestine in the years
following the Oslo Accords led to the eruption of a violent Second Intifada which began
in 2000 and lasted over 5 years going into 2006.
Cross-border terrorism in Israel, a common occurrence during the Second
Intifada, has come to define the most serious threat facing the Israeli population over the
last two decades with dozens and dozens of notable incidents. These include the terror
bombings that took place during February 1996 in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem killing 58
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individuals and in March of 2002 when a total 127 Israelis lost their lives due to
Palestinian terror attacks. (Wasserstein, 2003, p. 189-90) Complicating the issue further
is the fact that two separate governments now control the divided Palestinian territories
with the moderate Fatah in the West Bank and Hamas, which observes the guidelines of
the 1967 Khartoum Resolutions 34 and which the US and the EU have declared a terrorist
group, governing the Gaza strip. The political division of the Palestinian authority and the
hardline, terroristic approach that Hamas continues to implement towards Israel have
added another obstacle to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and further
strains hope for a sustainable peace-agreement in the near future.

Histories of Conflict as Bridges of Connection
This brief, yet thorough summary of the major conflicts experienced by
India and Israel since their near respective dates of independence provides a
historical foundation on which the two countries have found common ground.
There are a few key areas that can be highlighted within these histories of conflict
that provide points of connection in the attempt to identify India and Israel with
one another in such a manner. To borrow terminology coined in Samuel
Huntington’s highly scrutinized Clash of Civilizations theory (1996), India and

34
As it relates the discussion on Israel and Hamas, the most critical clause found within the Khartoum
Resolution stipulates the following on line 3: “The Arab Heads of State have agreed to unite their political
efforts at the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the
withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the
aggression of June 5. This will be done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab
States abide, namely, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and insistence
on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country” (“Khartoum resolution”, 1967). For a brief
commentary on the historical context of the particular timeframe when the Khartoum Resolution took
place, see Ahmar (2001, p. 144-145)
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Israel both engaged in their conflicts across three “fault-lines” of contact:
territory, national identity and religion.
Territorial dispute has been a consistent feature of the continuing conflict each
country is involved in with neighbors. Kashmir was demonstrated to be the key
conflictual issue between India and Pakistan and remains as such even until the presentday. Additionally, other territorial issues between the two nations, such as the Rann of
Kutch dispute, have also historically been used as a legitimizing pretext for perpetuating
conflict on both sides. In Israel exchange and control of territory have also been central
themes in the history of its conflict with Palestine. Hamas refuses to recognize Israel’s
right to exist, therefore denying Israel’s claim to any territory at all in the region. Fatah,
as well as several other Arab factions, have demonstrated their desire for Palestine to be
granted a state based on the pre-1967 borders, a notion that would require Israel to give
up territory in Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. Territory is a serious point of
contention in both conflicts due to issues involving security of borders, the ability to
adequately defend the state in the event of a military attack, and because of the limited,
but shared, water resources that these contended lands possess.
The next two “fault-lines”, national identity and religion, are argued throughout
this writing to converge in the cases of India and Israel, thereby creating the unique
existence of religion-based nationalist identities in each case. For purposes of this section,
however, I will briefly attempt to deal with them in separate fashion.
The Indo-Pak conflict, as well as Israel’s conflict with its Arab neighbors, have
always been inclusive of elements of national identity. The conflicts in each case have
been fought between clearly defined nations (although not necessarily nation-states), over

145

what are perceived to be the borderlines separating these nations and the populations that
identify with and are a part of each. Despite the role I argue that religion has played in
underpinning the national identities of the state factions involved in these conflicts,
classical elements of nationhood have always been very much a part of these conflict
narratives. These include disputes over territory, issues of sovereignty, and notions of
common history, language and culture, all of which have been used as mechanisms of
separation.
Religion, to one degree or another, has been a visible point of contention
throughout the history of conflict for both countries. In the case of India and Pakistan,
conflict generated over religiously-related issues was present from the moment of
partition and even prior. Here, religion was used as the primary method for dividing an
independent Pakistan from an independent India, separating Muslim-majority populations
from the Hindu-majority areas in both the far east and far west of the mighty subcontinent. In Israel’s case, religious divide also played a key role in the initial partition
plan with Palestine in 1948. This is a narrative of conflict that has historically been
viewed along Israeli-Arab national lines, however, the development of Islamist groups
like Hamas and Hezbollah regionally, and the global rise of religiously-inspired terrorism
to the forefront of international security concerns over the last twenty-odd years, has
reframed this narrative along Jewish-Muslim lines.
It is therefore from connections such as these that a political and social narrative
of “shared” history can and has been built on, particularly by the BJP and other Hindu
nationalist groups in India.

146

The Formation of the BJP and Normalization of Indo-Israeli Relations
This section works to demonstrate how the growing influence of the BJP’s agenda
on the domestic political sphere correlates with the shift in India’s Israel policy and how
it parallels the process of gradual normalization with Israel. While there always had been
a small contingent of Israel supporters within India’s political arena for the more than
three and a half decades prior to the BJP’s establishment, the INC’s dominance of this
arena left little chance for any deviation from their policy path. In referring to India’s
political climate of the mid-1960’s, Blarel notes:
The Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), the Swatantra Party, and the Praja
Socialist Party (PSP) were traditional supporters of the establishment of
diplomatic relations with Israel, but these parties lacked the political
access and leverage to press the INC-dominated government to implement
change. (2014, p. 159)
Given the absence of domestic power and influence on the part of pro-Israeli advocates,
the sentiment of such parties and politicians on the Israeli issue could easily be pushed
aside or even outright disregarded. For there to be any change in India’s Israel policy
there would have to be a notable shift in the demographic of India’s political
establishment whereby more traditionally Israel-friendly parties and politicians would
gain power.
This prevailing circumstance throughout India’s political history, therefore, makes
the timing and impact of Hindu Nationalism’s (i.e. the BJP’s) arrival on the scene
seemingly significant with regard to India’s relations with Israel. The genesis of Hindu
Nationalism, and the eventuality of its official role in the political arena, was documented
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in the preceding evolution from Savarkar’s conceptualization of Hindutva, to the
formation of non-governmental organizations like the RSS and the VHP, and finally to
the eve of its establishment as a meaningfully functional political party within India’s
parliamentary system beginning approximately with the onset of the 1980s. The
foundation of the BJP’s ideology, the platform of their political movement, and their take
on Israel, ultimately requires attention to be redirected back to Savarkar’s Hindutva
concept and his accompanying writings. As shown above, Savarkar’s Hindutva writings
are the ideological centerpiece of Hindu Nationalism and, more specifically, of the BJP.
One of the most notable components of Savarkar’s Hindutva writings observed in BJP
rhetoric and its constituent’s actions in their rise during this time period, is the
development of a threat perception of the Islamic “Other”. This stands out as a key idea
that drove the acceptance and support of BJP political campaigns beginning in the mid1980s. Further, Savarkar’s arguments work to implicitly connect Hindus, politicized
Hinduism, and ultimately India’s indigenous Hindu civilization, to Israel and its
indigenous Judaic civilization via the social construction of a narrative depicting the two
as having “shared” histories as modern nation-states uniquely based in two general
premises: 1.) they are victims threatened by the same enemy; and 2.) they are ancient,
religion-based civilizations.

The RSS: From Vishwa Hindu Parishad to Bharatiya Janata Party
The relationship of the RSS and the VHP with the BJP has been a controversial
one since the late 1970’s when the BJP’s immediate predecessor, the Jan Sangh, was
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initially founded. The nature of this relationship is given a succinct description by Van
Der Veer who notes:
The political success of the BJP depends squarely on its alliance with two
Hindu nationalist movements the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), an
organization of religious leaders, and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS), a militant youth organization. This alliance allows it to use
religious discourse and mass-scale ritual action in the political arena.
(1994, p. 1)
It is important to keep in mind that the early- to mid-1990’s in India was a tumultuous
time for politics within the country and the potential for communal violence between
Hindu and Muslim factions had been exacerbated by the 1992 destruction of the Babri
Masjid incident (detailed in the next section). Nevertheless, while the nature of this
relationship and the domestic political atmosphere in India have undoubtedly transformed
since then, the beginnings of this relationship remain the same and the influence still
markedly apparent in the modern day.
The VHP was established in 1964 on the birthday of the Hindu god Lord Krishna
and attended by over one hundred and fifty religious leaders, and a man named Shivram
Shankar Apte, an RSS worker, was appointed the first general secretary of the
organization. The basic mission of the institution set out goals similar to many of its
predecessor Hindu nationalist organizations, including the strengthening and
consolidation of Hindu society, the fostering and dissemination of Hindu life values, and
establishment of schools, hospitals, etc. to serve “downtrodden [Hindu] brethren” of the
world. 35 (Van der Veer, 1994, p. 130) As an institution designed, in part, to link the RSS
with Hinduism’s religious establishment, the religious leaders that much of VHP’s
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membership was composed of could frequently be seen taking on positions as “spiritual
advisors” to high-ranking politicians in a process that aimed to create a “nationalized”
form of modern Hinduism through populist discourse and high-profile appearances.
(Hansen, 1999, p. 102)
The extent of the VHP’s strategic relationship with the RSS would become much
more noticeable given the RSS’s role in the VHP’s staging of political rituals beginning
in the 1980’s, with some even arguing that the initiative to found the organization was put
forth by Golwalkar himself as a means to essentially involve Hindu religious leaders in
the mission of the RSS. (Van der Veer, 1994, p. 131) The history, genesis, and mission of
the RSS since its inception, one of the best ways to summarize its relationship with the
politicized Hindu nationalism that arose by the 1980s, specifically the BJP, would be
with the Sanskrit term rajguru 36. The term, which roughly translates as the “spiritual
teacher of a ruler”, denotes the RSS (the rajguru) as a sort of divinely-imbued mentor or
advisor for the BJP (the ruler or ruling party) whose subsequent governance and policies
could then be viewed as emanating from this divinely-inspired influence. In 1979, just a
few years prior to the BJP’s initial ascent to the primary stage of Indian politics, then BJP
member of the Rajya Sabha explained this notion:
Fact is that RSS is not political. It is, if I may coin a word, meta-political.
It is not interested in power as such but it is very much interested in the
factors and forces that go into the making of a country’s politics. It is
interested in the people and their character, in our culture and its integrity,
in the country and its unity and strength, but stands above and beyond
politics, like some sort of institutional Rajguru. (Goyal, 2000, p. 2) 37
36

The rajguru is a Hindu mythological concept whose nearest modern, functional equivalent could be a
“think-tank” with divine backing. The rajguru worked to advise rulers on all matters of governance, but
who was beyond reproach due to their divinely-sanctioned status as, “A force standing between earth and
heaven, negotiating with heavenly beings the fate of denizens of a particular territory” (Goyal, 2000, p. 1)
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While not a political party or an official political party itself, the role of the RSS and its
associate organizations within the BJP and India politics generally speaking, can more
clearly be defined in light of the seemingly ambiguous nature they have emitted for much
of the time they have existed.
It is from these beginnings, ideologically rooted in Savarkar’s idea of Hindutva
and grown through organizations such as the RSS and the VHP, that the identity wielded
by Hindu nationalist groups would have its foundations. Cultivated by the events prior to
and following partition, these foundations would create an environment that would
eventually lead to the blossoming of the BJP in the mid-1980s.

The BJP and its Establishment
In the aftermath of the 1980 national elections in India, the BJP was formed from
the Jan Sangh contingent which left the coalition Janata party and adopted a moderate
political stance based on Gandhian socialism for the first six years of its existence. (Sahu,
2002, p. 254-255) Founded in large part through the efforts of Hindu Mahasabha
president Shyama Prasad Mookerjee in 1951 as a means for the RSS to formally enter
politics, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh was the forerunner of the BJP. In 1977, in an effort to
ally with other parties and defeat the INC, the Jana Sangh took to adopting a more
moderate line, but remained closely associated with the more militant-minded RSS.
While this coalition did manage push Indira Gandhi and the INC out political leadership
in India’s lower-parliament for a time, the alliance lasted for little more than three years
37

Note that this quote originally comes from an April 8, 1979 issue of the Organizer, a weekly magazine
published by the RSS.
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and the Jana Sangh’s close association with the RSS proved detrimental to its
membership in the Janata party. (Jaffrelot, 2011, p. 47-48)
The subsequent break led to the Jana Sangh’s formation of a new party. From its
founding in April of 1980 until approximately 1984, the BJP was prone to highlighting its
secular credentials in an effort to demonstrate itself as an alternative to the Congress
party and its leader Indira Gandhi, while simultaneously using this as a strategy for
initially distancing itself from the RSS given the history of controversy that surrounded
this organization. (Andersen and Damle, 1987, p. 143) It is no surprise then that the
BJP’s overall impact and influence on Indian policy, including that towards Israel,
remained marginal at this time.
The dismal results of the 1984 election for the BJP, however, prompted a shift in
the BJP strategy. In 1986, the highly motivational and, eventually controversial, Lal
Krishna (L.K.) Advani was elected as BJP president. His advocacy for close BJP-RSS
relations was well regarded and in one of his first marquee presidential speeches he called
for political action to abolish Kashmir’s special status, while denouncing existing
legislation put in place by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress party that called for
application of traditional Islamic law in certain civil cases within India’s Muslim
community (Andersen and Damle, 1987, p. 236). A multitude of domestic political and
social issues taking place in India beginning in the late 1970’s, and continuing up and
through the early 1990’s, would be further cited as justification for the shift in BJP’s
agenda during these years. For example, the conversion of over one thousand Scheduled
caste Hindus to Islam in the Tamil Nadu village of Meenakshipuram in 1981 (Koithara,
1999, p.16) was looked back upon and highlighted as a blatantly hostile attack aimed at
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India’s indigenous Hindu civilization, an event that saw a vigorous reaction and countereffort put forth by the VHP at the time this event took place. (Andersen and Damle, 1987,
p. 134-135) And while the threat to the ritual or “religious” aspect of Hinduism was a
concern, the threat to Hindu belief or ritual practice was not the central focus. As Sahu
notes, “The Hindu nationalist organizations succeeded in uniting the Hindus not so much
through common religious belief, but more through shared hostility toward Muslims”
(2002, p. 257). As nationalist groups like the BJP saw it, with conversion to a non-native
religion comes a loss of values, ideals, practice of rituals, and ultimately one’s Hindu
identity.
The agenda of the BJP was further bolstered throughout this time period by the
existence and mission of political factions such as the Jama’at-i-Islami of India and
Islamist groups like the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). The Jama’at-iIslami is a missionary movement within India functioning through a wide range of
institutional developments across India including study circles (240+), schools of all
levels (600+), and a weekly presence as speakers at over 700 mosques country-wide.
(Agwani, 1994, p. 267) By 1981 they had published and distributed over 650 books in
Urdu (491), Hindi (77), and English (78) while adopting a program aimed at ‘nonMuslim brethren’ which stated that ‘Islam offers the best remedies for the intellectual,
moral, social, economic, and political crisis afflicting the people of India’. (Agwani,
1994, p. 267) Established in 1977, SIMI derives its ideals from the founder of the
Jama’at-i-Islami Sayyed Abul ‘Ala Maududi and strives for the goal of Islamic polity in
India in the establishment of one true monotheism, making political power extremely
central to the Islamic mission. (Sikand, 2004, p. 181) Until its banishment in 2004,
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SIMI’s presence could be felt in Indian society in the following ways: 1.) through the
propagation of its message in mass contact programs, lectures, literature, rallies, and
seminars; 2.) it’s gradual radicalization beginning in the 1980s and evolving through the
1990s; and 3.) its call to wage Islamic jihad against the Indian state and Hindus after the
Ram Janmabhoomi incident. (Sikand, 2004, p. 187-188) In the minds of many Indians,
past incidents, SIMI’s reputed connection to Lashkar-e-Taiba, and its call to wage
Islamic jihad against the Indian state justified blaming SIMI for an August 2003 carbombing incident in the heart of Mumbai which killed 50 people and wounded hundreds
more. (Brasted, 2005, p. 106)
By 1989 the BJP began to shed its moderate exterior in favor of a more militant
and hardline policy. In 1990 there was a demand by the BJP to hand over the Ram
Janmabhoomi 38 temple of Ayodhya, where a 16th century Babri mosque was standing at
the time, to “the Hindus” and disassemble the mosque as this site was believed to be the
sacred holy birth place of the Hindu god Rama. (Sahu, 2002, p. 256) With the support of
the BJP, the liberation movement for Ram Janmabhoomi gained more legitimacy, and
thereby highlighted the success of its greatly expanding base of support which spread
across the middle class in small towns all over India. (Sahu, 2002, p. 257) As Brasted
notes, “Likewise in India, the BJP’s championing of Hindustan and its tracing of Hindu
political practice to values and beliefs rooted in the past has appealed to large numbers of
Indians” (2005, p. 121). In December of 1992 the Ram Janmabhoomi liberation
movement culminated in violent Hindu-Muslim clashes resulting in the destruction of the
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Babri mosque of Ayodhya and death of thousands of people across India, many of which
were Muslims.
The growing power and support base of the BJP was not solely a product of
domestic developments, however. Various international developments taking place
during the 1980’s such as Zia al-Haq’s Islamization in Pakistan, the impact of the Iranian
Revolution and the rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Muslim world working
to increase support for the BJP. (Sahu, 2002, p. 257) Regionally, development in the
rivalry between Hindu and Islamic nationalists has manifested itself most notably perhaps
through the history of military engagement and violence between India and Pakistan
which was described in a previous section. This history of conflict with a Muslim faction
(nation) outside the domestic sphere has greatly influenced the construction of the BJP
identity and agenda that developed after its founding in 1980 and the malevolent view
they ultimately perpetuated towards various aspects of Islamic civilization.
This conflict, although multi-faceted over the years, is defined by the primacy of
the dispute taking place up until the present-day in the northwest Indian frontier state of
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The highlighting of the enduring conflict over Kashmir, a
conflict which is as old as the partition movement itself, has continued to be used in
Hindu nationalist rhetoric to explicitly demonstrate that Pakistan is still a major “external
threat” (Brasted, 2005, p. 121), while implicitly working to demonstrate the threat of
political Islam and Islamic civilization to India’s indigenous Hindu civilization. The
militant Islamic front which has opened up in Kashmir, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence which operates there and is responsible for over 30,000 deaths since 1989,
have given the BJP a large amount of tangible substance and talking points to further
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underscore and justify this threat. (Brasted, 2005, p. 121) In this fashion Kashmir became
a rallying point, a sort of ‘poster child’ used by the BJP to demonstrate the reality of the
perceived threat of Islamic civilization and influence within India to the Hindu masses.
In addition to providing the potential for the narrative of a “shared” history with
Israel, the aforementioned regional disputes between India and Pakistan that have taken
place from partition up until the contemporary day, added fuel to the fire of Hindu
nationalism both before and after the founding of the BJP. To reiterate, these included the
Kutch-Sind border issue in the mid-1960’s which resulted in Indo-Pakistani War of 1965,
the war in East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) of 1971, the Kargil Operation (War) of
1999 where nuclear war seemed to be an inevitability and the multitude of terror attacks
in India over the last 15+ years, highlighted by attacks in Delhi in 2001 and in Mumbai in
2006 and 2008.
The general consensus was that historically right-wing parties, especially those
like the BJP, were pro-Israeli mainly because they are anti-Muslim:
Their [Hindus and Sikhs] immediate grievance against Muslims, whom
they held responsible for partition, was transformed into fondness for
“enemies” of Muslims. Their unfriendliness and suspicions toward the
Muslim population within India was externalized. They viewed Israel
primarily as a state opposed to Islam and Muslims, and were thus
favorably disposed toward it. (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 158-159)
The 1991 campaign platform of the BJP featured Hindu nationalism and identity at its
center while effectively exploiting anti-Muslim hostilities and the Ayodhya issue. This
led to the capturing of 119 seats in parliament and power in four Indian states. (Sahu,
2002, p. 257) If we look back at the elections of 1984, a time when PM Rajiv Gandhi was
taking only small, unsuccessful steps towards a renewed Israel policy, we see the BJP in
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a substantially different position in India’s government than they would be seven years
later, just prior to establishment of full diplomatic ties with Israel. As Kumaraswamy
notes:
In the 1984 Lok Sabha elections, the pro-Israeli Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) won just two seats in the 542-member parliament. The dogmatic
communists, who had won more seats, were never strong allies of Israel.
The third emerging force, namely the Janata Dal under V.P. Singh (who
subsequently became prime minister in 1989), was too eager to cultivate
Muslim groups to adopt an overly Israeli stand. (2010, p. 234)
The narrative of the BJP depicting of Muslims and Islamic culture as a threat is
clearly the result of the aforementioned domestic and international events as well as the
BJP’s adherence to Savarkar’s tenets of Hindutva, particularly the ideas he propagated
regarding concerns over Muslims, written several decades prior. The idea that Israel, and
by extension the Jewish people, are “natural” allies in combating the perceived threat
posed by Muslims is one that Savarkar addressed directly in his writing on Hinduism and
Hindutva, and on more than one occasion. And it was an idea at time plainly vocalized
by the BJP during this time period.
In chronicling its own history and referencing the 1991 elections specifically, the
BJP’s website states that:
When, in 1991, the Congress formed the Government on its own, even
though it did not have a majority of its own, the BJP acted very
responsibly and helped it have a speaker of its choice, content with deputy
speakership of the Lok Sabha. Having been all along opposed to a licensepermit-quota Raj it welcomed the policy of liberalization in principle. At
long last New Delhi recognised Israel and South Africa, something the
BJP had urged for long. (Jayate, 2011)
This again attests to the BJP’s desire then, and their continued support now, for
established diplomatic relations with the Israeli state.
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The 1991 BJP rise to prominence in the Lok Sabha came less than 1 year prior to
normalization of relations with the Israeli state. The BJP’s supportive stance on Israel
during this time is clear and this support would play a significant role in India’s foreign
policy towards Israel given the number of seats the BJP had recently gained in Lok
Sabha. A second important influence on India’s choice to alter its foreign policy towards
Israel came from a shift by a significant faction of India’s Hindu population in the
normative stance regarding Islam in Indian society which would ultimately bode well for
the BJP’s campaign platform at the time. The shift to viewing Islam’s role in Indian
society and politics as a threat is seemingly evidenced by several factors. The first, the
BJP’s rise to power and their great success in the elections of ’91, is indicative of the
popular support of Indian voters who would have presumably been on board with their
campaign platform that election season.
Secondly, the level of the anti-Islamic sentiment in society, and the fear of Islam
as a threat, was undoubtedly manifest in the violent communal events that took place
beginning the mid-1980’s up and through the early 1990’s, hitting an apex with Ayodhya
incident in late 1992. This event, perhaps more than any other during the timeframe under
analysis, epitomizes both the BJP’s agenda towards Islam and adoption of this agenda as
normative by a certain segment of India’s Hindu populace. There is also evidence of
recognition of this normative shift by Islamic parties within India. This can be seen in
1993, shortly after the Babri mosque incident, in the formation of a Muslim-dalit (lower
castes) coalition in order to defeat the BJP during that year’s elections in an attempt to
limit the BJP’s influence and power in the Lok Sabha. (Brasted, 2005, p. 122) It can
therefore be seen how the strong Hindutva based platform and rhetoric of the BJP would
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have affected India’s foreign policy in two ways: 1. directly, by means of the influence
and power that comes with the sheer number seats they held in the Lok Sabha on the eve
of normalization of relations with Israel; and 2. indirectly, as the primary cause of a shift
in the normative response to a perceived threat of Islam to Indian society and the
subsequent influence this would have had on India’s foreign policy towards Israel.

Normalization and the Significance of the Islamic “Threat” Perception
The normative stance towards the Islamic threat from within Hindu society could
continue be seen throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century, a stance whose
acceptance would be key in viewing relations with Israel positively. Popular support for
the BJP would flourish from 1998-2004, and subsequently so did Indian-Israeli relations
(Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 160). The 1998 national elections provided a sobering
reflection of how large numbers of Indian constituents identified with the BJP’s message
as the Financial Times media outlet noted, “The BJP’s 1998 electoral performance, its
all-time best, was a telling testimony to the assertion of its ideological identity” 39 (Miller,
2013, p. 99). While the government collapsed shortly thereafter, new general elections
were held the following year in 1999. By the end of this voting period, the BJP had
collected 183 seats (‘General 13th Lok’) on their way to winning national elections yet
again, in addition to forming a second coalition government and having Atal Bihari
Vajpayee take the position of Prime Minister.
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The successful 2002 “anti-Muslim” campaign run in Gujarat by then BJP hardline
chief provincial minister Narendra Modi (Brasted, 2005, p. 119), and the riots against the
Islamic populace that followed, attested to the continued perception of an Islamic threat
by India’s Hindu populace nearly two decades after this narrative was revived. The riots,
which claimed more than 790 Muslim lives, were said to be retribution for the Sabarmati
Express train fire where 59 Hindu pilgrims died and which a group of Muslims was
blamed for.
While high-profile incidents of anti-Muslim violence committed by Hindus have
been largely absent since that in Gujarat in 2002, numerous incidents of communal
violence between the two religious groups have taken place in India from that time up
until the present. This provides further evidence that, although the BJP’s rhetoric
concerning Muslims has taken a noticeable regression as of 2015, the continuation of the
normative stance of Islam as a threat to Hindu society has been, and continues to be,
strongly present within segments Indian society up until the contemporary-day.
The narrative combining the story of Hindu civilizational supremacy, with the
idea of an Islamic “threat”, was central to the BJP’s campaign strategy from the mid1980s to the early 1990’s. Further, it was the BJP’s perception of Israeli identity as a
modern-state under civilizational threat from a common foe that would be an absolutely
necessary condition for the BJP’s support of normalization. The Israel issue was by no
means a primary campaign initiative during this time and was couched in with the much
larger, louder narrative of Hindu supremacy and Hinduism under threat. However, the
reasons that ultimately achieved political success for the BJP in the 1991 are the same
reasons Israel would have been looked at favorably by the BJP and its voting
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constituency, thereby creating a positive environment for normalization. The prevalence
of an identity forged in anti-Islamic sentiment could therefore be seen to extend beyond
the realm of politics into the general populace through the BJP’s public support base and
voter constituency. This notion was also voiced with great disapproval by the General
Secretary of the Communist Party of India-Marxist Prakash Karat when he stated:
The chauvinist positions and military attacks by Sharon and his rightwing
government find positive response amongst the BJP and its RSS mentors
in India. The war against the Palestinians is seen through the prism of the
Hindutva war against Muslim minorities in India. Some of the barbarism
which is taking place in Gujarat finds a parallel in the Israeli atrocities in
the West Bank. That is why the Vajpayee government has remained silent
throughout except for a muted expression of concern for Yasser Arafat
during the siege. There is no indignation or revulsion as the savagery of
the Israeli onslaught. The nexus with the Israeli regime established by the
BJP rulers need to be exposed and thwarted. (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p.
160)

While less popularized and disseminated, there also existed within Hindu
nationalist circles an understanding of another avenue of connection believed to create a
“natural” bond between India and Israel. The link made to Israel by the BJP via the
Islamic “threat” narrative perpetuated during the Party’s rise to political power is the
primary of two conceptions by which this relationship could be framed. The second
understanding of Hindu India’s link to Israel was framed in terms of the related, yet
distinct notion of “civilizational resonance”. Awareness of what could be a foundational,
deep-rooted civilizational bond had been vocalized and written about even prior to
partition. It is an awareness presented as a kind of implicit understanding of a “natural”
comradery between the two civilizations, the basic framework for which is described as
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being based on many of the premises found in the discussion on Hinduism and Judaism
as religions of orthopraxy.

Non-violent Connections: BJP Understandings of “Civilizational Resonance”
The influence of V.D. Savarkar’s writings and his Hindutva ideology on the
Hindu nationalist movement, and specifically the BJP, has been explained above. The
anti-Muslim sentiment explicit in his rhetoric and the primacy and high-status he affords
to Hindu civilization are highlighting themes found within his strain of thought.
However, apart from a connection based on being the “victims of Islam”, some of
Savarkar’s less controversial writings on Hindutva’s relationship to Judaism and the Jews
also provided the BJP and Hindu nationalism as a whole with significant points for
understanding Israel
Savarkar, Israel and the Jews
In addition to using comparative and relational arguments as a means to justify
support of Israel from the standpoint of Hindutva, Hindu Nationalists can also draw on
Savarkar’s writings that explicitly dealt with Jews and his take on a potential, future
Jewish state in the biblical Eretz Israel. The phrase “National home of the Jewish people”
was commonly used is Savarkar’s reference to a future Israeli state. He is documented to
have directly compared and applied the situation of Hindus regarding their holy-land of
India to that of the Jews and Eretz Israel:

Look at the Jews; neither centuries of prosperity nor sense of gratitude for
the shelter they found, can make them more attached or even equally
attached to the several countries they inhabit. Their love is, and must
necessarily be divided between the land of their birth and the land of their
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Prophets. If the Zionists’ dreams are ever realized– if Palestine becomes a
Jewish State and it will gladden us almost as much as our Jewish friends –
they, like the Mohammedans would naturally set the interests of their
Holyland (sic) above those of their Motherland in America and Europe
and in case of war between their adopted country and the Jewish state,
would naturally sympathise (sic) with the latter, if indeed they do not
bodily go over to it. (1969, p. 135-136)
Savarkar’s argument here regarding Jews and Israel, in near identical fashion to his
argument for Hindus vis-à-vis India, directly links religion with sacred land in an
understanding that ultimately politicizes religion and imbues a national identity on a
group essentially understood by opponents to be based in compartmentalized notions of
religion as discussed earlier. When the Jewish people finally did succeed, and an
agreement was reached by the UN that was in favor of the establishment of an
independent Israeli nation-state, Savarkar was keen to again address the Jews and the
would-be Israeli citizens directly. He expressed his pleasure with the fact that such a
large majority of the world’s nations voted in the manner they did while also noting that
these nation’s should have provided “armed assistance” to the Jews in order to expedite
and ensure this process:
After centuries of sufferings, sacrifices and struggle the Jews will soon
recover their National home in Palestine which has undoubtedly been their
Fatherland and Holyland (sic). Well may they compare this event to that
glorious day in their history when Moses led them out of the Egyptian
bondage and wilderness and promised the land flowing with milk and
honey came well within sight. (1967, p. 219)
He continues, writing in the context of an Indian public he perceived as being
misinformed by sinister pro-Moslem propaganda regarding the issue:
It must be emphasized therefore that speaking historically, the whole of
Palestine has been, from at least two-thousand years before the birth of the
Moslem Prophet the National Home of the Jewish People. A long line of
their great prophets and kings, Abraham and Moses, David and Solomon
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(sic), has endeared that country to them as their Fatherland and Holyland
(sic). The Arabian Moslems invaded Palestine only a few decades before
they invaded our Sindh, and as their fanatical fury exterminated the
ancient Egyptians or Persians, they attempted to wipe out with fire and
sword the Jewish people too. (1967, p. 219)
Once the establishment of Israel became a reality, Savarkar’s rhetoric towards the Jewish
state maintained its ‘religio-nationalist’ imagery and character, while continuing to
parallel it with the situation of Hindus in India. His words here work to cement the
legitimacy of the Jewish claim to Israel by highlighting the deeds of key, albeit
unverified, figures from Judaism’s religious history, by condemning Islam’s initial
conquest of the sacred lands of the Jews and Hindus, and by again denoting the status of
the Jewish people as a nation, not simply a religious group.
To further cement his ideas on Jews and Israel, and by extension his own Hindu
nation, Savarkar notes that, “And speaking relatively [with reference to the existence of
race] alone, no people in the world can more justly claim to get recognized as a racial unit
than the Hindus and Perhaps the Jews” (1969, p. 90). In this manner, Savarkar creates an
image of the Jewish people that is practically indistinguishable from the orthopraxic
understanding of his own people: in primordial fashion as a religion, as a nation and as an
ethnic or racial group, permanently bound to an ancestral and sacred homeland. This
understanding of Jews and a future Israeli state demonstrates a ‘bridge of connection’
between the two civilizations as acknowledged by Hindutva’s founder and most
influential thinker. This civilizational resonance is further solidified and intensified when
reflecting on the tumultuous past that each nation shares in its relationship with
neighboring Muslim states or factions. It is an understanding that followers of Hindutva,
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including the BJP, can agree to and act on vis-à-vis their feelings and policy towards the
Jews and, ultimately, Israel.

The Value of “civilizational resonance”
Savarkar’s comparisons of Hindu and Jewish civilization, and the implication of
an inherent cultural resonance, were recognized and voiced by other Hindu nationalist
politicians and members in the years that followed. Professor M.L. Sondhi, a former MP
of the Jana Sangh and then the BJP, was an avid Israel supporter throughout his tenure as
an academic, politician and public figure in India from the start of his professional career
in the 1950s until his passing in 2003. Sondhi was well-known, within Israel and India,
for his efforts in establishing formal relations between the two countries. His efforts were
frequently manifest through his voice at parliamentary meetings, in his many visits to
Israel, through his writing and through his establishment of the Hebrew-Sanskrit society
in the 1960s. (Sehgal, 1993) Sondhi, a highly influential, outspoken and well-regarded
leader of the Hindu right, was very well aware of the cultural sentiment that the two
ancient civilizations shared. He made this notion an active part of his strategy and drive
to have India normalize relations with Israel throughout his life, recognizing the
important role that shared cultural sentiment, and the inseparable spiritual dimension that
is an inherent part of these cultures, could and would play in a diplomatic relationship
between the two nations.
His establishment of the Hebrew-Sanskrit society was reflective of early efforts at
creating an understanding of cultural resonance, something which he insisted had been
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present throughout the comparative histories of both nations and in the legacies of certain
historical figures:
Gurion’s intense interest in India and Buddhism, the views of A.D.
Gordon (Israel’s answer to Karl Marx) on labour (sic), the comparison
between Indian thinkers and Martin Buber (the great Israeli philosopher),
the philosophies of Herzl (the founder of the modern Zionist movement)
and Ahad Haam (Israel’s Mahatma Gandhi), the essential historic
consciousness- these are the areas that India needs to explore if it wants to
have an enduring relationship with Israel. (Sehgal, 1993)
Sondhi’s words, efforts and actions demonstrate an active understanding of what was
perceived to be a unique, civilizational bond that India and Israel purportedly share with
the implication pointing to the an understanding of its existence since the earliest years of
the two nation’s modern existence.
An understanding of a “civilizational resonance” is very much present within BJP
circles today according to some individual party leaders, activists and members. Dr.
Anirban Ganguly, director of the BJP-affiliated Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee Research
Foundation, has acknowledged this understanding as a significant component
underpinning the India-Israel relationship at its roots that creates a unique and naturally
favorable condition for development:
Ever since the first Jews came to India in order to seek asylum, amongst
the vast majority of the people of India, especially Hindus, there is a
spontaneous affinity towards the Jewish traditions. An affinity towards the
Jewish civilization, the people, and, in modern times, towards Israel. This
is regardless of any political framework, involvement, or considerations. It
is civilizationally spontaneous. We were taught and we were told about
Jews growing up and as children and I think that this still acts in our
minds. Israel, the Jews and their holy land, is for the Indian Hindu is
something very civilizationally attractive. There is a sense of kinship that
has developed since the beginning. This has helped sustain a momentum
in favor of the Jewish demands when they have taken place. A large
number of spiritual leaders, opinion makers and our ideational leaders
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were fascinated by the Jewish civilization, tradition and life. They
basically saw us and them as tied in civilizational kinship.
It is not only the politicians in the early 90s that decided to open relations
with Israel. I believe there was this entire ground swell of opinion and
feeling towards Israelis and the Jews, especially among non-Left, nonCommunist Hindus. The civilizational link has remained through the
centuries because the Jews came millennia ago and stayed, lived and
comfortably thrived. It has always been a positive and progressive link.
(Ganguly, Personal Interview, 2014)

Dr. Ganguly highlights some of themes earlier discussed regarding orthopraxis in
Hinduism and Judaism. Further comments and understanding of Dr. Ganguly on the
subject closely parallel those Savarkar wrote about with reference to Jews and Israel:
If I speak of the Hindu civilization, there has been in the past suffering
from displacement often in our history. There has also been deculturization, we have suffered all these. So automatically one does not
have to make an effort if one has a sense of that Hindu identity. Those
who are practicing Hindus and have a sense of this civilizational identity
will tell you about this displacement which was due to external invaders
and external rule for a thousand years. When the Hindu looks at the Jew, it
is the same similar feeling of displacement that comes. They see that the
Jewish nation was displaced and faced dislocation from its civilizational
roots. When the entire movement for a Jewish homeland arose, the Hindu
could empathize because despite this group having no land for centuries,
they still never lost their sense of nationhood and civilization. (Ganguly,
Personal Interview, 2014)
Dr. Ganguly’s responses to my questions about Indian-Israeli cultural connections lend
credence to the idea of the presence of Savarkar’s two-pronged understanding of Jewish
civilization being found within the BJP’s narrative. This same general sentiment
regarding India’s connection to Israel was in informal conversations I had with other BJP
affiliates, including an active politician.
The understanding of a Hindu-Jewish, or Indian-Israeli, connection is not limited
to the BJP elite (i.e., ideologues, politicians, associate academics, etc.), but can also be
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found at the sub-leadership levels as well. One area where I found awareness of this
understanding was in the realm of social activism and organization. Amitabh Tripathi,
author and journalist on Indo-Israeli relations and Middle East affairs and founding
member of the Hindu Struggle Committee, also expressed a deep awareness of several
connecting features of Hindu-Indian and Jewish-Israeli civilization according his
summary understanding of Indo-Israeli relations:
There are several reasons why people in India are so fascinated with
Israel. The common threats India and Israel have, it binds it together and
because of that Indians feel so excited about having good relations with
Israel. Second, in the sub-conscious mind of the Indian people there is a
civilizational resonance between the two nations with binds us together.
Jews are not alien to India and when they were being persecuted around
the world, they came to India and have become a welcome part of our
history. These relations are not a modern phenomenon. The modern nation
which they have founded is based on their ancient traditions. There is a
blend of ancient tradition and modernity which we see in the Jewish
nation. The nation of India is the first whose people I have seen in the
whole world that have given their consent to the people of Israel as a
Jewish nation. India, as a people, have accepted Israel as a nation of Jews.
Religion, I think, is always playing a big role in Indo-Israel relations.
When Hindus talk about their civilization and who can be their friends
based on civilizational matters, I think for a long time Indians as a whole,
and Hindus in particular, have seen Israel as a natural ally in every sense.
When you talk about civilizational identity, when you talk about threats,
and when you talk about development and modernity. Since the economic
developments of the 1990’s, people of the Indian middle class have started
to realize that if we want to be more modern and technologically advanced
that we need to learn much from Israel. This is the newest dimension of
Indo-Israeli relations. (Tripathi, Personal interview, 2014)
While the extent of this understanding throughout Indian society as
presented by Mr. Tripathi is open to debate, what can be discerned is that an
awareness or recognition of strongly perceived civilizational link between the
entities also exist to a degree at the sub-state level. While an extensive survey of
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Hindu Indians regarding their awareness of such an understanding is currently
beyond the scope of this study, the responses of Dr. Ganguly and Mr. Tripathi, in
conjunction with the writings of Prof. Sondhi and V.D. Savarkar, are significant
for the insight they provide regarding historical and contemporary strands of
thought of the Hindu Right regarding the Jewish identity and Israel. They provide
some empirical grounding for the existence of this civilizational narrative within
Indian society for the last several decades, in particular at the state level of
society, where its primary significance will later be demonstrated as far as India’s
Israel policy is concerned.
Building on Savarkar’s original thoughts and understanding of Jewish civilization,
the previous discussion demonstrates the awareness that BJP leaders would have been
cognizant of this Hindu-Jewish civilizational connection, thereby creating a circumstance
which could then have formed a significant impetus for the establishment of relations
with Israel when combined with the perceived connections via the Islamic “threat” that
have been well established.
Awareness of the Islamic “threat” link, rather than the “civilizational resonance”
link, was much more dominant in BJP circles in the years leading up to normalization
with Israel and was arguably the most vocalized tenet of their ideology as a whole at this
time, Israel aside. However, individuals like Savarkar and Sondhi demonstrate that this
understanding of a civilizational link was present to varying degrees among Hindu
nationalist leaders and ideologues years prior to the formation of the BJP and,
subsequently, India’s normalization with Israel. Further, as I argue in the following
chapter, the significance of perceived civilizational connections is demonstrated to be
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more apparent as a condition that creates an “environment for cooperation” across
societal sectors, including the “geo-political”, the “geo-economic” and the “geo-cultural”,
in the decades following normalization. In any case, if such two-pronged understanding
about an Indian-Israel relationship did exist within the BJP during the time period under
review, placing the BJP’s ascendency in India’s domestic political arena into a theoretical
framework will explain how this development would have been key in the ‘how’ and
‘when’ of India’s normalizing of ties with Israel.

Framing the BJP’s Rise and India’s Establishment of Relations with Israel
If looked at through general constructivist lens, India’s establishment of relations
with Israeli must be viewed as the product of the socially constructed conceptualizations
(Kratochwil, 2008, p. 81) of the BJP-led Indian government’s threat perception of Islamic
society and Muslims themselves. At its core this perceived threat is not based on material
(i.e., economic or military) or structural factors, but rather is based on ideational factors
that has their roots in India’s Hindu nationalist movement that dates all the way back to
the late 19th century. Also, at a secondary level not so widely recognized or propagated at
the time, a socially constructed idea of “civilizational resonance” was in circulation as
well, albeit only within small political and academic circles of the Hindu Right.
The Hindu nationalist narrative constructed over a period of several decades
worked to establish a threat perception of Islam on the part of the BJP that ultimately
translated into securitization efforts on the part of the Indian government during the time
period under examination and the years that have followed. This securitization narrative
was the most recognizable manifestation of the Hindu nationalist political narrative as a
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whole and would be the center-piece of the BJP platform for years to follow. This
security agenda framed India’s security issues as ones of a Hindu state and cultural
society, thereby giving credence to Katzenstein’s notion of cultural factors and responses
to them as defining security interests for some groups. (1996, p. 2)
Katzenstein (1996, p. 4-5) reinforces the idea that the constructed identity of
states, governments and political actors comes to play a central role in the creation of
norms that constitute the identities and/or regulate the behavior of the actor(s) under
examination. Here, that political actor is the BJP and its Hindu nationalist support-base.
The BJP’s identity was constructed on a foundation of Hindu exceptionalism through its
adoption of the Hindutva ideology. Fundamental to Hindutva was the understanding of
the orthopraxic nature of Hinduism, a nature that necessarily transgresses the Western or
secular understanding of the role of religion in a state society to include sectors of
politics, law, social organization, etc. The BJP’s argument for Hindu exceptionalism in
India was legitimized by pointing to Hinduism’s indigenous and demographic
credentials.
The social (re)construction of the Hindu identity was not completed within a
vacuum of unitary religious configuration. Threat perception also proved to be a critical
(or perhaps the critical) element in the politicized reconstruction of the Hindu identity for
the BJP during their rise and its initial stance on normalization with Israel. The perceived
threat of the Islamic “Other” is a theme demonstrated to have been consistently present
throughout some of Hindutva’s most influential writings up through this time period. The
described trajectory of historical events, both within and outside of India, combined with
the political environment fostered by the Congress-led government for so many years to
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legitimize the threat perception of the Hindu Nationalist camp. Furthermore, for the state,
notions of threat and threat perception tend to be inextricably linked to many foreign
policy decisions and/ stances. In the case of India then, this line of reasoning is
demonstrated to form a major component of its Israel policy. For a BJP-led India, the
construction of a shared identity with Israel, and eventually the establishment of
diplomatic relations with Israel, has its foundations in viewing Israeli culture and its
majority religion and defining identity (i.e. Judaism) as also having historically shared the
same threat from Islam.
Such a notion of threat conception, where by the referent object of securitization
is a large-scale collective identity, is described by Buzan as a ‘societal sector’ threat.
(et.al., 1998, p 22-23) Conceptualizing Islam and the Muslim “Other” as a threat to what
is regarded here as an inherently Hindu Indian society creates a foundation which
supports perceptions of specific kinds of threat, including political and military, based on
the increasingly visible role they come to play as the narrative develops. This is where the
discussion and understanding of Hinduism as an orthopraxic religious tradition becomes
so significant. The perceived threat to Hindu society equates to a threat which
encompasses not only “religion” but social organization, politics, the state, etc. The
Hindu identity cannot be separated from these other sectors or facets of life in India.
Perception of threat to a society and state based in an indigenous, orthopraxic religious
tradition also becomes key in creating a foundation for Hindu India’s link to Israel as
well. Securitization of the “Other” takes place within a narrative, first and foremost, of
threat to identity and the society representative of this identity, without which, the argued
basis for agency would be severely compromised. With this understanding, the shared
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notion of a societal threat becomes both the ideational linchpin for Indian-Israeli relations
and the foundation on which the other sectoral “building blocks” of the relationship find a
base and more tangible threats, such as terrorism, build a narrative.
Further analytical framing of the BJP’s genesis during this time period
demonstrates a process that functionally mirrors the understanding postulated for India’s
non-relations with Israel from Partition until normalization, which took place under the
guise of the Congress Party’s domination of the domestic political apparatus. This
framework stipulates the significance of change in the ‘Environmental (normative)
Structure’ and “identity” of the state in order to modify a given “policy”.

(Jepperson et al, 1996, p. 53)
Again, the conceptual framework above is demonstrative of the process which created the
conditions necessary within the India political and social context for a marked shift in
policy towards Israel. The rise of the BJP to political relevance during this time period
brought with it the presence of the aforementioned “identity” and the cultural and
institutional elements of an “Environmental (normative) Structure” to the system. This

173

identity and normative stance perpetuated “interests” that allowed for the creation of a
“policy” conducive to a normalized view towards Israel.
While the BJP did not come to dominate the political arena at this time in the way
that Congress traditionally had, its views and positions as a one-fifth minority (120+
seats) by1991 could no longer be disregarded. It was the first time that it had garnered
more than a few seats, and its momentum of social and political influence had been
building since the mid-1980s. The element of the BJP’s identity that was most
recognized, publicized and widely disseminated, was that of a civilizational entity under
threat from another outside and aggressive civilizational force who wished to dominate
society. This would have made the perception of a shared threat from Islam key for
Hindu Indian support for Israel given recent events that had taken place in India, the rapid
rise in communal tensions and violence there, and, by then, the inability of the ruling
Congress Party to justify the seemingly absolute nature of their support for the ArabMuslim world in the political realm which had always gone unreciprocated. These factors
came together as a formidable force for a change in India’s Israel policy, I argue,
ultimately due to the degree of political pressure at the top on the Congress-led
parliament from the opposition that had never existed before. The BJP’s constant
presence as a sizable opposition within India’s lower parliament from normalization until
the present-day, combined with the political, logistical and even practical issues that
would accompany breaking off diplomatic relations (if there ever had been a desire to do
so), have worked to ensure the recursive nature of India’s Israel policy as it has been
gradually and progressively reconstructed at the normative level.
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While Mesbahi’s (2011) framework is most useful in understanding India’s state
identity vis-à-vis Israel several years after normalization, the BJP’s rise and establishment
as a politically relevant entity within the parliamentary arena was a critical development
that allowed for the possibly of a “composite” state identity transformation and, to a
arguable degree, of a transformation in India’s prevailing “unitary” identity as well. This
was a transitional time period whereby the Nehruvian identity that dominated India’s
policy towards Israel since its inception, was challenged by the events and developments
taking place within India’s domestic political realm. From this transition there would
arise the ideational foundation on which the social construction of a Hindu-Jewish link
and a new normative understanding towards Israel could gradually be built. It would be
nearly a decade after normalization between India and Israel, and with the growing
support of Hindu nationalists in politics and society, that the relationship could be
observed to have blossomed across several sectors and strata of Indian society, thereby
demonstrating a shift in India’s “composite” identity as far as it interaction with Israel is
concerned.
Placed within this combined analytical framework, the BJP’s ascent in the realm
of domestic politics can be conceived of as a highly significant factor in the
normalization process with Israel. The narrative, I argue, that provided a base for
establishment of relations with Israel continued to be present in the rhetoric of the BJP
after normalization and certain social, political and military developments involving India
thereafter, would continue to be used to legitimize the narrative. When considering both
the rhetoric of Hindu exceptionalism and the perceived social and political threats posed
by Islam and Muslim factions that defined their political philosophy during this time, the
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BJP’s rise should therefore be considered as one of the primary catalysts that led to
India’s establishment relations with Israel. The creation and subsequent perpetuation of a
normative stance towards Israel that becomes present and publicized within India
beginning during the BJP’s rise lays an infrastructure from which relationships across
structures and within and between multiple “composite” strata of society have developed.
This normative stance, and its prevailing historical narrative, can therefore be seen to
have created a deep-rooted avenue for cooperation that is maintained and reified through
the very relationships and cooperative developments that it gave rise to in the first place.
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BEYOND NORMALIZATION: INDIA AND ISRAEL SINCE 1992

With the previous chapter making the case for the correlation between the BJP’s
climb to domestic political-party relevance and India’s normalization process with Israel,
chapter five works to demonstrate the link between the BJP’s influence in India’s
domestic political sphere and the progression of Indian-Israeli relations since
normalization took place in 1992. Certain key events or milestones are observed to have
taken place during time periods of BJP-led parliament control, time periods when the
prime minister hailed from the BJP, or as a direct result of BJP-related initiatives and/or
circumstances.
In August of 2015, C. Raja Mohan, head of strategic studies at the Observer
Research Foundation in New Delhi, spoke candidly about the changing and seemingly
“intimate” nature that Indian-Israeli relations were experiencing under the 2014-elected
BJP government. Mohan was keen to note that the previous Indian Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, and most prior to him since normalization, kept India's relationship
with Israel at low profile while current PM Modi has not, "Cynics in Israel would point
out that Delhi was treating Tel Aviv like a mistress - engage in private but refuse to be
seen with in public. The Modi government is having none of that" (Bagla, 2015). While
the rhetoric between India’s leader and the Israeli government has never been so
transparent, and the overt cooperation seemingly never more apparent, there does exist a
degree of precedent for the shift in the manner in which this relationship is presented to
the Indian public.
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If we look at the BJP’s popular growth as a political party and its performance in
general elections since its inception in the early 1980s, three major milestones of success
can reasonably be highlighted and two analyzed in relation to the Indian-Israeli
relationship. The first milestone came in the 1991 when the BJP first cemented its
presence as a significant minority party in India’s Lok Sabha. As noted earlier, the 119
seats it managed to capture in the Lok Sabha was just over twenty percent of the total in
parliament. It was by far the most seats the BJP held in the Lok Sabha up until that point
in time in its history. Paralleling the BJP’s rise and first major success in general
elections in 1991 was India’s process of normalization with Israel and ultimately the
establishment of diplomatic relations shortly after in the months that followed the
elections.
The second milestone came in 1999 when the National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) coalition, led by the BJP’s 183 seats, took power in the Lok Sabha with a total of
298 representatives. (‘General 13th Lok’) Subsequently, the BJP’s success in this election
was followed by a flourishing of Indian-Israeli relations, the most notable feature of
which was general beginning of the burgeoning security co-op and arms trade that exists
between the two countries today. Furthermore, India also saw its singular visit from an
Israeli Prime Minster, Ariel Sharon, towards the end of this term of BJP power in 2003.
The BJP’s third milestone took place in the 2014 elections where it claimed an
astonishing 284 seats in the Lok Sabha, their most successful showing in elections to
date, and an overall capture of 336 seats by the NDA coalition they form the vanguard of.
(‘General 16th Lok’) Based on the general historical pattern that can be observed
regarding the nature of the Indian-Israeli relationship following previous BJP election
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milestones, what could this indicate for the depth and development of Indian-Israeli
relations as they continue to progress forward?
The relationship between India and Israel at the state-to-state level, as well as with
or between actors at the sub-state level, has seen a gradual progression across several
different areas and sectors. Based on the previous discussion, it could be gathered that the
existence of spikes in this line of progression or cooperation tended to have come when
the BJP or a BJP-led coalition comes to power in India’s government, with continued
positive development even after it left power.
The first section details a summary of Indian and Israeli relations in the areas of
security cooperation, technology sharing and arms dealing, in what I collectively refer to
as their overall security relationship. The narrative that fortifies this security relationship
highlights the mutual threat of cross-border terrorism perpetrated by Islamic radicals that
each state has faced at times over the last few decades. I argue that the normative nature
of this narrative in Indian society and politics is a corollary of the decline in threat from
several states which historically sat at the top of the list of India’s security concerns,
combined with the increased volume of radical terror incidents perpetuated over the
previously mentioned timeframe. The security relationship, subsequently, reifies the
narrative, resulting in a circumstance of co-constitution between idea or perception and
practice. Currently, as the most manifest feature of the Indian-Israeli relationship, the
security relationship holds great significance for several reasons. The genesis of this
security relationship, inclusive of the briefly described narrative and resulting actions,
provides a clear demonstration my theoretical framework in action, while also sustaining
a broad, historical narrative rooted in religious and cultural ideas that creates a foundation
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from which relationships between India and Israel within the geo-economic, geo-cultural,
and geo-political structures of my analytical framework can flourish. Simply put, the
narrative supporting the relationship changed as the nature of the threats to the two
countries changed.
The next chapter lays out a comparative timeline of BJP political milestones (i.e.,
when they ascended either to parliamentary majority or executive control in India) and
the subsequent significant developments that came to pass in India’s relationship with
Israel during those same periods. Included here is a detailed explanation of the progress
in relations between the two nations since normalization in the political, economic, and
cultural sectors, and the role religion-based national and cultural identity could play in the
foundation or facilitation of such progress.
A following sub-section describes an event that highlights an official religion and
cultural interaction between the two states that also has theoretically significant
implications across sectors and structures. It documents the track-II diplomatic efforts of
Hindu and Jewish leadership at the 2007 and 2008 Hindu-Jewish dialogue sessions, and
the impact this could have on Indian-Israel state ties and the relationship as a whole. The
significance of this track-II diplomatic effort is underpinned by the argument I make
throughout this writing regarding the role of religion in Indian and Israeli society and
politics, particularly as religions of orthopraxis.
The final section places the post-normalization developments within the
aforementioned theoretical construct. Mesbahi’s (2011) tripartite framework for state
identity conceptualization provides an analytical tool that allows for an understanding of
how the identity-based notion of a Hindu India-Jewish Israel connection can and does
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play a constructive role in the progressive development of relations between the two
countries across the structures and strata that makes up each state’s “unitary” and
“composite” identities.

Indian-Israeli Security Cooperation: Were Identities in Shared Threat Manifest?
Cooperation between India and Israel within the security and defense sector is
undoubtedly the most recognizable and scrutinized aspect of their relationship. The
precedent for cooperation in this sector dates back to as far as 1962 when India was
surreptitiously receiving arms from the Israeli government in India’s short, but bloody
border-conflict with China. As was detailed earlier, this cooperation could be observed on
several occasions in the years that followed and so the predominant nature of the security
cooperation comes as less of a surprise. Despite this, however, it would not be until
several years after normalization that developments falling within the security realm
would merit a significant increase and begin making headlines as the primary attribute of
the relationship. The onset of the short but high-stakes Kargil Operation in October 1999
would mark a new milestone for India in security cooperation between the two nations.
During that war Israel provided technological and arms support to India in a very short
timeframe in a move that became critical to India’s success in the conflict. The BJP had
previously come to power with a parliamentary high of 182 seats during the 1998
elections, in addition to being a part of the National Democratic Alliance *NDA) that
formed the governing coalition of the Lok Sabha at the time. (Kumar, 2014) When new
elections were held a few months after the Kargil War began the BJP retained its seats,
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and the NDA its leading position, in an electoral outcome that would keep them in power
until 2004. (Blarel, 2014, p. 292) 40
It can be observed that the arms trade and security cooperation have steadily
increased every year since the BJP’s second stint in power; there is little reason to believe
this trend will be reversed any time soon, especially now that the BJP is back in power.
From the onset of normalization until the BJP’s first majority leadership position in
parliament in 1998, India had only completed four defense deals with Israel. From 1998
until 2004, they completed fourteen major deals. (Blarel, 2014, p. 324) This sector of the
security cooperation was institutionalized under BJP leadership, a circumstance that was
given a major boost by the events that took place during the Kargil War. In 2006 Israel’s
defense companies had recorded the value of India’s purchases to be at approximately
$1.5 billion, with the average spending per annum between 2002 and 2006 reaching the
$1 billion threshold. This is tantamount to nearly a quarter of India’s annual arms
expenditures estimated to be around $4 billion at the time. According to these figures,
therefore, India is Israel’s leading market for defense export. (Inbar, 2009, p. 240)
Subsequently, this makes Israel the second largest arms dealer to India, sitting behind
only Russia. Furthermore, from the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999
until 2009, Israel racked up military business with India that was in excess of $9 billion
dollars. (“India, Israel decide”, 2009) Recently, the existence of extensive intelligence
cooperation over the last fifty years has been revealed, spanning even the “unfriendly”
years of Indira Gandhi’s leadership during the 1960s and 1980s. Reports even went as far

40
See Blarel’s footnote (#47) on this page for brief, but detailed explanation of the situation involved in the
October 1999 parliamentary elections held in India.

182

as to confirm a “secret liaison relationship with Mossad” approved by Gandhi in 1968.
(Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 241) There many accounts that attest to this now widely
believed fact, including one mentioning the Research and Analysis Wing 41 (RAW)
which:
… has always had links with the Israeli’s and the US. In the late 1970’s, it
engineered the visit of Moshe Dayan to India; it also played an important
role in trying to get the Israeli defense industry a foothold in India. RAW
sent its personnel to Israel for specialized training and in late 1984, in the
wake of Indira Gandhi’s assassination, it also [sought the advice of] … a
senior Israeli security specialist on the Prime Minister’s security systems.
(Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 241)
The specialized training received by India’s RAW from Israeli forces demonstrates an
important facet of Indian-Israeli military strategic cooperation that continues to the
present-day.
In 2002, the two countries formed the Joint Working Group of Counter Terrorism
aimed at bi-lateral collaboration dealing with the issue of terrorism in all its forms. In a
meeting in Jerusalem in 2002, the two countries outlined the following goals for
collaboration:
India and Israel Sunday [6 January] held the first meeting of Indo-Israeli
Joint Working Group on anti-terrorism and discussed ways to boost
cooperation to fight the menace plaguing both the countries.
The discussions were held in a spirit of friendship and covered a number
of issues including the threat of terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations as well as the sources of terrorism, the legal dimensions of
global fight against terrorism and other matters, a joint communiqué (sic)
issued at the end of the meet said. (“India and Israel discuss”, 2002)
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The external intelligence arm of India’s intelligence services.
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Some of the most important security cooperation interaction of Indian and Israeli
officials in this regard have come in the last several years, including a 2008 visit by
Major- General Avi Mizrachi to obtain a close view of India’s Kashmir situation, advise
Indian military leaders, and organize a tactical training co-op between Israeli commandos
and Indian counter-terror units on combatting guerilla warfare in an urban setting. The
primary purpose of Major-General Avi Mizrahi’s visit was to lecture senior Indian
officers about counter-terror operations:
OC Ground Forces Command Maj.-Gen. Avi Mizrahi paid an unscheduled
visit to the disputed state of Kashmir last week to get an up-close look at
the challenges the Indian military faces in its fight against Islamic
insurgents. Mizrahi was in India for three days of meetings with the
country's military brass and to discuss a plan the IDF is drafting for Israeli
commandos to train Indian counterterror (sic) forces. Under the proposed
agreement, the IDF would send highly-trained commandos to train Indian
soldiers in counterterror (sic) tactics, urban warfare and fighting in
guerrilla settings. (Katz, 2008)
The varying degrees of security cooperation discussed here are indicative of how the
security collective between the two countries has evolved, to a much grander scale, since
the normalization of relations in 1992.
This well established pattern of arms exchange between the two nations is
recently highlighted by the planned cooperation to build an integrated anti-missile system
for the primary purpose of defending against potential future attacks by China.
(Raghuvanshi, 2014)
A multitude of weapons and technology has been bought, sold and exchanged
between India and Israel over the last 15 years. Perhaps the largest of deals, approved by
the United States in 2003, was for India’s purchase of two Green Pine Radar systems and
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three Phalcon airborne warning and control systems which amounted to a staggering $1
billion. (Inbar, 2009, p. 241) Other deals include the purchase of the LR-SAM and MRSAM for the Indian Air Force (“India, Israel decide”, 2009), upgrades of India’s Russianmade MIG-21, thermal imagers for the Indian army’s Russian-made T-72 tank fleet, and
ship-based surface-to-air Barak systems for the Indian Navy. India has also implemented
Israeli counter-terror techniques and equipment which includes radar, fences, and arms.
(Inbar, 2009, p. 241-244)
In October 2014 India made an agreement with Rafael Advanced Defense
Systems, an Israeli defense company, to purchase anti-tank missiles worth more than
half-a-billion USD. (“Israel defence chief”, 2014) Perhaps the most intriguing
undertaking between these nations in the realm of weaponry and defense has come with
regard to their previously mentioned joint-development of the Barak 8 missile system.
This is a long-range, surface-to-air missile system designed to intercept incoming antiship missiles. A corollary to this joint development has been the meeting of several highranking military officials on both sides, including an august 2015 visit of Israeli Navy
chief vice admiral Ram Rutberg during one of the trial launching sessions of the Barak 8
by the Indian navy. (“Israeli navy chief”, 2015)
Although the previous list is not an exhaustive one, there is little doubt about the
extent of Indian and Israeli security cooperation. As P.R. Kumaraswamy notes, “Because
of increasing acts of terrorism and cross-border infiltration, Israeli expertise in
intelligence gathering, innovative and proactive counterterrorism policies, and electronic
surveillance along international borders have become key areas of cooperation” (2010, p.
257). India and Israel continue to exchange information and intelligence in several anti-
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terror areas including terrorist recruitment patterns, operations, training and financing.
Numbers in sale of arms from Israel to India continue progressively higher each year,
while joint-R&D efforts between the two countries in weaponry and technology have
become gradually more common.

India’s Historical Security Concerns: The Threat from State Actors
In making the case for the primacy of the shared threat of religiously-inspired
terrorism in the Indian-Israeli security dynamic, and the parallel narrative that
accompanies it, it is necessary to succinctly explain the role of other threats to India’s
national security and why primacy is given to issues of terrorism in India as opposed to
other threats that concurrently exist to the state. Historically, the most significant threats
to India’s security apparatus have traditionally come from state actors. Given this notion,
I briefly highlight state-security concerns posed by three of India’s neighbors:
Bangladesh, China and Pakistan. The primacy I afford to the threat of terrorism in the
India national security agenda comes in response to the shift in the South Asian security
climate over approximately the last ten to fifteen years. As such, it is important to note
that this section’s focus is on the current security environment of the outlined state
threats, not what the security situation has been like historically, in years past with these
neighboring nations.

Bangladesh
India’s neighbor to its northeast, Bangladesh, has never posed a threat since the
war and its subsequent independence from Pakistan in 1971. On the security front today,
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tensions have arisen between the two based on India’s claim that safe havens for Indian
secessionist groups are provided within Bangladesh on its northeastern border. (Lewis,
2012) Although there have been ups and downs in the relationship, the two countries
have seen a great increase in cooperation since the 2008 general elections when the
Awami League came to majority power in Bangladesh. (“Embraceable you: Growing”,
2012) The rapidly improving relations have been highlighted by the visitations of top
Indian leaders to Bangladesh in recent years, including a visit by then Indian Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh in September of 2011.
The two countries have agreed to several areas of cooperation including the
development of transit routes from Bangladesh to India’s remote northeast at the cost of
over $10 billion as well as other infrastructure projects. (“Embraceable you: Growing”,
2012) The forecast for India’s ties with Bangladesh appears to be quite optimistic. In
referring to a friendly June 2011 meeting between Sonia Gandhi of India and Sheik
Hasina of Bangladesh (among other notable figures), the following was described:
As a result, officials this week chirped that relations are now “very
excellent”. They should get better yet. India's prime minister, Manmohan
Singh, will visit early in September to sign deals on sensitive matters like
sharing rivers, sending electricity over the border, settling disputed
patches of territory on the 4,095km (2,500-mile) frontier and stopping
India's trigger-happy border guards from murdering migrants and cowsmugglers. Mr. Singh may also deal with the topic of trade which,
smuggling aside, heavily favours (sic) India, to Bangladeshi ire.
(“Embraceable you: Growing”, 2012)
Most importantly to India’s national security vis-à-vis Bangladesh, I would argue,
is that it too has implemented serious efforts in dealing with extremists who pose a threat
to India. These include individuals and groups with ties to Pakistan, Indian Mujahideen,
and anti-Indian and Islamist politicians within Bangladesh. (“Embraceable you:
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Growing”, 2012) Further, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval has noted the
“extremely helpful and friendly” nature of the support the regime in Bangladesh has
provided in cooperative efforts with India to control insurgency problems in India’s
northeast. (“India’s relations with”, 2015)
As with any diplomatic relationship there is always a possibility of relations
taking an unexpected turn, which could become possible in the event of a new ruling
party coming to power in Bangladesh. There has also been some discussion over India’s
intentions in building the transit system and how these intentions could affect
Bangladeshi relations with China and the unruly neighboring population in India’s
northeast provinces. (“Embraceable you: Growing”, 2012) Never the less, the future is
anybody’s guess. There is no threat to Indian national security from Bangladesh and
current relations are on the upswing. The threats to Indian security that do come from
within Bangladesh are posed, in large part, by radical Islamist and Maoist terrorist
organizations and are being dealt with by the Bangladeshi state. (Lewis, 2012) Keeping
this in mind, the majority of threats to Indian national security from Bangladesh are
connected to terrorist groups, the fear of cross-border terrorism and insurgency issues, not
the state of Bangladesh itself which is a willing and active partner with India in the
efforts to minimalize these types of threats.

China
China has been seen as a national security threat to India since Indian
independence in 1947. The conflict between two rising Asian superpowers could be
observed as far back as 1962 during the short, but violent, Sino-Indian War and other on-
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going territorial and border disputes. Since the turn of the millennium, however, there has
been a trend towards rapprochement and a stabilization of ties between India and China.
The contemporary security environment, therefore, can most accurately be described as
“Lockean” where rivalry replaces enmity because, “…unlike enemies, rivals expect each
other to act as if they recognize their sovereignty, their ‘life and liberty’ as a right, and
therefore not to try and conquer or dominate them” (Wendt, 1999, 279).
Although rivalry and competition exist between the two, common domestic
challenges, including high poverty rates, developing economies and huge, rapidly
increasing populations, have led to increased cooperation between India and China in
recent years. (Lal, 2006, p. 131) Since the end of the Sino-Indian War in 1962, the
remaining conflict between India and China has been manifest most notably in several
territorial disputes that dot the immense 3,488km border between the two Asian giants
including those in Kashmir region and paralleling the Tibetan corridor, particularly along
India’s northeastern border with China. Ajit Doval has deemed settlement of this conflict
in that stretch the most critical, “All advancement made in the ‘relationship’ with China
gets centred (sic) around and becomes important on settlement of the [Arunachal
Pradesh] border” (“India’s relations with”, 2015). The contention over the territory of
Arunachal Pradesh continues today but a cooperative dispute resolution is currently being
employed gradually and as Colonel R. Hariharan notes that, while progress has been
minimal on the issue, “…modalities to avoid accidental intrusions and conflict have been
worked out between the two countries” (2015). In 2003, in a gesture that worked to
reduce ill-will in the territorial dispute process, India moved towards recognition of Tibet
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as a part of China. The Chinese officially recognized Sikkim as Indian sovereign
territory just two years later. (Lal, 2006, p. 136)
A major reason for the improvement of the security situation between the two
nations is due to trade. China is India’s largest trading partner with an all-time high of
$73.9 billion in total bilateral trade completed between the two countries in 2011. (“India
expects stability”, 2012) Within the economic and commercial realm Modi’s India has
also voiced persistent calls inviting the Chinese, given their vast foreign currency
reserves, to invest in infrastructure and the manufacturing sector in what is termed as the
“Make in India” program, the ultimate aim of which is to transform India into a global
manufacturing hub. (Karl, 2015) India recognizes the potential benefit in minimizing
dependence on Western financial institutions such the IMF and the World Bank, in favor
of China which has largely avoided any sort of reliance on Western financial institutions
during its meteoric economic rise, while also seeing itself become a new source of
economic and financial assistance to several developing countries around the globe. This
is a strategy that would give India the dual benefit of further improvement of relations
with its neighbor while side-stepping reliance on institutions like the IMF/World Bank
and the destructive results of their loan conditionalities. Moves aiming to build
commercial and economic ties have been further supplemented on India’s part by joining
the BCIM 42 corridor project, which seeks to create a common transit line between these
countries (Hariharan, 2015), and two alternative institutions to the IMF and World Bank:

42

Acronym standing for Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar.
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the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a Chinese initiative, and the New Bank, an
initiative of the BRICS 43 countries. (Hariharan, 2015; Karl, 2015)
In addition to territorial disputes, other areas of contention currently do still exist
between the Asian giants including Indian concerns due to the massive trade imbalance
that exists between the two nations, and those relating to the military assistance China
provides to Pakistan and the $46 billion infrastructure aid package China offered to
Pakistan in 2015. Limits to this relationship and a certain degree of distrust are sure to be
present for years to come and progress will be very gradual. However, while a Europeanstyle “security community” realistically remains only a pipe dream currently, the costs of
conflict between one another appear to substantially outweigh the benefits for both India
and China, a fact that both nations recognize. Impending domestic issues, more pressing
territorial disputes with other neighbors, as well as continuing occurrences of ethnic and
religious conflict within their own borders, have made India and China realize the
advantages of improving relations. India and China are greatly beneficial to one another
as far as bilateral trade goes, despite the imbalance, military relations have even reached a
level of cooperation inclusive of joint military drills in the last several years (Lal, 2006, p.
142) and India has joined the Chinese-created Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
(Hariharan, 2015) As Lal notes, “When asked, many leading officials and scholars in
both countries say that remaining disputes on borders and Tibet are not worth war”
(2006, p. 131). With these facts considered, China ultimately cannot be considered
India’s primary security concern as of 2015.

43
BRICS is an acronym referring to the nations of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and the
expected development of their economies on a global scale.
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Pakistan
The final threat analyzed, Pakistan, has traditionally been India’s most pressing
security concern since partition and subsequent independence in 1947. The history of
violent conflict between these two nations is highlighted by four wars and several other
armed conflicts rooted in nuclear proliferation, border contentions and territorial disputes,
and, most notably, the persisting fight over the Kashmir region. Despite the history and
ongoing issues between the two countries, there has been a slight improvement in
relations over the last few years. Prior to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, India and Pakistan
were in the process of implementing confidence-building measures and restarting the
talks to resolve the Kashmir issue. (Qazi, 2012) Although this attack suspended progress
for over three years, a push towards normalization between the traditionally bitter rivals
began in 2011. Pakistan’s current leaders have voiced their aims to stabilize relations in
the immediate region while attempting to champion a liberal foreign policy over the last
few years. With regards to steps towards normalization between India and Pakistan, Qazi
notes:
For example, 15 years after India first granted it most-favored nation
status, Pakistan finally reciprocated. Furthermore, in September [2012],
the two countries also signed a new visa agreement easing restrictions on
travel. Together, the moves are expected to boost cross-border trade and
increase cultural contacts between Indians and Pakistanis. (2012)
Perhaps the most significant development recently in India’s relationship with Pakistan
comes in the shift by Islamabad in delinking the Kashmir issue from other points of
contention it has with India. Pakistan has even agreed to allow India a limited role in
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Afghanistan whereby India may pursue interests of development and trade. These are
developments never before seen in the history of the Indo-Pak saga. (Qazi, 2012)
In light of the more recent political developments between the two nations,
Pakistan’s apparent push towards normalization, and the absence of any meaningful
military engagements in over a decade, the threat of the state of Pakistan as India’s
primary national security concern becomes diminished, although still relevant. In contrast
to some of the more encouraging developments in recent year, there are still several areas
of concern that continue to strain the Indian-Pakistani relationship. One of India’s main
concerns with Pakistan comes with regard to its status as a nuclear-armed power.
Pakistan gained status as a nuclear power in 1998 and the following year the Kargil War
with India took place, putting the world’s major powers and everyone in the region on
high-alert over fears of a potential nuclear war between the two sides. While nuclear war
never materialized between India and Pakistan during this time, and there have been no
official armed conflicts between the nations since then the theoretical possibility of
nuclear war always exists between the two rivals.
The potential inability of the Pakistani government to control its domestic terror
issue, and thereby maintain stability within and on its own borders, inevitably has a
detrimental effect on neighboring India’s security and the historically strained
relationship that plagues the two countries. Several major terror outfits have originated
and operate within or from Pakistan. A plethora of notable large-scale, deadly terror
attacks have taken place in Pakistan since the turn of the millennium. Sectarian violence
plagues the western state of Balochistan, major urban areas such as Karachi, Lahore,
Peshawar and Islamabad have been the target of dozens of high-casualty incidents (some
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involving the hundreds of casualties), and the porous northwest border with Afghanistan
has allowed for a free-flow of illegal weapons, munitions and militants into the country.
It has been estimated that Pakistan has lost as much as $110 billion (Vasudevan,
2015) in recent years in its struggle with terrorism on its own soil. Thousands of
individuals fall victim to terror attacks in Pakistan each year The Pakistani government’s
fight against domestic terror has, since summer of 2014, been highlighted by ‘Operation
Zarb-e-Azb’ in North Waziristan. The primary objective of this military offensive has
been to push-back and ultimately eliminate the operating capacity of Terik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) and several of its allies from Pakistani territory. According to government
figures, nearly 3,000 militants have been killed as of August 2015 and ninety percent of
militant strongholds have been cleared. (Kaplan, 2015) While Pakistan’s imminent
domestic instability can work to destabilize India’s own security at home, particularly in
Indo-Pak border regions, this instability also creates a situation that requires the Pakistani
government and military to prioritize problems within its own borders, thereby directing
time, money and other resources into addressing such problems that may have
historically been otherwise used in their historical conflict with India.
Pakistan is still considered by many to be India’s number one threat to national
security, however, due to the fact that a number of the most notable organizations that
have perpetuated terrorist activity inside the Indian state originate within Pakistani
borders, and due to the relationship that Pakistan’s government has or had with some of
these organizations. Despite the presumed link between the two, however, the state of
Pakistan should not be confused with what officially are labeled as independent, nonstate actors (i.e., extremist Muslim terror organizations) operating from within Pakistan’s
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borders who employ the terror tactics that result in India’s most pressing national security
concern. India possesses a great concern with the potential Pakistani connection to terror
groups, most notably Lashkar-e-Taiba which is responsible for several high-level attacks
in India since the turn of the millennium. Furthermore, even though India seeks an end to
its tensions with Pakistan, Kronstadt notes:
New Delhi acknowledges that a stable Pakistan is in India’s interests. At
the same time, however, Indian leaders are convinced that Pakistan has
long been and remains the main source [of] India’s significant domestic
terrorism problems. They continue to blame Islamabad for maintaining an
“infrastructure of terror” that launches attacks inside India. (2010, p. 3)
The Pakistani government categorically does not accept responsibility for such acts,
however. Islamabad officially condemns many of these acts when they take place and has
cooperated fully in select investigations by New Delhi into some of the incidents, but
constant acrimony impedes this process and the peace process as a whole. (Kronstadt,
2010, p. 2) Pakistan’s PM, Nawaz Shariff, has also implicitly accused its neighbor and
historical enemy of supporting the same type of destabilizing ventures as India accuses
Pakistan of supporting. During a speech at an all-party meeting, Sharif highlighted what
was perceived to be India’s attempt to divide Pakistan and incite communal tension
throughout the country saying, “The enemy is using different tactics to divide the nation
on sectarian and ethnic grounds but we will thwart their designs with unity”, and noting
that, “There are some who wish to make us fight amongst ourselves” (Vasudevan, S.,
2015). This rhetoric, of course, is nothing new for Pakistan or India when speaking about
one another’s impact on its own, domestic security situation.
Regardless of the potential link between the state of Pakistan and terrorism, it is
very important to reiterate the distinction between the Pakistani state and the terrorist
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factions that operate independently within and from Pakistan. This is necessary here in
order to establish (cross-border) terrorism directly as the primary threat to India’s
national security as opposed to the state of Pakistan itself. As such, extremist terror
factions originating or operating from within the Pakistani state should be analyzed in
their own right and as a security threat independent from other issues threatening India’s
national security.
The important distinction between threats from the Pakistani state itself (i.e., its
military) and threats emanating from within the Pakistani state (i.e., terrorist
organizations based from with the state), combined with the imminent reality of
Pakistan’s mounting domestic issues currently highlighted by military operations on their
northwest frontier that they must address, create a situation where the Pakistani state
should not be considered the primary threat to India’s national security.

Modern-Day Histories of Terror
“India shares with Israel a common perception of terrorism as a menace, even
more so when coupled with religious fundamentalism. Our mutual determination to
combat terrorism is the basis for discussions with Israel, whose reputation in dealing with
such problems is quite successful.” - BJP leader L.K. Advani in 2000
(Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 252-53)

In revisiting some of my earlier statements, we are presented with the overlapping
identity of India and Israel based, in part, on a dreadful history of terrorism each has
experienced. These countries have been victims of cross-border terrorism, an experience
that more than any other has worked to create a shared identity-base which is recognized
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by many Indians as well as Israelis. It is just one characteristic of identity that citizens of
these two nations share and one that proves to be crucial to the collective security
dynamic that exists between India and Israel today.
The following discussion in this section briefly details the history of terrorism in
both India and Israel by illustrating various examples occurring over the last twenty
years. These examples work to provide a point of comparison between the two countries
and highlight there ongoing struggle with the threat of terrorism.

India
It is a painful, but ironic, fate that India would become one of the world’s
foremost victims of terrorism. It was the India-linked, Hindu extremist group known as
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (i.e., the Tamil Tigers) that, beginning in the
1980’s, popularized the despicable tactic of the suicide bombing during its separatist war
in the country of Sri Lanka. (Pikert, 2009) For over thirty years, the headlines of Indian
news reports have featured dozens and dozens of examples of terrorist activity by several
different religious or ideologically-based groups. These groups include Hindu radical
groups, Sikh extremists, and Leftist movements, such as the Maoist Naxalites, in addition
to Islamic extremist organizations. Highlighted here are instances of Islamic radical terror
that have occurred over the last two decades or so.
The December 2001 terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistani
militants resulted in the deaths of nine individuals. The government placed blame on the
groups Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. (Robertson, 2007, p. 368) This was
significant for the choice of target as a direct attack on the highest, representative body of
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the Indian state. The infamous November 2008 attacks on the Hotel Taj Mahal Palace
and the Nariman House, the single most significant event epitomizing the Hindu-Jewish
narrative due to the symbolic nature these targets project, resulted in 164 fatalities and the
wounding of at least 308 (Bora, 2015). All in all, between 1994 and May of 2010, terror
attacks in India resulted in 58,204 fatalities. (Misra, 2010, p. 39) Another notable attack
took place in July of 2011 when again the Pakistani-based militant group Lashkar-eTayyiba attacked the city of Mumbai, setting off two near simultaneous blasts in the city
center which killed at least 21 and injured over 140 more. (“Near simultaneous blasts”,
2011)
Other notable terrorist activities, several of which were perpetuated by Lashkar-eTaiba and Indian Mujahideen, that have taken place in India over the last twenty years
includes, but are not limited to, the following:
•

March 12, 1993: More than 300 people die in 13 separate but almost
simultaneous truck bombings at financial sites in Bombay, India.

•

February 14, 1998: A series of 12 bomb attacks [perpetrated by Al
Ummah] at 11 locations in the city of Coimbatore in the state of Tamil
Nadu killed 58 people and injured more than 200.

•

October 1, 2001: Suicide attack on legislatures in Kashmir and Jammu
leaves 38 people dead. Jaish-e-Mohammed initially claims responsibility,
but later recants.

•

August 25, 2003: Lashkar-e-Taiba sets off two car-bombs in Mumbai
killing 54 and injuring 244.

•

October 29, 2005: Three explosions in New Delhi kill 62 and injure more
than 210. Lashkar-e-Taiba was responsible for the attacks.

•

July 11, 2006: Commuter trains in Mumbai, India, bombed, killing 209
and injuring more than 700 with Lashkar-e-Kahar claiming responsibility
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•

May 13, 2008: Blasts in Jaipur kill 63 and wound 216. Indian Mujahideen
(sic) claims responsibility

•

July 26, 2008: A series of 21 attacks in Ahmedabad carried out by Indian
Mujahideen kill 56 and injure over 200

•

February 13, 2010: A German bakery in Pune is bombed with 17 fatalities
and Indian Mujahideen claiming responsibility
(Bora, 2015)

In addition to some of these larger incidents, there have been dozens of smaller terror
incidents throughout India perpetrated by Islamic extremist groups, as well as nonIslamic groups, since Mumbai in 2011 and through 2015, including one in 2013 in Bihar
that killed six and targeted eventual Indian PM Narendra Modi. Since 2010, according to
New Delhi’s Institute for Conflict Management, that number of fatalities has further
increased to approximately 65,000, albeit not all the result of Islamic extremism. (“Indian
fatalities 1994”, 2015). While annual fatality numbers due to terrorism have dropped in
recent years, several contemporary developments have relegated cross-border/domestic
as India’s primary security concern as of 2015. These include the previously argued
demise of state actors that have been historical threats to India’s security, the increasingly
unstable political and security situations in neighboring Pakistan where many terrorist
threats to India originate, and the rise of terror groups, recruits, and incidents worldwide
headlined by the rise of Islamic “state” in Iraq and Syria.

Israel
Cross-border terrorism in Israel, an especially common occurrence during the
second intifada that lasted from 2000-2005, has come to define the most serious
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immediate threat facing the population over the last two decades with dozens and dozens
of incidents to take note of. Israel faces cross-border terror threats from the groups
Hamas and Islamic Jihad on their southwestern border with Gaza and from Hezbollah
militants on their northern border with Lebanon. All three of these groups and others,
such as the former Palestinian Liberation Organization, have carried out terrorist
bombings and attacks with relentless frequency since the 1980’s. These include the terror
bombings that took place during February of 1996 in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem killing 58
individuals and in March of 2002 when a total 127 Israelis lost their lives due to
Palestinian terror attacks. (Wasserstein, 2003, p. 189-90) It is documented that from
2000-2004 there were 157 suicide attacks in Israel perpetrated by individuals from
various Islamic radical groups in which a total of 507 Israelis were murdered.
The examples of terrorism and suicide bombing activity that took place within
Israel’s borders over the last two decades are seemingly innumerable. The following list
provides several more examples (out of literally hundreds) briefly demonstrating the
nature of frequency of this violent phenomenon the plagues the day-to-day existence of
Israeli society:
•

January 22, 1995: Bomb at Israeli military facility kills 19; Islamic Jihad
claims responsibility

•

February 26, 1996: Hamas suicide bomber blows up bus in Jerusalem,
killing 26

•

March 4, 1996: Tel Aviv shopping center bombed; 20 deaths reported.
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad claim credit

•

June 1, 2001: Hamas suicide bomber hits “Dolphinarium” dance club in
Tel Aviv, killing 21 people and wounding 140
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•

March 27, 2002: Hamas suicide bomber attacks Passover worshipers at
Park Hotel in Netanya, Israel, killing 22 people

•

October 4, 2003: Hezbollah suicide bomber attacks Haifa restaurant,
leaving 19 dead
(Robertson, 2007, p. 362-371)

•

July 12, 2005: 5 dead, 90 injured as result of suicide-bombing in Netanya
mall

•

April 17, 2006: 11 dead and 61 injured in a Tel Aviv suicide bombing at a
fast-food restaurant

•

March 6, 2008: 8 killed, 11 injured when an Islamic extremist entered
Mercaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem and opened fire

•

August 8, 2011: 8 dead, 31 injured in Eilat as result of an attack on a bus,
a roadside bomb and mortar fire on civilian vehicles

•

November 18, 2014: Two Muslim extremists enter a Jerusalem synagogue
killing 7 worshippers and injuring 11
(Johnston, 2014)

While the highest spikes in the frequency of terror attacks and the number of
fatalities since the late 1980’s have taken place during the first and second Intifadas,
forms of terrorism remain a serious threat daily for Israeli citizens in certain parts of the
country. This holds particularly true for those living on the border areas with Lebanon
and especially Gaza, where indiscriminate rocket fire from various jihadi groups has
become a regular occurrence taking place, on average, several times a year.
Israel’s capability to defend its citizens against such attacks during both war and
peacetime, has improved markedly since the lessons learned after the Second Intifada.
These include the tightening of border security through the erection of walls and fences,
increased numbers of check-points at border crossings, the strict control of all naval and
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air-space in and out of Gaza, and the creation of the ‘Iron Dome’ system, just to name a
few of the measures taken. Despite the continual advance in Israeli technology, weaponry
and strategy, however, cross-border terrorism still remains a regular and constantly
evolving threat for Israeli society. This is due to the ongoing existence of extremist
factions such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad in the territory surrounding Israel,
and the continued state-sponsored support of these groups by Iran and/or many of Israel’s
historical Arab enemies.

Political Developments and Exchanges
It is no secret that the BJP has traditionally had a favorable view of Israel
throughout its 30-plus years of existence which has been characteristic not only of
privileging Israel on several occasions, but also of criticizing the Congress Party and its
partners for their failure to support or properly engage the Israelis throughout most of
their history as India’s primary ruling political party. (Mohan, 2014)
With the BJP’s ascent to domestic political relevancy just prior to normalization
provided the Israel relationship with a much-needed support base within the lowerparliament who policy stance could no longer be disregarded, tangible signs of a
significant rapprochement were very gradual and the institutionalization of this normative
stance would take several years. During the years that made up the BJP’s first majority
governance term following the events of the Kargil War, the bilateral relationship would
progress with the occurrence of four key political visitations. These included visits to
Israel by India’s first senior cabinet member, Home Minister L.K. Advani, and India’s
Minister of External Affairs, Jaswant Singh, in June of 2000, a meeting in the USA by
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India’s National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra with the American Jewish Committee
in May 2003, and, most significantly, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s visit to India
in September of that same year. (Blarel, 2014, p. 300-303)
Sharon’s visit was a major political milestone in the relationship between the two
countries that has yet to be reciprocated. No Indian Prime Minister has ever visited Israel
while in power, however, this is scheduled to change under the BJP-led government that
undertook its role in 2014. The newly elected Prime Minister of India, Nerendra Modi,
visited Israel in 2006 while he was chief minister of the state of Gujarat which is known
for its cooperation with Israel in several areas including water management, sustainable
agricultural practice and joint research ventures to name a few. (Katz, 2014) If we
consider this past occurrence with the BJP’s well-documented support of Israel, the
change seemingly appears imminent with Modi at the helm as India’s PM.
While the BJP’s current support of Israel is apparently strong as ever, their
historically anti-Muslim rhetoric also seems to have been reduced by a measurable degree
over the last several years as well and has left the door open for the narrative focus to
shift to the less militant, more positive connections the two nations share regarding
“civilizational resonance”. The BJP campaign platform for the 2014 elections placed its
focus on economic growth, highlighting Modi’s success in Gujarat, and on the promise of
equal treatment of all Indian citizens, among other things. The initial reaction by India’s
Muslim populace to these promises and to the implicit self-image change of the BJP has,
generally speaking, been one of belief and the approval as 2014 election results from
several of India’s Muslim-dense states seem to indicate. (Chalmers & Kalra, 2014) The
invitation Modi extended to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to visit India
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immediately following his party’s victory at the polls is perhaps further evidence of a
perceived BJP image change vis-à-vis India’s domestic Muslim constituency and its
Muslim neighbor Pakistan.
Although the BJP’s third term in power is now only in the second year of a six
year term, history would suggest that India’s relationship with Israel, politically, socially
and militarily, will only continue to expand under BJP leadership, potentially in a more
broad-based and rapid fashion. In what could traditionally viewed as a practice
contradictory to developing ties with Israel, the BJP has also set out to change its own
historical self-image regarding Islam and a sizeable portion of India’s 175 million strong
Muslim minority appears to have given their initial vote of confidence in this image
change. Only time will tell if Modi and the BJP can successfully maintain this balancing
act between the way it is perceived by India’s Muslim citizenry and unwavering support
of Israel. Only later will we be able to judge the success or failure of the BJP’s third
milestone and the legacy of the 2014 Indian general elections.
The normative stance taken by the BJP towards Israel throughout most of its
existence may also be becoming reflected in India’s institutional behavior, in addition to
the improvement of direct, state-to-state cooperation that has be observed since the
party’s electoral success in May of 2014. In December of the same year, India’s longtime policy of abstention in the UN voting was purportedly under review as a part of the
Indian government’s evaluation of its foreign policy strategy as a whole. India’s voting
record in the UN, which has a historically well-known track-record of Palestinian
support, is under consideration for revision with only an “administrative nod” needed to
make this revision move forward. (Berman, 2014) Conversely, India’s Foreign Minister
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Shrimati Sushma Swaraj, who is slated to visit Israel in October 2015, has stated
publically that, “To say that we are tilted towards Israel or we are making any changes in
our policy is wrong” (Ahren, 2015), insisting India’s foreign policy remains unchanged.
Despite the recent oratory from Swaraj reinforcing India’s longstanding position
and UN voting patterns regarding the Israel-Palestinian issue, developments on the
ground seem to suggest otherwise. The beginnings of this potential policy shift were
hinted at nearly a year earlier, in July of 2014 when India’s BJP-led lower-parliament
rejected a primarily Center and Left-supported resolution to condemn Israel over the
conflict that was, at the time, taking place between Israeli forces and Hamas in the Gaza
strip. (Gupta, 2014) Similarly in early July 2015, just before Swaraj was quoted
reassuring India’s support for Palestine, India had abstained in a vote on a UN Human
Rights Council resolution that backed a report critical of Israel’s behavior during the
conflict with Hamas in Gaza last summer. (Ahren, 2015) Furthermore, two months prior
to this it was confirmed that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi would be the first
Indian head-of-state to visit Israel. (Keinon, 2015) This visit will be an event with
symbolic implications as great if not greater than the practical ones, and it will work to
further support the onset of “civilizational resonance” I argue is now being fostered
within the narrative on Indian-Israeli relations.
The takeaway is that, while these developments are significant in terms of the
tangible or practical benefit they could bestow upon Israel (or India for that matter) in the
short- or long-term, what is most remarkable here is the seeming reversal of India’s longterm normative stance towards Israel that had been solidified under Nehru’s leadership
over six and half decades ago. India’s stance on Israel, as explained in chapter three, was
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always publically assessed and promulgated vis-à-vis the Palestinian issue and the status
of this conflict at any given time. The staunchly pro-Palestinian sympathies espoused in
India’s official position on all Israeli-related issues remained strong even after
normalization of relations between the two countries in 1992. While there has been a
gradual improvement of relations every year since normalization, on the international
stage throughout this time period India had always remained critical of Israel and the way
Israel has handled its issues with Palestine.

Economic Relations and R&D
From a stance of a relationship embedded in the notion of a “shared” identity, an
environment results that is conducive to fostering of ties across sectors. If Modi’s trackrecord during his time in Gujarat is any indication of what we can expect during his
tenure as India’s prime minister, then close attention should be paid to the progression of
India’s economy, and economic relationship and bi-lateral trade relations with Israel.
Since the establishment of relations between India and Israel in 1992, there have been
several other areas in which cooperation has been initiated and has continued to flourish
in addition to the security realm. Economically speaking, bilateral trade has increased
from just $200 million annually at the establishment of official relations, to $4+ billion
per annum currently. Of this amount, anywhere from 50-70% is said to be a result of the
diamond trade and trade of other precious stones. (Kumaraswamy, 2010, p.254-255)
Two areas that are especially burgeoning are those of science and technology
(“India and Israel”, 2010) which comes as no surprise if one considers the unprecedented
rise of the I.T. sector in Israel’s ‘Silicon Wadi’ and the south Indian city of Bangalore
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over the last several years. The status of both these countries as global tech centers has
created a multitude of opportunities for research and development cooperation and
collaboration. Fields of cooperation here include telecommunications, nano- and
biotechnology, and space technology to name a few, as evidenced by the visit of India’s
Minister of Science and Technology Kapil Sibal in May of 2005 and the subsequent
understanding on the creation of joint research and development fund (Blarel, 2014, p.
334-335) The vast-growing nature of the technology relationship has even led Israel to
open up a consulate in India’s tech-city Bangalore in 2012 (Blarel, 2014, p. 334) in order
to aid in facilitating the high-volume of day-to-day interaction between individuals and
companies of the two nations’ technology sectors. In 2014 the two governments were in
ongoing talks about the establishment of an R&D fund of a reported $40+ million dollars
that would be aimed at bringing together Indian and Israeli companies and scientists for
collaborative technological efforts. (Cohen, 2015)
The seemingly limitless capacity for current and future R&D co-op, and its
mutually beneficial relationship for the two countries’ economic ties, was voiced by the
official spokesmen of the Israeli embassy in Delhi, Ohad Horsandi, in an interview I
conducted with him:
Market-wise it is huge for Israel, 5.5 billion dollars in 2012. We are
working on signing an FTA with India which is a huge game changer. It
will allow Israeli companies to sell more equipment and commodities
here, much more than it has been now, and experts say that trade can triple
within 3-4 years. This also has an effect on areas of R&D and movement
of people. Israel is a small country and we need markets because it is an
export economy. Also, India is very good with R&D and can be a very
good partner for this whether it is private to private, government to
government, or academic to academic.
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You can only get so far by doing all R&D in-house. In a few years this
will be a pillar of the relationship along with defense, agriculture, and
trade. Israelis are good with innovation and creating ideas and developing
them to a certain point and that is it. Indian companies are good at taking a
good idea and sustaining it and making it grow. They can take that idea,
adapt it, lower its cost and then mass market it. (Horsandi, Personal
Interview, 2014)
The two countries appear to be “natural” partners in this regard with the very nature of
the market, and the rapid increase in reliance on technology, creating a situation for
seemingly unlimited growth between the nations. Israel is well-known for product
innovation and design, while India adapts that product and then markets it. Each country
provides the other with something the other vitally needs to ensure a healthy economy
and, in large part, some the other lacks. The Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) that currently
being negotiated is a restart initiative of Modi’s BJP-led government and, once the details
are agreed upon, is predicted to at least double the already booming economic partnership
and open up more avenues for trade beyond the dominant arms and diamond sectors.
(Parashar, 2015)
As Mr. Horsandi was keen to mention, there have also been major technology and
learning exchange programs centered on water and agriculture. (Beck, 2013; Kamin,
2013; Udasin, 2013) Similar to the Israel development-Indian marketing dynamic, Israel
has agricultural technology, but little land, while India has an immense amount of land,
but lacks the technology to maximize cultivation of this land. A multitude of factors
including inefficient agricultural practices, natural disasters, insufficient water supply and
a rapidly increasing population, all negatively impact the amount, distribution and quality
of India’s water supply and India’s ability to effectively grow and manage crops in many
areas. Technology developed in Israel over the last several years and its experience in
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managing water issues at home have made this an area ripe for cooperative measures and
problem solving.
A multitude of bi-lateral agreements between states within India and Israel have
been put in place over the last several years with the aim of vastly improving agricultural
techniques, making water and irrigation practices more efficient and generating greater
crop yields. For example, an agricultural collaboration initiative known as the Action
Plan was initiated by the Israeli government in 2008 which continues in 2015, has created
many centers where the collaboration is based on and includes seven different Indian
states 44. (Blarel, 2014, p. 334) The continued developments in technology, agriculture,
research collaboration, trade and others, function to integrate deeply the two societies in a
fashion that is poised to result in their ascent to a level of significance alongside the
defense and security relationship.

Cultural Developments
A rapidly developing area of Indian-Israeli relations that demonstrates relevance
for my argument is the booming tourism industry. India is currently a top tourist
destination for Israeli travelers, a growing trend with more than 40,000 visiting annually.
It has become an especially popular destination for young Israeli soldiers after finishing
their required military service, and Israeli tourist volume is so high in some places, such
as parts of Kashmir, that it has become the norm to see signs and labels written in
Hebrew.

44

Includes the states of Harayana, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, and Karnataka.
(Blarel, 2014, p. 334)
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A major impetus for such a trend lies within the civilizational affinities that
Jewish Israelis have for the widespread ‘culture of spirituality’ that day-to-day life in
India is perceived to be embedded in. This is a spirituality that ultimately finds its base or
beginnings in what can only be described as “Hindu” sources of culture and being. Hindu
culture, which historically has been a religious tradition famed for its tolerance and
integration of minority religions into the fold of Indian society, for nearly two millennia
has welcomed and respected Jews who have lived within the territorial confines of their
ancient civilization. This highly redeeming quality of the Hindu society, many centuries
in the making, has created a deep rapport with the Jewish community. Israeli Jews are
especially cognizant of this rapport which is reflected in the spiritual and cultural
attraction they have for India and the civilizational base on which this society is built.
The spiritual and cultural ties embedded in the tourism sector are manifest most
notably perhaps in the joint-collaborative effort between Indian and Israeli governments
that aims to bring Jews Indian-origin to India for heritage tours. This program is set to be
in place by early 2016 and will allow the estimated 85,000 Indian-Jews from Israel to
tour and experience various Jewish heritage sites throughout India in an effort to educate
and connect them with their Indian origins:
With India renovating Jewish heritage sites in the country, India's envoy
to Israel has appealed to young Jews of Indian origin to utilize the ease of
travelling to the land of their forefathers and to contribute in strengthening
bilateral ties by connecting to their roots. (“India to start”, 2015)
The notion that this program will “contribute to strengthening bilateral ties” demonstrates
an implicit recognition by both governments of the deep ‘religio-cultural’ connections
and affinities that these countries share as well as the utility that that cultural cooperative
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efforts can have for the solidifying of ties at the state-to-state level. This ‘religio-cultural’
cooperative endeavor also finds significance in the fact that, as far as Israeli Jews of
Asian origin are concerned, it is a unique opportunity that practically only India can offer
(save for China 45) due in large part to the travel bans and serious safety concerns that
would be faced by these Jews in any attempt to visit their country of origin across the
Asian continent. Unlike many other locations in Asia where historically significant
populations of Jews once lived, but Israelis cannot travel (i.e. Iran, Uzbekistan,
throughout the Arab world, etc.), India is very welcoming and relatively safe for Israelis
to visit. This again plays into the entirety of the history of Jews in India and the theme of
“civilizational resonance” discussed throughout this writing.
The historical circumstance(s) on which this rapport is built on is quite unique for
Israeli-Jews and one that, I argue, may not be found with any other nation or society in
the world. From this circumstance, a platform for cooperation and resonance forms
within the normative-social sector of Mesbahi’s framework that reinforces and aids in
facilitating new avenues of engagement between the nations within/between other sectors
and composite levels. Given the primordial and often deep-rooted nature of the cultural
enterprise, connections or cooperation made at this level could be argued to create bonds
that are stronger and longer-lasting than any sort of relations emanating from purely
pragmatic circumstances or tangible reasons.
45

China is an Asian country where it is currently permissible for Israelis to travel. While native Jewish
communities are known to date back several centuries, the numbers were relatively marginal. Common
estimates have these numbers potentially reaching a thousand at one time, with a few sources claiming up
to 10,000, although this figure is not widely accepted. See Pollak (1980) for details on Jews of China.
Despite the fact that Israeli Jews can safely travel to China, the relationship between China, Judaism and
Israel is much less significant within the context of the discussion for several reasons including that the
native community in China is all but non-existent and the Chinese-Israeli relationship is primarily
economic, currently lacking any real connective substance in the geo-cultural or geo-military sectors.
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Recognition of Civilizational Resonance: Building a Case for a Cultural Foundation of
State-to-State Interaction
The topics that informed the comparative explanation of the orthopraxic nature of
Hinduism and Judaism found in chapter two, in addition to others, were major themes of
discussion when top religious leaders from India’s and Israel’s majority religion began an
official inter-faith dialogue starting in 2007 in New Delhi 46 with the Chief Rabbinate of
Israel representing the Jewish delegation and the H.D.A.S representing the Hindus. These
two religious envoys were brought together, in part, through the effort of a third-party
NGO 47 called the World Council of Religious Leaders 48 and its Secretary General Mr.
Bawa Jain. Subsequent meetings took place in the following years, including the second
installment of the original New Delhi meeting which took place in 2008 in Jerusalem 49
and less publicized 2009 meetings 50 in New York and Washington which were conducted
between secondary associate groups of the main Hindu and Jewish contingencies, in
addition to the H.D.A.S. These groups included the Hindu American Foundation, the
American Jewish Committee, religious leaders and several academics and experts in
fields of religion, political science, and other disciplines.
The importance of this dialogue and these meetings with regards to Indian-Israeli
relations derives from the holistic role of Hinduism and Judaism in their respective
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For further reading on this meeting refer to Bender (2011; 2014); “1st Hindu-Jewish” (2007)

47

Non-Governmental Organization

48

For further information on this organization prefer to "The world council" (2002)

49

For further information on this meeting refer to Bender (2011; 2014) and “2nd Hindu-Jewish” (2008)

50

For further details on this meeting please refer to Brill (2009) and “Hindu, Jewish religious” (2009)
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societies as described in previous sections. These high-level meetings between the leaders
of the two most important communities within each respective religious tradition provide
a palpable example of the mutual recognition of commonalities in the character, history,
and development of each nation not only within a contemporary context, but at a deeper,
primordial level as well.
The effects that such an understanding and partnership could have on India-Israel
relations can be measured within the framework of track-II diplomacy51. Track-II
diplomacy is one angle from which religion can be approached within the IR discipline.
Track-II talks (diplomacy) can be defined as:
Discussions held by non-officials of conflicting parties in an attempt to
clarify outstanding disputes and to explore options resolving them in
settings or circumstances that are less sensitive than those associated with
official negotiations. They are neither academic conferences nor secret
diplomacy conducted by government representatives. (Agha, Feldman,
Khalidi & Schiff, 2003; p. 1-2)
As the definition indicates, this alternative form of diplomacy has the potential of being
both very useful as well as effective in addressing and dealing with pressing issues of
nation-states. Further, some of the most recognizable forms of track-II diplomacy occur
between religious groups and can be seen in formal meetings between religious leaders in
the form of inter-faith or inter-religious dialogue. Inter-religious meetings and dialogue is
are methods of integrating the “religious” with the “political” within or between states in

51

For a more in-depth discussion regarding track-II diplomacy and notable historical examples refer to
Agha & et. al. (2003), which details the role of track-II talks throughout the history of much of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, Leguey-Feilleux (2009), whose chapter on 'track-II diplomacy’ typologizes the
enterprise while providing notable historical examples for each, and Johnston & Cox (2003), whose
discussion highlights track-II diplomatic efforts in the context of role and potential of religiously-affiliated
individuals and/or groups.
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a way that is sensitive to public opinion and knowledge and the overall process of
conflict management. Joseph Montville, the individual who first coined the term track-II
diplomacy in his 1981 article “Foreign Policy to Freud”, details this integration into the
political sphere by noting that:
Track two diplomacy is a process designed to assist official leaders…by
exploring possible solutions out of the public view and without the
requirements of formal negotiation or bargaining for advantage. Track two
diplomacy seeks political formulas or scenarios that might satisfy the basic
security and esteem needs of the parties to a particular dispute. On its
more general level, it seeks to promote an environment in a political
community, through the education of public opinion that would make it
safer for political leaders to take risks for peace. (2006, p. 16)
Track-II diplomatic efforts, therefore, can create a potentially viable bridge between the
Indian and Israeli states which makes each cognizant of the antecedent notion of
“civilizational resonance” that I argue exists between the two states at multiple societal
levels.
In addition to conflict resolution, however, I would expand the usefulness of
track-II diplomacy to include those efforts by non-official representatives in seeking to
improve existing stable relations or relations that have encountered a lull acknowledged
to fall short of the traditional label of ‘conflict’ which implies the presence of some
degree of force and/or violent measures. Putting aside for the moment any relation or
effect the Hindu-Jewish dialogue can or does have on India-Israel relations, there was
definitively a conflict present in terms of a perceived serious theological and dogmatic
divide between the two religions. This was a primary reason for organizing the dialogue
in the first place, an attempt to shed light on and come to an understanding over these
concerns. In this manner, this example of track-II diplomacy conforms to most definitions
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of the term that are ‘conflict oriented’. This religion-based enterprise of civilizational
bridge-building could also work to subdue the remaining conflict-creating misgivings
stemming from the Israeli-Palestinian issue that prevented India from establishing
relations with Israel prior to normalization, and that have made them so cautious in their
dealings with the Jewish state ever since. In this sense, even after normalization, India
has continued to have a sensitive conflict of interest to a certain degree in its relationship
with Israel. Furthermore, it is when the dialogue is placed in the context of its potential
effect on the India-Israel relations that it then becomes a means to build on an already
existing and stable relationship, as my extended definition posits, in addition to aiding to
overcome historical reservations that India has had against Israel relating to Palestine and
Israel’s creation as a religiously-based state.
The potential significance of the Hindu-Jewish Summits for the Indian-Israeli
relationship, and the value of ‘religio-cultural’ interaction for this venture more broadly
speaking, was implicitly demonstrated by Israeli state through the recognition of
importance that it gave to the dialogue at the time. This recognition went as far as hosting
and receiving the Hindu delegation at several events. The delegation was hosted as
honored guests at official dinners, on tours to certain parts of the country and a special
welcome greeting by the Israeli Parliament in session. Among those who met with the
Hindu delegation were local governmental officials, members of the Foreign Ministry,
President Shimon Peres and even then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. ("Delegation of
senior," 2008; "Hindu leaders meet," 2008) The potential significance of the HinduJewish dialogue for Indian-Israeli relations, as can be implied from the actions of
endorsement by the Israeli government, was previously and dually acknowledged by the
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delegates at the Delhi summit of 2007 in the official report of this meeting which states
that this initiative, “… is becoming increasingly important as India and Israel continue to
take steps to strengthen their relationship, a relationship that has the potential to affect
global politics by altering the balance of power in Asia” (“1st Hindu-Jewish”, p. 3, 2007).
Track-II diplomacy, broadly speaking, cannot and will not supplant ‘formal’
diplomacy (track-I), nor is it typically sufficient as a stand-alone measure in conflict
resolution or bringing about a major progressive shift in an existing stable relationship
between states. However keeping in mind the potential value of track-II diplomacy,
combined with the complexity of religious integration that pervades both Indian and
Israeli society as a whole, the existence of such a dialogue potentially takes on much
more significance. This significance emanates from the notion that this is a relationship
between state societies where religious leaders would theoretically hold a greater measure
of influence among the large contingent of citizens who defined themselves as a member
of one of these two majority religious communities. This includes those citizens who hold
official political office or power, particularly those whose party ideology finds its base in
religion or religious identity. This type of dialogue works in reinforcing the
commonalities of the shared history between these countries and provides a significant
point of connection between the religion-based cultures that underpin each state’s society
and, theoretically, the formal relationship between these states. When situated within the
theoretical framework set out in the next section this religio-cultural base, when
combined with other currently thriving sectors such as cooperative economic
development, would provide “incentives, institutional support, and continuity to the
political and psychological processes” (Montville, 2006, p. 16).
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By placing this Hindu-Jewish dialogue within a context which highlights the
significant effects that track-II diplomacy can have on state-to-state relations, and
parlaying this idea with the erstwhile explanation of religion’s unique position and
influence in the societies of India and Israel that was offered earlier, further conviction
can be demonstrated for the overarching argument of this dissertation regarding the
normative and functional effects that religious identity has, or can have, on the IndianIsraeli relationship.

The Analytical Framework of Security, Politics, the Economy and Culture post-1992
Chapter four argued for the initial impact of the BJP’s influence on the
“environmental structure” and “identity” (Jepperson et. al., 1996) of India leading up to
and including the time of normalization. With the cultural and institutional elements
needed to challenge India’s state identity and implement a shift in their policy towards
Israel, an opening was then created for various sectors and support mechanisms to be
established in the years that followed. These would work to support, uphold, and progress
this policy and the identity that was argued to underpin it.
The security co-op was highlighted first as it is currently the most recognizable
and deeply embedded sector of the Indian-Israeli relationship and because notions of
shared threat (the primary component of securitization) were the initial link for
establishment of relations during the BJP’s rise. A short, comparative history of terrorism
over the last few decades in each country was discussed in order to highlight the realworld examples used in the legitimization of a primary theme of the narrative that
underpins the Indian-Israeli bond. Propagation of such a comparison provides impetus to
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take action, such as security cooperation and the buying of arms. In short, the narrative
urges the taking of action and then resulting action works to support and reify the
narrative.
The BJP’s perception of threat shared with Israel was set within a context of one
religiously-based society relating to another, that is a Hindu India threatened by an
“outside” Islamic identity comparable to a Jewish Israel threatened by an “outside”
Islamic invader. As a threat to identity at its most basic core, a link is established within
Buzan’s (et. al, 1998) “societal” sector of securitization. As the narrative was taken up by
the BJP, an established party within India’s state, regional and local political arena, the
threat was brought into Buzan’s (et. al, 1998) “political” sector. Here the Islamic identity
was securitized with reference to the growing influence of Islamist parties in India and
the perceived preferential treatment Muslims have historically received from Congressled governments over the years. Once the BJP became a relevant opposition and, at times,
the governing party in India, its influence was strong enough to bring this narrative and
threat perception into Buzan’s “military” sector of securitization. This sector of course is
where the biggest flurry of activity has taken place between the two nations in recent
decades. Its foundations, however, are still ultimately rooted in notions of shared societal
threat perceptions and, without the BJP’s gradually progressive influence at the highest
levels of government since the late 1980’s, the narrative encompassing these threat
perceptions might not have sufficiently politicized to create the security partnership we
see today.
The three security sectors of Buzan (et al.) outlined above, the “societal”, the
“political” and the “military”, seem to be significant factors that fit within two of the
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three structures of Mesbahi’s state-identity framework, with notions of “societal” security
falling into geo-cultural (normative-social) structure and the “political” and “military”
sectors falling under the geo-political (military-coercive) structure.

In referring back to the tri-partite framework posited by Mesbahi (2011), developments
rooted in the geo-cultural structure advanced and, through its inherent interaction with the
geo-political, essentially fostered the normalization by the central government which
opened up and allowed for further engagement between India and Israel in and between
structures, at the “unitary” level and across “composite” strata. These developments refer
to the social construction of the BJP’s identity and how this identity was and is used to
create a connection with the Israeli state and its majority Jewish society. While the initial
social construction of a connection between the societies and states fell mainly within the
realm of the perceived threat from Islam, the “civilizational resonance” construct was

219

also present at the time, albeit to a rather minimal degree. As a social construct and a
narrative built around a threat to a society based in the Hindu religion and culture, this
series of events can then be viewed as emanating from the geo-cultural structure.
The gradual and progressive development of the BJP’s position in parliament
from its electoral victory in 1991 to the present, has allowed it to gain power and
influence as both a minority and majority party in the state government over this span of
time. As an accompanying attribute of its progressively increasing and influencing
presence in government, the narrative it constructed could then be inserted within the
geo-political structure to challenge India’s longtime “environmental (normative)
structure” and “identity” that this stratum dictates regarding Israel, thereby creating a
gradual shift in “interests” and ultimately effecting “policy” towards Israel. The narrative
of course is not static as has been demonstrated by increased awareness of connections
with Israel via “civilizational resonance” and with the BJP’s greatly toned down rhetoric
regarding Islam as a threat generally speaking, instead opting for a more refined focus on
the threat of Islamic extremism. In any case, being that the geo-political structure puts
forth the “official” identity of the state and has the most direct influence on a state’s
interaction/relationship with the system and other states, shifts or changes within the geopolitical structure generally have a great impact on policy.
The presence of such a narrative at the “unitary” (i.e., state government level) that
sits at the top of the “composite” Indian societal strata, puts it in a position to create a
trickle-down effect on these sub-state levels within the other structures, both the geocultural and the geo-economic. Several years after normalization, relations began to
flourish across multiple strata within the geo-economic structure and relations within the
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geo-cultural have taken on a much more tangible character, developments that have
paralleled the progression within the geo-political structure. What is critical to highlight
here is the role and evolution of the bonding narrative of threat and “civilizational
resonance” within structures and across various strata. As some of the examples
demonstrate, the dual-layered narrative works in manners both indirect and direct. For
example, indirect, within the geo-economic structure through notions of “shared” identity
which foster a comfortable environment in which to do business or create partnerships,
and direct, as can be observed in the geo-cultural structure through high-level,
government-involved interfaith initiatives or in the religious or spiritual tourism highly
popular with Israeli tourists in India.
While determining the exact tangible impact of such developments across stratum
is a long-term research task that is beyond the scope of this writing, the significance of
the development of these types of relationships over the last several years can be
conceptualized through the tri-partite framework. The “trickle-down” effect that growing
BJP influence theoretically had in influencing the “environmental structure” and
“identity” of India allowed “composite” stratum to subsequently begin forging new
relations with the Israel state within all three structures and across similar strata. The
progressive nature of these relationships, in turn, began to gradually reflect in the
“identity” of the Indian state, thereby essentially reifying the BJP’s narrative on Israel at
the “unitary” level through a kind of “trickle-up” effect and continually strengthening the
relationship between the countries as a whole.
This model then conceptualizes the interdependent and cyclical nature of how this
narrative functions within Indian society, from the state-level down to the individual, and
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what this means for India’s relationship with Israel. Instances of increased BJP leadership
in Parliament were and are important to the relationship which has affected and continues
to affect across the structures and strata of society as a whole. This also works to
demonstrate the intersubjective nature of reification of the identity narrative from
“unitary” down to “composite” levels and back up again. While the initial shift in India’s
“identity” and ‘environmental (normative) structure’ necessitated the existence of an
influential actor (i.e., the BJP) at the highest state-level stratum (i.e., the “unitary” level),
critical support and strengthening for the foundations of the narrative underpinning this
structure and identity were and are increasingly found at the various “composite” strata.
The more these relationships exist and develop, the easier it becomes for pro-Israel actors
within the geo-political structure at the state-governmental level to advance official
relations with Israel and continue to perpetuate the identity-based narrative heralded to
give the two nations such a unique bond.
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CONCLUSIONS

The final chapter of this work aims to reiterate my initial argument on religion’s
role in Indian-Israeli relations, summarize the findings regarding my thesis and briefly
discuss future avenues to continue this study. First, however, I would like to analyze
some of the challenges that arose in the conduct of this research. I also will review some
of the other competing explanations for the nature and normalization of Indian-Israeli
relations and how these alternative factors fit, or could fit, within my analytical
framework and future research avenues. This will be followed by discussion of future
research possibilities and, lastly, a summation of my argument and research findings.

Research Challenges and Other Factors in Normalization
This work on the role of religious identity in the Indian-Israeli relationship, of
course, did not come without some challenges. These challenges can be categorized in
two primary ways: challenges to my research design and challenges from competing
arguments regarding reasons for Indian-Israeli non-relations and subsequent
normalization. Both categories will briefly be reviewed below, followed by a section
highlighting potential avenues for future research inclusive of strategies for obtaining a
more complete understanding of my topic and a plan for successfully building on my
research findings.
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Challenges to Research Method and Analysis
While in the field, as well as during the writing process, some challenges arose
with regards to the general nature of my chosen theory and methods used for gathering
information and evidence. There exists an inherent difficulty in demonstrating empirical
evidence for the effects of ideas, a criticism that social constructivist theory has had to
deal with since its inception.
While an extensive review of the arguments surrounding this debate is far beyond
the scope of this writing, I felt it important to acknowledge the limits of taking such a
theoretical approach and how these limits could be present in my case. Determining the
functional, normative or causal effect(s) of an identity can be difficult given that
identities are based in acceptance of ideas, and ideas ultimately are private information.
While the sharing of knowledge regarding the true motivation for the endorsement of
certain policies or the taking of any sort of action on an issue is ultimately at the
discretion of the individual or individuals under analysis, several research methods can be
utilized in an effort to close this discretionary gap, but these too have their short-comings.

Archives
In an effort to accurately access this private information, as was detailed in my
earlier methods section, I engaged in primary-source archival research and personal
interviews as supplementary measures to the empirical analysis of secondary literary
sources, such as books, academic journals and newspaper articles. For all of these
different types of source material I would pay particular attention to the rhetoric used by
key individuals under review, being written about or being interviewed in an attempt to
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find terms or concepts with religious meaning, value, or relation. For the archives, the
major challenges came with regard to the availability of material and the general
discretion that government officials tend to use in managing access to these documents.
Gaining entrance and access to material available in India and Israel was of little issue,
however, since what material was available was rather meager in some cases.
In India, the major challenge came with reference to the archival material released
to the public to date. India, unlike nearly every other free and democratic nation, has no
policy requiring the release of classified documents after a certain period of time. As
such, documents on its official dealings with Israel are only available up through
approximately the mid-1970s. Even these are relatively few in number and many,
although officially listed as having been released, still remain in “transit” from India’s
Foreign Ministry office and are not physically present in any accessible archive.
In Israel, while the availability and release of documents are much more
transparent and organized, a minor obstacle was presented by the language barrier. This
issue was not present in India, since India uses English as a primary mode of government
communication. Also, Israel’s archives lacked the third-party communication that Indian
archives had regarding relations between the two countries. India’s third-party
discussions with other countries were important due to the fact that they provided an
indirect line of communication with Israel and because these discussions were almost
exclusively done through the medium of the English language.
For both nation-states, officially democratic and secular countries, any seemingly
“religious” language would typically be avoided and any incidents or issues of a religious
aspect would have been very carefully articulated so as to maintain a decidedly political
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tone. Given the highly sensitive nature of religion and politics in both countries, and the
tumultuous and tactful environment that surrounded India’s relationship with Israel,
further impetus has been created for maintaining a subtle and less transparent protocol
regarding archives on India’s official dealings with the Israeli state.

Interviews
Much in the same fashion as official government archives and communications,
attempting to get politically or religiously involved individuals to speak openly about
religion in the Indian-Israeli relationship proved to be quite challenging. Government
officials tend not to depart much from the official party position on the matter and they,
along with religious leaders and academics alike, are very careful in how they iterate their
views on religion and Israel, again because of the highly sensitive nature of both topics
throughout the nation’s history. Related to this issue was the fact that many interviewee’s
were wary about speaking on the record at all, a concern that resulted in my inability to
record conversations, their unwillingness to sign the necessary forms and even meet with
me at all in some cases. While such obstacles were fairly predictable, the relatively
limited timeframe I had in contacting interviewees, establishing rapport, and organizing
interviews, all placed a limit on the amount of valuable information I was able to obtain
using the interview method.

Considering the Role of Other Factors
There are, of course, several other occurrences and circumstances that have been,
and continue to be, argued as contributing factors to both normalization and non-
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normalization. While the analysis in this writing had the primary aim of highlight the
significance of religion and religious identity in the historical Indian-Israeli relationship,
it was by no means an argument for a mono-causal trajectory of this history. The
influences on, and causes of, such historical developments are ultimately the result of the
interaction of a multitude of complex processes over a long period of time. Though the
aim of my analysis was not to investigate and establish the role of these other processes, I
would acknowledge a fair amount of the scholarly arguments concerning the significance
of these factors. As such, I will briefly address some of the other factors that have been
considered and discussed as causal factors for (non) normalization in the historical
Indian-Israeli relationship as a whole. The goal here is not to disprove the significance or
effects of these alternative factors, but rather to direct attention to some of the
shortcomings or lack of explanatory power they may possess regarding the (non)
normalization discussion which, in turn, could be supplemented or improved by taking
my argument for religious identity into consideration.

End of the Cold War: Economic Liberalization and the End of a Bi-Polar World
The end of the Cold War was a meta-event that had significant repercussions
worldwide, the effects of which we arguably can still see being played-out in the modern
day. The consequences of this historical occurrence for India itself were particularly
significant given its ideological commonalities, its reliance on the arms trade and, despite
its leadership role in the Non-aligned movement, its close relations with the former
Soviet Union. The resulting shift in global hegemony that accompanied the fall of the
Soviet Union, in part, caused India to reevaluate its socio-economic strategy and its
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position within this new state of global political affairs that saw the United States solely
positioned at the top. In addition to economic liberalization and its opening to the freemarket, this was a reevaluation for India that has been argued to include its relationship
with Israel given the timing of normalization and two newly existing conditions that were
present given the collapse of the USSR: 1.) India was, to an extent, bound to the EastWest political division of the Middle East that eventually saw Israel as a staunch US ally,
but this was no longer the case with a now defunct Soviet Union and bi-polar world; and
2.) Normalization with Israel was a strategy for building closer ties with Washington
given the break-up of the Soviet alliance system and subsequent US hegemony.
The Soviet Union did have a particularly tumultuous relationship with Israel after
the 1956 Suez crisis, an occurrence that would give way to decades of Soviet support for
the Arabs, and hit an apex after the 6 Day War when the Soviets cut off diplomatic
relations with Israel, a situation that would not be remedied until the Soviet Union fell in
1991. Despite this historical trajectory, the Soviet Union had been one of the first
countries to recognize Israel’s sovereignty and the Jewish state’s historical connection to
socialism provided a potential bridge of connection between the two countries for the
first few years of Israel’s existence. However, India’s pro-Soviet bias was gradual
(Kumaraswamy, 2010, p. 20), taking place over several years. In any case, India’s policy
towards Israel was previously argued to have become institutionalized under Nehru’s
leadership and cemented in the occurrence of the Suez Crisis, a series of events that took
place prior to the staunch anti-Israel stance that the Soviets would eventually take. India’s
position on Israel, then, seems to have been well-established prior to Soviet influence on
the matter which instead served to support existing views against relations. By the time of
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the Soviet Union’s breakup, an event that very few saw coming, the normalization
process, had seemingly been underway for a few years, a condition that implicitly
reduced any influence that the fall of the USSR might have had on this process.
India’s relationship with the US has certainly improved since 1991, the end of the
Cold War, and 1992, the year of its normalization with Israel. However, while
normalization with Israel was certainly not an impediment to US-India relations and,
understandably, could have only served to improve this relationship, I believe this notion
to be of marginal importance in India’s normalization process with Israel. It is true that
India’s relations with the US are currently quite stable and have gradually improved since
the early 1990s and I agree with Kumaraswamy (2010, p. 258-260) who outlined the
main sources of India-US rapprochement which he rooted primarily in India’s economic
liberalization, its economic growth and the elimination of its anti-American ideology and
mindset. Furthermore, despite the growing and relatively healthy relationship between the
two, several noticeable conditions remain that India would presumably seek to reevaluate
or downplay if indeed US relations constituted a primary concern rather than simply one
of many important foreign policy initiatives. These include India’s continued warm
relations with Russia, the nature of its relationship with Israel which seems to be
increasingly conducted independent of US concerns, and its innate uneasiness with the
continuing American partnership with Pakistan.

Non-Religious Identity
Two other notable and, to a degree, interconnected identities are observed to play
role in India’s overall political development prior to the end of the Cold War: Socialist
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and anti-imperialist (i.e., their NAM identity). There had been contacts and friendly ties
(generally speaking) between Indian socialist party members and Israel as a whole given
the connection its founding and earliest leaders had to socialism. J.P. Narayan, former
Indian PM and one of India’s most prominent socialist party leaders, recognized the
connection between the two nations via the socialist avenue in the early days of each
state. He was one of the few prominent Indian leaders to visit Israel in the first decade of
the Israeli state’s existence noting that, “I can promise you that Israel has many friends
among wide circles of Indian people, in the Socialist movement” (Archives-NAI,
“Military, naval and air attaché”, 1958) 52. Despite India’s socialist credentials, its long
history of association with socialist states, and the strong presence of a variety of socialist
leanings among many of its leaders, better relations between India and Israel on this
ideological front never really had a significant impact on the relationship as a whole.
Many of the socialist nations India was associated were unabashedly anti-Israeli and,
furthermore, many of India’s socialist-minded leaders were members of the dominant,
more Centrist Congress Party or were significantly greater to the Left as active members
of one of India’s communist parties. In any case, whether more towards the Centre or
more towards the Left, neither was in favor of relations with Israel.
The Non-aligned Movement demonstrates another avenue for the analysis of
India’s non-relations with Israel within the context of the role of India’s identity with
anti-imperialism. However, several different factors seem to detract from any primary
causal power that may be given to India’s adoption of such an identity. The first is that,
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This archival note was a photocopy of a newspaper article with the following bibliographical
information: ‘Narayan foresees closer ties between India and Israel’. (1958, September, 21) The Jerusalem
Post.
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despite the critical role of anti-imperialist ideas in India’s founding and the fact that many
of its earliest leaders held such ideas close to their heart, India’s Israel policy was well
established by the time the NAM came into official existence. Also, Israel’s close
affiliation and cooperation with Western imperial powers did not really materialize until
the years following the Suze Crisis and could not by itself have been considered an
imperial or colonial power in any traditional sense of the word, but rather only an
“associate” of such imperial states. Second, was the close relationship India historically
had with one of the two major “aligned” powers, the USSR. Its close relationship with
the Soviets would seem to imply that being a major imperial power, or being closely
associated with a (major) imperial power, did not seem to be a deal-breaker when it came
to relations with India. Israel did not have a very close association with any imperial
power until after 1956 and the Suez crisis. Further, Israel was arguably only a regional
power at best during the first couple of decades of their existence, a notion does not
comfortably fit the criteria for the type of “imperialist” India sought to denounce or to
avoid alliance with. Furthermore, in a historical circumstance markedly contrast to one
another, Egypt, one of NAM’s founders and close ally of India, was able to normalize
relations with Israel in 1978 while India’s own relations with Israel would reach a
historical low during that same exact time period.
In either case, whether looking at identity based in socialism or as part of NAM,
both provide potential arguments linking concerns or issues of identity with India’s
history of (non-) normalization with Israel. While any role in the normalization process
given to socialist identity would reasonably be considered negligible, identification with
anti-imperialism and NAM could be viewed as providing another useful leg of support in
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the legitimization of India’s Israel policy. As such, they both provide further impetus for
studying the normative and functional role of identity, broadly speaking, in the historical
Indian-Israeli relationship in addition to that of arguments constructed around the role of
religiously-related identity.

Israel’s Status in the 1990’s: The Madrid Peace Conference and New Diplomatic
Partners
With the Soviet Union’s sharp decline and the Cold War imminently coming to an
end, several events with international significance took place or began during the early
1990s that would impact Israel’s international standing and, ultimately, India’s view of
them. The Madrid Peace conference, which took place in late 1991 and sought to launch
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, was significant for its symbolic value and the
subsequent advancement Israel made in improving their relations with several nations
thereafter. This conference demonstrated the willingness of some of the most important
Israeli and Palestinian leaders involved in the peace process to engage one another on the
grand stage and it had the moral support of many countries throughout the Arab-Islamic
world, including Saudi Arabia. Israel saw ties improve with Arab countries like Oman,
Qatar and Jordan, and saw (re-) normalization with major powers such as Russia and
China, with India following suit shortly after. (Blarel, 2014, p. 238-239)
Despite these notable events, the successes of Madrid were offset by a few
circumstances that I argue would overshadow any tangible or symbolic importance the
conference might have had in India’s view. Ties improved with many of the
aforementioned Arab-Muslim nations, but only to a marginal degree in most cases. All
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but one of these countries still does not have diplomatic ties with Israel up until the
contemporary day and the one that does, Jordan, did not do so until 1993 when the Oslo
Accords were signed. Moreover that the First Intifada was ongoing during this time
period and would essentially remain active up until around the time the Oslo Accords
took place. This means that while Israel made symbolic and even some tangible in-roads
with several countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim, the two main parties involved in
the fighting by this time, Israel and Palestine, were still very much engaged in conflict.
The Madrid Conference and its fallout undoubtedly worked to further ease the
normalization process with Israel for India, but much of the groundwork for
normalization was demonstrated to have been laid in the 1980s up and through the
months prior to the conference to the conference. Prime Minister Rao had,
unsuccessfully, tried to push towards normalization beginning half a decade before
Madrid and, once the domestic atmosphere was made ripe for this normalization with the
BJP’s substantially increased influence, this process was able to take place.

Future Research
Given the previously explained challenges in measuring the normative and
causative effects of identity in state-to-state relations, as well as the malleability and influx nature that identity inherently possesses, future directions of research would seek to
engage such challenges. This would be done in an attempt to generate evidence for a
more empirically grounded take on religion-based identity as it pertains to Indian views
on Israel. An expansion of the interview process of those individuals whose opinions or
views are judged to most likely to impact foreign policy decisions in India (i.e.,
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parliamentary members, religiously-affiliated social organizations like the RSS, popular
religious leaders who actively engage the political sphere, etc.) would aim to provide a
larger sample of the framework within which Israel is viewed by those whose views
could reasonably be considered to matter most. In order to integrate more sub-state views
on Israel into the equation, I would also seek to supplement these interviews through
surveys or questionnaires of the general population. A solid sample size of voters across
the religious demographic and the social stratum will aid in providing an overall view of
Israel reflective of India’s one billion-plus individuals at the sub-state (i.e. “unitary”)
levels.
In considering the importance conflict with bordering entities has had in shaping
India’s foreign policy since its inception, an analysis of parallel historical developments
and the possible role of religious identity from the perspective of Pakistan would provide
a more complete picture of the historical processes involved. Focus would be on the socalled “opposite side of the same coin” that is Indian history by researching the same
dynamic, but as it pertains to the historical Pakistani-Palestinian relationship and
Pakistan’s historical views on Israel. Potential research questions would highlight
processes of “Othering” of Hindu Indians in Pakistan’s historical construction of threat
perceptions and how this has factored into its relationship with Palestine and Palestine’s
own historical “Othering” of the Jewish Israeli identity in its construction of threat. What
role has potential “Othering” played in Pakistan’s historical and contemporary
relationship with Israel, with Palestine and/or with the Arab-Muslim world? How (if at
all) is the Israeli Jew’s identity constructed with reference to Hindu Indians in Pakistan
and how could or does this reflect in the way they deal with India, Israel and the friendly
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relations they now have? Furthermore, how could the existence of such a socially
constructed threat of a “Jewish” Israel have been used to create support from the Muslim
world for Pakistan vis-à-vis their decades-long conflict with a “Hindu” India?
Such questions create fairly broad and deep research platform to work from in the
future, but raise some intriguing and potentially significant questions given the climate of
religious violence in South Asia and the role that religion considerations have in both
India and Pakistan. Former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf’s desire to engage Israel
several years ago, Pakistan’s current alliance with the United States, its desire to maintain
a well-armed military and the need to solve the widespread terror threat Pakistan deals
with daily, are all factors that make study on the role of religion in Pakistani-Israel
relations a seemingly important topic of study.

Summing Up Normalization and Identity in Indo-Israel Relations

Bridges of Indian-Israeli Connection and Cooperation: “Shared” Identity Reviewed
Formal diplomatic relations between Indian and Israel were established in 1992
despite the fact that interaction between the two dates back to the independence of each
country over 60 years ago. The original policy of non-relations was established and
maintained during a time period when the Congress Party, a party which prioritized its
relations with the Islamic world and India’s large Muslim minority above much else, had
an essential monopoly on the rule of India. Contrast to this, normalization of relations
came during the time of the BJP’s initial rise to power and influence in India’s lower
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parliament and India’s majority Hindu society. The resulting political environment was
demonstrated to have significant meaning for India’s foreign policy towards Israel.
While the policy of non-normalization was initiated early and fortified over
several decades, normalization, by contrast, emerged and was built upon merely over
several years. The Muslim-identity factor had been present for India since its very
beginning as a state and even prior, whereas the “shared” identity of a Hindu India and a
Jewish Israel was socially constructed only after decades of conflict and connective
cultural reimagining. Given these facts, the identity-based linkages underpinning reasons
for normalization were presented as key concepts for the understanding or religion’s role
in this process. The BJP’s ascent to power was demonstrated to parallel the process of
India’s normalization of relations with Israel and in addition to being a primary political
factor in the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, the BJP’s Hindu nationalist
discourse was also demonstrated to create or maintain other important in-roads of
connection and cooperation with the Israeli state that would provide a foundation for their
pro-Israeli stance.
This Hindu nationalism perpetuated by the Hindutva discourse that the BJP
adheres to, is easily relatable to the Zionist ideology responsible for reestablishment of
Israel. Both ideologies stress the need for a state based around the culture and religion of
the native people within the borders of a sacred piece of land. The growth of nationalism
in the case of each country has at least its initial roots in religious sentiment and culture;
Judaism for Israel and Hinduism for India. The clashes between Hindu nationalists and
Muslims continue to be primarily characterized by difference in religion. In Israel,
religious differences have become a crucial point of nationalist dissention in their conflict
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with Palestine and the Muslim world in the contemporary day, due in part to the rise of
Muslim extremism globally and the resulting narrative of such a rise that has been
perpetuated internationally by the West and its allies. The Hindu nationalist movements
and Jewish nationalism find a common threat and enemy in extremist and political Islam,
which is persistent to the present-day in each country and across the borders that surround
each.
Since normalization occurred in 1992, no other realm of cooperation has
flourished more than the India-Israel security dynamic, highlighted by an extensive arms
trade. With its primary focus of concern on Islamist extremist terror, and the origins
much of it is believed to have in the neighboring Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the
development of this security and arms trade dynamic plays directly into Islamic “threat”
narrative originally perpetuated by the BJP beginning in the 1980s. This cooperative
effort between the two countries has not only grown with each passing year since the
establishment of relations, but continues pointing, both implicitly and explicitly, towards
Muslim factions as a primary source of India’s domestic security issues. The security
relationship continues to evolve, reinforcing the identity narrative underpinning IndoIsraeli relations, and creating empathetic ground from which other non-military
relationships in cultural and economic sectors can be established and build a close bond.
India and Israel are both ancient nations with a majority culture based on nonuniversal religions of orthopraxy. The age of these nations’ existence, and the traditional
integration of each’s orthopraxic religion into the lives and society of its indigenous
majority, has made Hinduism in India and Judaism in Israel unique as modern nationsstates in this regard. Furthermore, no other Jewish-majority or Hindu-majority (minus
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Nepal which is a historical contingent of the territory of ancient Bharat) nation-states
exist in this world and no other major religious traditions are believed to as ancient as
these.
On-going territorial disputes can also be viewed as providing a point of
connection for India and Israel via the Hindutva movement and also provides a major
talking point regarding security issues and the “shared” historical narrative. Within the
Hindutva narrative, historically the Kashmiri conflict has become an overarching symbol
of a Hindu-majority India’s “struggle” with Islam in India while reasserting and
strengthening the Hindutva identity which has been formed over the last several decades.
This resonates with Zionism in Israel, underscored by an identity embodied in territorial
struggle with Muslim-Arab political factions over the last several decades as well. These
territorial issues in Israel have come to take on a decidedly sacred and religious
symbolism in some cases, especially with regards to the holy city of Jerusalem (and the
Temple Mount) which has increasingly come to be viewed through the lens of Dar-alIslam 53, and therefore territory that should be under the control of the Muslim world.
The growing threat of Islamic extremism, and the cross-border terrorism that is so
often the characteristic of this venture, has been experience by Israel and India more than
any other country statistically speaking. This commonality that these two countries share
finds its roots in extremist political Islam and “justifies” the anti-Islamic rhetoric of the
Hindutva movement, particularly as embodied in BJP agenda in the late 1980s to early
1990s. Israel and India share a history of being victims of cross-border terrorism in the
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past and in the present. This has resulted in cooperative efforts in areas of security and
military action based in large part on this shared history which was strongly reinforced,
both tangibly and symbolically during the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.
Several areas of the relationship today outside of the political-military sector are
flourishing including trade, technology R&D, tourism and cultural exchange to name a
few. The “civilizational resonance” discussed earlier seemingly creates a unique
environment that is conducive to interaction between the two societies at a variety of
different levels and strata. Evidence of such resonance, and the resulting existence of
such an environment, can be found indirectly in the rhetoric and language used by agents
involved in some exchanges and partnerships, and directly in the candid goals and actions
of others, such as the Hindu-Jewish interfaith dialogues.
All of these factors combined to create a history and on-going motivation that
works to build bridges of commonality among these civilizations. The narrative
surrounding a positive view of the relationship has been socially constructed to include
an awareness and understanding of such common or “shared” historical notions. These
notions are continually perpetuated and, at times, reconstructed in order to facilitate a
progression of India’s state-to-state relationship with Israel now and moving forward.

The Final Word: “Shared” Identity as Key
The aim of this dissertation was to demonstrate the significant normative and
functional effects (broadly construed) that identities based in religion have had in the
historical Indian-Israeli relationship. I sought to accomplish this through the combination
of analysis in four identifiable areas by: 1.) explaining how religions of orthopraxis

239

function in society and the unique significance this would theoretically have in Hindumajority India and Jewish-majority Israel; 2.) highlighting events or instances along the
historical time where issues or concerns dealing with religion-based national and cultural
identity came to play a primary role, directly or indirectly, in India’s policy towards
Israel; 3.) reviewing the multitude of cooperation areas that have come to exist between
the two countries since normalization and how this cooperation is intertwined with
identity; and 4.) placing this understanding of Hinduism and Judaism, these historical
events and instances, and the major areas of cooperation, within a proper analytical
framework, enabling to understand processes by which identity may function to affect a
given state-society’s relationship or policy towards another state-society.
Identity was demonstrated to function as both an obstacle to friendly and official
relations and as a means to facilitate them, and it did so directly in some cases, but
indirectly in many others. This pattern can be seen to a degree in other Indo-Israeli
research as well. Much of the other research on the topic of Indian-Israeli relations is
keen to discuss, at fair length in some cases, the nature of religion in this state-to-state
relationship historically. Issues contributing to the non-normalization of relations
between India and Israel were discussed within the context of India’s large, minority
Muslim population and the majority Muslim population of the many states engaged in
conflict with Israel that India consistently sought optimal relations with. In similar
fashion, other research also reflects cognizance of religion’s presence during the
normalization process as it relates to politicized versions of Hindu nationalism.
However, despite the fact that most research on India-Israel relations brings
religion into the discussion to one degree or another, completely absent from this writing
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has been any attempt to make primary the role of religion through social constructivist,
identity-based theories or analytical frameworks. Discussion of majority orthopraxic
religious societies and what this implies for the state is an original contribution in the
study of Indian-Israeli relations. It is unlike previous research that present issues relating
to religious identity as merely an existing fact in the historical development of the IndiaIsraeli relationship or as one of several overarching conditions present at certain times
during the evolution of India’s foreign policy towards Israel. By contrast, this work
focuses on religious identity as a primary ideational driving force of policy by grounding
it in an understanding of orthopraxic religiosity, “shared” historical experiences and the
resulting impact this theoretically has for state-society relations and the day-to-day
environment within which this relationship functions.
The overall analytical framework is built around developments within the cultural
sector (emanating from religion) in a way that demonstrates the theoretical significance
of a relationship where a deep religion-based cultural rapport in the form of “shared”
identity is functioning between the majority demographic of the two states at numerous
societal strata. An approach to understanding the relationship between these two
countries within such an analytical frame that highlights the centrality of a religion-based
cultural sector/structure is absent from research on the subject. In this regard, the final
summation of the analysis demonstrates concerns over the religious identity by and of
certain actors, domestic and international, to be a consistently present condition inhibiting
India from establishing relations with Israel until 1992. The analysis further posits the
social construct of a “shared” identity as a highly significant concept facilitating IndoIsraeli relations at its foundation since normalization up and through the present-day.
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The inherent nature of identity and identity construction as the fundamental
means by which we establish our place in society and separate ourselves from that which
we are not (i.e. the “Other”), makes it a condition that is omnipresent and, to a certain
degree, one that is in constant flux. A primary identity based in the context of religion,
however, tends to have deep foundations that are less susceptible to abrupt or immediate
change due to the absolutist and infinite characteristic of the beliefs or message religion
tends to perpetuate. The narrative surrounding the Hindu, Jewish and Islamic civilizations
that is designed to bring India and Israel closer together implies the existence of such
characteristics in each religion. It does so through an understanding designed to confirm
the immutable historic and continuing truth found within each of these religious
traditions. If the perception of such a truth continues to be increasingly accepted, and the
accompanying understanding further perpetuated, the future of Indian-Israeli relations,
for better or for worse, may find itself in a partnership with boundless potential and the
possibility of near permanency.
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